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H. Troord

R. H. Ellcritt

AN INQUIRY

INTO THE

STATE OF THE NATION,

AT THE

COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

PRESENT ADMINISTRATION.

" In hujus modi re tantoque bello, maximæ curæ est, ut quæ copiis et opibus tenere vix possumus, ea mansuetudine et continentiâ nostrâ, sociorum fidelitate teneamus.'

CIC. EPIST.

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AN

INQUIRY,

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INTRODUCTION.

SINCE the constitution of this country acquired its present form, and public business came to be transacted regularly in the great council of the nation, it has been customary in all important junctures, for our representatives to undertake a general investigation of the state of our affairs. The method of conducting this examination has varied at different periods. Sometimes a motion for inquiry has been

agreed to by the ministry, and their adversaries have been permitted to bring forward their propositions upon the situation of the commonwealth. Sometimes the motion for inquiry has been opposed, while a view of the public misfortunes was given as the ground of claiming a solemn investigation. But in every case the inquiry has substantially been entered into, and has consisted always in the free and comprehensive discussion to which such motions gave rise.

Those who have attended to the tactics of parliamentary debate, and remarked how greatly the separation of different articles of charge assists the party accused in shifting off the attack from any one point, will easily admit the superior advantages of such a comprehensive view of the actual posture of affairs, as we commonly denominate "*a state of the nation.*" It happens, however, that several years have now elapsed, pregnant beyond all former experience in disstrous changes, without any discussion of

this wholesome and constitutional nature. In consequence, too, of certain recent occurrences, it has been found impossible to investigate at all, even in their distinct character, those measures which occupied the government during the last vacation. And thus a new ministry is formed, and a new system about to commence, before the account has been settled with the old; before the causes of our present calamities have been ascertained; before the nation has been able to determine, either the extent or the origin of its dangers. Greatly as this change of men and of measures is to be rejoiced at, we may venture to question, whether it would not have secured more solid benefit to the country, had it been delayed until the wisdom of parliament had been applied, to such a full discussion of the late calamitous interference with continental affairs; and such a comprehensive review of our present situation in every particular, as can alone furnish the ground-work of that radical change of system, in which our

only remaining chance of salvation must be sought.

It is to be feared, however, that the change of ministry has deprived us altogether of the benefits which would have resulted from a parliamentary investigation of these grave and difficult subjects: and it becomes the more necessary to attempt such a compilation of particulars, as may assist the public in examining the question out of doors.—With this view the following statement is drawn up. It is a very humble attempt at providing a substitute for the information respecting the state of their affairs, which the people would have received from the deliberations of their representatives, had the formation of the new ministry been so long delayed as to have given time for an inquiry into the state of the nation.

This disquisition may conveniently be arranged under three heads—as it relates to the state of our *foreign relations*, our *domestic œconomy* and our *colonial affairs*. It is of the last importance that

the country should be able to estimate the nature and extent of its resources in each of these departments; and to appreciate the system of management in all of them, which has given rise to the unparalleled dangers that at present surround us on every side. After examining under each head the causes of our calamities, and fairly stating their real extent, we shall shortly inquire if there are any changes of system by which the fate of the empire may yet be stayed.

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

In discussing this primary and important branch of the subject, it is necessary to dwell at greater length on points which have never been brought before the Houses of Parliament. Of these the most material, is the late continental policy of the British government. We shall accordingly begin with an examination of the various particulars presented by the history of the "Third grand Coalition." We shall then take a view of the situation in which it has left our external relations. Our attention will be directed in the next place toward the remaining objects of foreign policy in the present crisis; more particularly the state of the neutral questions; and we shall conclude with suggesting the change of system which the previous deductions appear to prescribe.

I. THE LATE CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE.

1. The first circumstance which strikes us in contemplating the system of nego-

tiation lately pursued by the British cabinet is, that the documents laid before parliament furnish no evidence of any attempts having been made to procure the mediation of our allies for an amicable adjustment of our differences with France. As far back as May 1803, a direct assureance was given by ministers, that they would solicit the mediation of Russia, and in recommending this salutary measure, all parties cordially united. A communication of a pacific nature was received from the French government at the beginning of 1805. His Majesty declined entering into any negotiations until he should consult his allies, and especially the Emperor of Russia; but he expressed himself, at the same time, desirous of seeing such a peace established as might be consistent with security and honour.

It is well known that the dispositions of Russia towards this country were never more favourable, nor her sense of duty towards the rest of Europe more strong, than at the time when the king returned this answer:—Our cabinet then, with the

concurrence of all parties, stood pledged to procure, if possible, the mediation of Russia: The dispositions of France were officially announced, at least, to be pacific. Russia was engaged in confidential intercourse with us: His Majesty was advised only to delay entering upon an amicable discussion with France, in consequence of that intercourse with Russia.—Might it not have been expected that our cabinet would seize this happy juncture, to press for the mediation of a court at once so powerful and so favourably disposed, and thus to redeem its pledge, at least, if not secure an honourable termination of the dispute? Yet it is not a little remarkable, that in the whole mass of papers laid before parliament with a view of detailing the history of the late negotiation, no traces whatever are to be found of any steps towards obtaining the mediatory interference of Russia.

On the contrary, our communications with that power have been from the beginning of a war-like nature.—The *treaty of Concert*, 11th April, 1805, the first result of our negotiations,

is framed for the purpose of marching half a million of men against France, in the pay of England, (Art. 111*.) That a mediator of differences should be in a respectable state of strength, in order to interpose with effect, is not denied; but no power can assume the functions of an umpire after forming such a concert with one of the contending parties. It deserves further to be remarked, that the pacific inclinations expressed in his Majesty's answer to the French message, appear never to have produced any effect on our negotiations. The Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburgh were engaged in the correspondence which gave rise to the war, as far back as November, 1804. The British government was a party to this intercourse at the same time. The French message was communicated during these negotiations, and no circumstance appears either in the official documents, or in the conduct of the parties, tending to shew that this pacific proposal produced any effect

eaties, p. 9. † Supplementary Papers, p. 4.

upon the progress of an intercourse avowedly hostile to France.

But it may be said that the seizure of Genoa rendered it impossible for Russia to mediate, or hold any amicable correspondence with France. To this various answers are obvious. The Russian mediation was first thought of long after the invasion of Switzerland—a violation of the treaty of Luneville infinitely more important to the interest of all parties, than the annexation of Genoa. The incorporation of Piedmont, without any indemnity to the king of Sardinia, was made in express violation of the same treaty, and in contempt of specific engagements with Russia herself: yet this neither prevented Russia from offering her mediation, nor our government from pledging themselves to accept it. But, in truth, it is absurd to lay any stress upon the seizure of Genoa, when the first article of the treaty of Concert, concluded two months before that event, bound Russia and England to league against France in measures of hostility, "without waiting for further encroach-

ments on the part of the French government*."

Long before the seizure of Genoa, then, we had given up every chance of Russian mediation, by our hostile league with the court of St. Petersburgh; and that event was viewed with exultation by the friends of the new war, as an additional means of rousing Austria and Russia to join us—not with regret as an obstacle to the work of pacification, which we had pledged ourselves to undertake. Even after our allies had placed themselves in a commanding posture of military preparation, and were fully disposed to embrace whatever plan might be most effectual for restraining the encroachments of France, no attempt was made to avail ourselves of so favourable a juncture, for effecting that object in the manner pointed out in 1803, by the united voice of parliament. Our government seems only to have been anxious that there should be a battle, and impatient but to see the fighting begin. This leads us to

* Treaties, p. 8.

the next remark suggested by the history of the late coalition.

2. The league appears to have had no precise or definite object in view. To attack France, and try the issue, is the only fixed point of concert. How far the allies were prepared, in the event of their success, to propose such an arrangement as might secure the future independence of Europe, may be determined by a consideration of the purposes for which they avow that the league was formed. These are stated in Art. 11. of the treaty of Concert*. We shall begin with the independence of Holland.

By the treaty of Luneville, the independence of Holland was guaranteed, and at the peace of Amiens France pledged herself to withdraw all her troops from the Dutch territories. It is of little moment to inquire by what circumstances the fulfilment of these stipulations was retarded. The war between France and England finally prevented them from taking effect; but France has repeatedly

* Treaties, p. 9.

declared her readiness to evacuate Holland as soon as the other points in dispute should be settled. Suppose the new confederates were successful in the war, and demanded a renewal of the stipulations respecting Holland. France withdraws her troops from that country during the peace which ensues—during the period when it is not her interest to keep troops there. But as soon as a new war breaks out—as soon as the occupation of Holland is of the smallest importance to France, or detriment to us, has she not the means of again overrunning the Dutch territories in a week? The whole of Flanders, from Ostend to Antwerp, from Antwerp to Wesel, is her's. No barrier remains between the enormous mass of the French dominions, and the little, insulated, defenceless province of Holland. The strongest part of her frontier, the triple line of fortresses which surround France on the north, is opposed to the weakest side of the Dutch territories. Long before the guaranties of Batavian independence could possibly send a man to the Rhine, the

French would take Amsterdam, and keep the country as easily as they can defend the rest of their provinces. The Hollanders of this age are no longer the men who inundated their fields to defend their liberty. France has a party in the councils, and in the nation of the republic, and nothing could be more chimerical than to hope that she would meet with any resistance from the unaided patriotism and resources of this state.

When, therefore, the new alliance professes to have in view the establishment of the Dutch independence, one of two things must be meant: either that nominal independence which consists in the removal of French troops, and which was guaranteed in the treaty of Luneville—or that real independence which consists in security from French influence during peace, and invasion during war; which was obtained for the Dutch by their own spirit, and the assistance of their allies at the beginning of the eighteenth century; which they only lost by the conquest of Belgium. To make war for the first of these

objects was evidently most unwise: it was attained by the treaties of Luneville and Amiens, and, when attained, was perfectly useless. To make war for the second object was quite absurd, unless those other measures were in contemplation, which alone could secure it; and the treaty of Concert gives us no hint whatever of any such measures. We are, therefore, left to conclude that the allied powers wished to see Holland once more independent, but did not know how to gratify this desire; that they had a general design of freeing the Dutch from French influence, but could discover no means of doing so; that, therefore, they resolved to attack France, but, if successful, they were not prepared with any specific demands in favour of Holland. In so far then as the interests of Holland were concerned, the purpose of the allies was perfectly vague and indefinite; it was merely the purpose of beginning to fight, trying their fortune, and afterwards finding out what they wanted.

Nearly the same observations apply to

the independence of Switzerland, which is stated as another object of the coalition. At the peace of Luneville, France was left in possession of the bishopric of Bale, the Frickthal, Savoy, and the territory of Geneva. The two first of these possessions give her a complete command of the passes of Havenstein, and consequently of the entrance into the plain of Switzerland from the north; while the acquisition of Savoy and Geneva throws open a passage on the south. With such advantages, it might be difficult for the Swiss themselves to prevent the return of the French troops at any time. But all plans for the independence of that country must evidently be futile, which do not originate in a firm union with the inhabitants, and no such union could well be hoped for under the constitution established by the interference of France. The league for making Switzerland independent, however, specifies no plan by which such an object is to be accomplished. The allies seem to have thought, that after France should be conquered, they would have time to dis-

cover how Switzerland might be made free, and to settle whether Savoy was to be separated from France, or the Frickthal given back to Austria, or Geneva restored to independence.

The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia, in Piedmont, is another object of the coalition. This must strike every one as a strange proposition to come from the court of St. Petersburgh; the court, which after pledging itself to obtain an indemnity for his Sardinian Majesty, carried through the whole business of the German indemnities in active concert with France, and suffered the scene to be closed without any mention of that Prince's name; the court which began in league with France, to parcel out Germany among its dependants, immediately after Piedmont had been seized by France, in violation of her pledge to Russia. No less singular is it to observe, that the prime mover of this claim in the King of Sardinia's favour is England, which gave him up without a struggle at the peace of Amiens;

and then witnessed unmoved, the partition of Germany. But the singularity of the interest displayed for Piedmont is complete, when we find that the third party in the league is Austria, who now comes forward in concert with the cabinets of St. Petersburgh and London, to avenge the King of Sardinia's cause against France, when a few months before she had been dragooned into the spoliation of Germany, by that very France, with the assistance of one of those cabinets and the connivance of the other. It is easy to perceive how little credit all those parties are likely to get with the rest of the world, either for their honesty or their wisdom—for their disinterested zeal in behalf of Piedmont, or their systematic views of the general policy of Europe.

Moreover, it would be difficult to imagine any less determinate or specific scheme than that of a war, for the re-establishment of the Sardinian family on the continent, "with as large an augmen-" tation of territory as circumstances will

permit *." While Savoy belongs to France, while the Italian republic is subject to her sovereign, and the Ligurian territory is at least controuled by her influence; the mere restoration of dominion provides no security against the sudden resumption of that province as soon as France may find it convenient. This object, therefore, is as vague and indefinite as the general plan of rendering Holland independent, while Belgium and the left Bank of the Rhine belong to France.

The bare statement of the next proposed object is sufficient to shew that it belongs to the same class—"the future security of the kingdom of Naples." There is apparently something less vague in "the evacuation of Italy by the French forces." But if by Italy is meant Naples and the states of the church, the treaty of Amiens bound France to withdraw her troops from thence; she had entered into the same engagement with his Sicilian Majesty, and had stipulated with Russia, in general, to respect

* Treat. p. 9. Art. II. Letter C

the independence of Naples. These obligations were fulfilled by France immediately after the peace of Amiens, and until the commencement of the present war she had no troops in the Sicilian territory. When, however, she found it convenient to occupy it again, no obstacle was thrown in her way: So slender is the "security" which Naples can derive, from France complying with such demands as the allies had proposed to make after a successful war! But, if by the evacuation of Italy, the allies meant the recal of French troops from the Italian republic, we may observe, that this was a most futile object of war. The whole Cisalpine territory is substantially a province of France; whether she rules it by French or by Italian troops. Subject to her sovereign; governed by the constitution which she has imposed; administered either by her emissaries or her creatures—that province, even if entirely freed from French armies, would continue under the influence of France, acknowledge her alliance, and receive her troops as soon as hostilities were renewed. So

nugatory is it to propose, as the object of an offensive league, the single, unsupported, ineffectual measure of recalling the French army from the Cisalpine.

The last object of the allies, is only in appearance, more vague than those already considered. "The establishment of an "order of things in Europe which may "effectually guarantee its security and "independence." Here, as in the former cases, we are left to guess at the particulars, and have no means of discovering how the general end in view is to be attained by the concerted plan of hostilities. This is the character of all the branches of the scheme, except only one, "the evacuation of Hanover,"—an object in itself so trifling, as not to merit consideration, among projects for the liberation of the world; and placed, it should seem, at the head of these plans, rather in compliment to one of the contracting parties, than from its value in the eyes of the rest.

A league, then, of unparalleled expense and vast risk is concerted, without any precise object but that of beginning a war;

without any view more specific than a vague desire of curbing the power of France; without a plan more comprehensive than that of freeing from momentary oppression, a few detached parts of the French dependencies; with no preconcerted scheme for securing their independence, or for carrying into effect the general wish that has been formed to check French usurpation.—But, it may be asked, is the situation of Europe so hopeless that no means can be devised for accomplishing the grand objects which we have been rapidly surveying? Must Holland be united in fate with Belgium, and the Cisalpine decide the destinies of the south?—The consideration of these matters belongs to a future stage of this inquiry. At present, it is enough to have shewn that those objects bear no relation to the mere act of commencing a hostile coalition; that the fortune of war might drive the French troops out of Holland and Naples, without rendering those states less dependent on France; that the emancipation of Europe could only be obtained from a war of this

description, in the most improbable event of its leading to the entire conquest of France; and that the choice of instant hostilities, without giving any reasonable prospect of success, in prosecuting the general scheme, precluded all chance of paving the way to better times, by a gradual and peaceable arrangement. The only specific object of the coalition, then, was to make war upon France, and try the event. Let us next inquire, whether this object was prosecuted with such a degree of wisdom, as bestowed any title to expect that the event would be prosperous.

3. In order to attack France with a fair prospect of success, it was indispensably necessary, that the different states of the continent should feel how much their real interests required a diminution of the French power; that their subjects should feel how much the cause was their own; that all Europe should feel how entirely England interfered for the general good, and not for the purpose of buying an attack upon France. By our inteference, indeed, it was possible that the moment of their recal to a true sense of policy and

duty, might be somewhat accelerated. But no salutary or lasting conversion could reasonably be expected from such a sudden change as our intreaties or subsidies might work, before the natural course of events had prepared them for adopting a new line of conduct. During the whole of 1802, Russia was not only blind to the encroachments of France, she was actively assisting them; she was leagued with that power in the new partition of Germany, which has been called the "Settlement of Indem-" nities"—in other words: France having despoiled several powerful princes of their dominions, was now pacifying them with the territories of several weaker states; and Russia, by a cordial support, enabled her to accomplish what the Germanic body in general viewed as an unparalleled violation of justice. In the same operation, Prussia, who had lost nothing, was an active coadjutor; and these three great powers were thus, so late as the middle of 1803, leagued together, for the purpose of aggrandizing themselves or their dependants at the expense, partly of Austria and her allies—partly of other powers, who had

been spectators of a contest, in which their weakness prevented them from engaging. This most unpromising state of things continued during almost the whole of 1803, and until a coolness began to arise between Russia and France; not on any solid grounds; not because France had made new encroachments—but rather from certain trifling and personal motives. Our clear policy was to have improved this change; confirmed the alienation of Russia; and attempted slowly to heal the wounds which her late conduct had an evident tendency to inflict on Austria. But to push hastily at any active measures—to hurry on an intimate union of two powers, lately in a state almost hostile; or even to engage Russia suddenly to exchange her alliance with France, for an open rupture, was in every view the height of rashness and impolicy. Far from pressing Russia towards so premature a conduct, it was our interest to have restrained her until both her own time and the time of Austria was come; and, instead of rejoicing, that the seizure of Genoa gave both those powers a new desire to resist

the French encroachments, it was our business to curb their sudden resentment, until it could be displayed with effect; and to retard the moment of their attack upon France, until their mutual relations were cemented and their resources were ripe for so dreadful a contest.

Let us consider whether this has been our policy. The documents laid before parliament, defective as they are in various particulars, furnish a most imperfect history of the late alliance; but they contain evidence quite sufficient to convict us of having adopted and persisted in a line of conduct, the very reverse of that which has just now been sketched.

In November 1804 * the negotiations between Austria and Russia were going on with a view to an offensive alliance. England must therefore have begun her operations at St. Petersburgh long before that period, probably before the end of 1803, or immediately after the union between France and Russia was relaxed. At any rate, it is certain that an alliance be-

* Sir Arthur Paget's Dispatch, Sup. Pap. p. 4.

tween this country and Russia existed as early as July 1804, and was the subject of common conversation during the course of that month. The British cabinet, therefore, took advantage of the very first coolness that appeared between France and Russia, (chiefly on account of the Duc d'Enghien's death) to offer subsidies and precipitate Russia towards a war. A subsidiary treaty was concluded with Sweden also, at the beginning of December 1804.

But, without the assistance of either Prussia or Austria, it was obviously in vain to think of a continental war. Perhaps it was foolish to think of succeeding in such a scheme, without the co-operation of both those great powers. Was it wise, then, to begin by engaging Russia and Sweden as principals, and trusting to chance for obtaining as accessories, those who ought to have been the principals? It was for Austria that the struggle was to be made, and by her exertions alone that it could succeed. Her resources were to bear the shock of the war, and her existence was staked upon its issue. Yet we do not apply to Austria, but to Russia, or rather

we first apply to Austria—we find she is not ready, or not willing to begin the war for her own interests; and therefore we go to Sweden and Russia, who happen at the time to be in ill-humour with France. This was surely not the best way of securing the cordial union of Austria.

We have already noticed the terms upon which Austria and Russia were at the beginning of the Year 1803; but the jealousy which had subsisted from the affairs of Switzerland in the last war, and which the business of the indemnities inflamed, received its last aggravation in May, 1804, from the promulgation of the secret convention, Oct. 1801, between France and Russia. Austria now saw a neighbour whose ambition she suspected, and whose power she dreaded, acting in conjunction with her natural enemy, as the sole arbiter of the south of Europe; taking upon herself the guarantee of Naples, Sardinia, and Rome; and stipulating for the general arrangement of the balance of Italy. Excluded by the successes of her enemy from all territorial power beyond

the Adige, she now saw herself cut out from all concern in Italian affairs, by the interference of her former ally. In the temper of mind which such a discovery was calculated to produce, she found that Russia and France were involved in a sudden quarrel. She plainly evinced her good dispositions towards the latter, by immediately acknowledging the Chief Consul's new title, which Russia and Sweden peremptorily refused; and she took this occasion of assuming a similar dignity to herself, against which Russia and Sweden protested*—And this was the moment chosen by the British cabinet for applying to Russia as the arbiter, the saviour of Europe; and to Sweden as the other great champion of the same cause! Surely, if any principle in practical policy ever deserved the name of self-evident, it is this, that our interest was by all means to avoid

* See Talleyrand's and D'Oubril's notes of May 16, July 21, and August 28, 1804.—Imperial and Swedish notes to the Diet, August 24—26, 1804.

whatever might give umbrage to Austria; to court her most, who must always be our best ally; and if we could not effect a cordial reconciliation between her and Russia, at least to beware of taking such a part with the latter, as must involve us in the consequences of the disunion *.

Having, however, made common cause with Russia, our next object was to obtain, at any rate, the accession of Austria. Nor can there be a doubt, that we availed ourselves partly of the formidable influence of Russia—partly of our subsidies—partly of fallacious representations of our own strength, and the dispositions of Russia; to force the cabinet of Vienna prematurely into a rupture with France. In order to demonstrate this, we have only to consult the Treaties and Supplementary Papers. By the first separate article of

* In the foregoing argument, it is not intended so much to state *absolutely* the sentiments of England, with regard to Russia, whose late conduct has been so pure and magnanimous, as to describe the feelings of Austria, and the deference which those feelings might have been expected to meet with from England.

the Treaty of Concert, England agrees with Russia to subsidize Austria, provided she shall take the field against France in four months *. This is a public article, and intended for the inspection of Austria. But there is a *secret* article † added, by which England engages not to refuse the benefits of the treaty to Austria, if she shall take the field during any part of 1805. This article was intended only to be used, if the threat contained in the former one should fail in bringing Austria forward. The two articles are of the same date.—Further, Lord G. L. Gower, in a dispatch dated Sept. 3, expresses his hopes that the Austrian cabinet "*may be induced not to wait the issue of the proposed negotiations with France* ‡," but to commence hostilities immediately. His hopes are founded on "the last dispatch from the Russian minister at Vienna;" where it appears, therefore, that war had not been resolved upon in the last week of

* Treaties, p. 11. † Treaties, p. 20.
‡ Supp. Pap. p. 16.

August. Yet, at the very same time, the march of the Russian armies towards the frontiers of Austria and Prussia, was formally announced to the Austrian cabinet*; and as far back as July 16th, official notice was given that Russia intended to put her forces in motion by the middle of August †. It is clear, therefore, that Russia was determined to act offensively, whatever Austria might resolve upon; and that this determination was used to quicken the cabinet of Vienna. Accordingly we find, in the very able Paper of Austria, entitled, "*Plan of Operations* ‡," the most decisive proofs of her unwillingness to come forward. A general view is taken of the relative situations of France and Austria, and the inference is drawn, "that the maintenance of *peace* till a *more favourable juncture* shall arise, seems to be *infinitely desirable*." The answer of Russia, which is indeed a paper

* Supp. Pap. p. 6, 16. † Supp. Pap. p. 40.
‡ Supp. Pap. p. 21.

of very inferior ability, combats those positions; affects to view the situation of Austria as much more prosperous; denies that any more favourable juncture can arise; and concludes that Austria, "assured of the assistance of Russia and England, should not hesitate to renew the war as speedily as possible *." In enumerating the inducements held out to Austria, the cabinet of St. Petersburgh does not fail to notice "the immense sums of money which England is ready to sacrifice," and the "powerful diversions which she will operate in Holland, Flanders, and Germany, perhaps even the regular invasion of France by her troops †." And that Austria did listen to such hopes, we learn from her own minister at London, who mentions the delay of England to attack France in the North, as the first cause of the subsequent disasters ‡.

Such then was the unwillingness of Au-

* Supp. Pap. p. 30. † Ibid. p. 29 & 30.
‡ Ibid. p. 51 & 52.

stria, and such the means employed to bring her into the late ruinous contest. —And truly when we reflect on the exhausted state in which the last war had left her; when we consider the loss of her ancient provinces, best situated for offensive operations, and the various difficulties which opposed themselves to any attempt at calling forth the resources of her new acquisitions; when we survey her finances, involved in unexampled embarrassment, and her cumbrous administration, checking in every quarter the development of her natural strength; when, above all, we think of the universal dread of a new war, which prevailed through every rank of her people, dispirited by a recollection of the last, and impressed with a firm belief in the ascendant of France; when, to all this, we oppose the signal advantages of her enemy in every particular;—a compact and powerful territory, impregnable to attack, and commanding its neighbours from the excellence of its offensive positions; an army inured to

war, and to constant victory; an armed people intoxicated with natural vanity, and the recollection of unparalleled triumphs; a government, uniting the vigour of military despotism with the energies of a new dynasty; an administration, commanding in its service all the talents of the state; finances, unburthened by the debts of old monarchies, and unfettered by the good faith of wiser rulers; finally, a military expedition of vast magnitude, at the very moment prepared, and applicable to any destination which the change of circumstances might require—when we contrast these mighty resources with the remnant of her strength which Austria had to meet them, we shall marvel but little at her backwardness to seize the present juncture for beginning a war, which, if unprosperous, must be her last. In a prudent delay she saw that every advantage might be expected;—an improvement of her domestic œconomy; a gradual amelioration of her political constitution; the correction of those evils in her military

system, which had formerly proved fatal; the change of conduct towards her frontier provinces, which the experience of last war prescribed; the progress of her rich dominions, and numerous and various population in civility and wealth; the confirmation and extension of her foreign alliances. On the other hand, most of the enemy's advantages were likely to be impaired by delay; many of them were peculiar to the present crisis; almost all of them were of a temporary nature. The pursuits of commerce might temper his warlike and turbulent spirit; the formidable energy of a new government might yield to the corruption which time never fails to engender; and though kept quite pure, could not but relax during the interval of quiet; the constitution was likely to become either more despotic and weaker for offensive measures, or more popular and less inclined to adopt them; for a nation always becomes a wiser and better neighbour in proportion as its affairs are influenced by the voice of the commu-

nity: The arts of peace must modify that system of military conscription which made every Frenchman a warrior: The remembrance of recent victories would gradually wear away, both in the army and the nation: Allies might desert from better views of their interest; dependant states might throw off the yoke, when they recovered from the panic that made them bend to it; neutral powers might be roused to a just sense of their duty, when a successful resistance seemed practicable, and the re-establishment of the Austrian affairs furnished a center round which to rally: The army destined to invade England would probably fail in the attempt, or at any rate might be occupied in making it: Factions were more likely to disturb the vigour of the government when the continent was at peace; nay, the chance was worth considering, which every delay gave, of some sinister accident befalling the chief, whose destinies involved those of France herself, and whose power had not yet received its last conso-

lidation.—Every thing then rendered a delay as hurtful to the enemy as it was desirable to Austria, and her allies. If France had been called upon to chuse the juncture of her affairs, at which a new continental league should be formed against her, not only with safety, but with eminent advantage to her interests, she would have chosen the year 1804; that the operations of this league, after it had once been formed, should be delayed till the latter part of the year, she could scarcely have dared to hope. If Austria had been desired to name the crisis at which her present necessities, as well as the prospects of bettering her condition, most clearly enjoined an adherence to peace, she must have been blind, indeed, not to fix upon the same period; and, if she had shut her eyes to her most obvious interests, it would have been the best policy of her allies to undeceive her, and chiefly of England, who had no stay on the continent but Austria. But the blindness was our's; Austria was alive to her true interests, as

she knew her real situation; and we unhappily prevailed upon her to seek certain ruin, by partaking of our infatuation.

4. We now come to examine with what prospects of assistance from Prussia the late attempt to deliver the continent was undertaken. Upon this part of the subject several principles are self-evident. It is manifest that every effort should have been made, and even any reasonable sacrifice offered, for the prospect of so inestimable an advantage, as the accession of Prussia to the league. Without her co-operation, every chance of ultimate success was against the allies; with her aid it was scarcely possible their scheme could altogether fail. If she persisted in adhering to her neutrality, this was at least an additional reason for the delay which so many other circumstances concurred to recommend. But, at any rate, it was the consummation of headlong impatience to hurry on the execution of the enterprize, before time was given to obtain a definitive answer from Prussia, whe

ther favourable or adverse to the views of the league. What shall we say, then, if it appears, that, far from waiting until Prussia had become favourably disposed, the allies did not even suspend their measures until she had given a positive answer; that far from waiting to ascertain whether Prussia meant to join them, or remain neutral, they rushed into the war before they knew whether she was to remain neutral, or to take part with France!—The documents laid before parliament, defective in every branch of the details, are peculiarly so upon this important subject; but they contain, nevertheless, sufficient evidence of the foregoing propositions, especially when coupled with the official communications of the continental powers.

In September, 1804, Prussia declared to Sweden her resolution to remain neutral, and in December she heard of the subsidiary treaty between Sweden and England. A notice was immediately given by the court of Berlin, that the king of Prussia was determined to protect the neutrality

of the north, and his Swedish majesty was warned against adopting offensive operations against France*. At the beginning of 1805, therefore, the allies had no reason to expect much from the side of Prussia; but this transaction neither prevented England from indulging in hopes of success at Berlin, nor from hurrying on measures at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, as if there was no chance of failure.

In the "Plan of Operations" proposed by Austria, we find mention made of "a great and important step which the Emperor of Russia has taken at the court of Berlin,' from the result of which "the allies are to learn how far they may reckon upon the co-operation or neutrality of Prussia†." Neither the nature nor the success of this step is disclosed; but that the allies, while combining their military plans, were ignorant of Russia's determination, is proved both by the foregoing passage, and by the following particulars—

* See Count Hardenberg's note, Dec. 24, 1804.
† Sup. Papers, p. 25.

In the Russian answer to the paper just now cited, it is stated that Austria, being assured of Russia, "will not be under *any great necessity* of maintaining a force *to observe Prussia**." Here then is a considerable doubt expressed as to the intentions of Prussia, and all hopes of her co-operation seem to have vanished. But soon after, the uncertainty increases, and a hope of assistance is changed, first into fear, least she should oppose—and next into an expectation of her hostility.

In the protocol of the conferences held between the Austrian and Russian generals, July 16, 1805 for the purpose of arranging the military operations of the allies, we find an express agreement, that the second and third Russian armies shall be "employed on the frontiers of Prussia, for the purpose of making *demonstrations against her* †." And in the treaty of Concert between Russia and England, there is an article (VIII. Separate Art.‡)

* Sup. Papers, p. 30. † Sup. Papers, p. 42.
‡ Treaties, p. 17.

binding the parties to make common cause against any state (meaning Prussia) " which may, either by employing its forces, or by *too intimate a union* with France, pretend to raise obstacles to the measures of the league."

Thus we find that the scheme was entered upon with the prospect of resistance from Prussia; that this was, however, not ascertained, but that the measures were nevertheless pushed forward; and that, when the details of the plan came to be settled before taking the field, the first service required of the allied powers was found to be " making demonstrations against Prussia;" either to induce her to join the league, or to prevent her from opposing it. Nor were these calculations, however indefinite, altogether unfounded; for it appears that, when the combined armies took the field, they were kept in check by Prussia a whole month.

Count Stahremberg, the Austrian minister, in a note upon the causes of the defeats in Swabia, and the capture of Vienna,

ascribes these melancholy events in a great measure to "the advance of the second Russian army being retarded more than a month, by the first armaments which the cabinet of Berlin threatened to oppose to those of the court of St. Petersburgh*." It was not then till the second week in October, and after the disasters of the allies had begun, that they knew any thing certain respecting the dispositions of Prussia.

The accidental circumstance of the violation of Anspach, which no one could have foreseen, first determined Prussia not to attack the members of the league. Before that moment, they had reason to fear that she would not even be neutral, and they planned their defensive measures accordingly. But through the whole of their negotiations and arrangements they pressed forward in the dark. Far fromdelaying their attack till they had disposed Prussia to join them, they began it with

* Sup. Papers, p. 52.

the prospect of her hostility, though, even of that prospect, they did not take time to be fully ascertained.

The conduct of Prussia suggests two important observations upon the proceedings of the allies. In the *first* place it appears that her warlike preparations kept the Russian armies in check for more than a month. Before the beginning of September, therefore, the allies were convinced that, instead of her assistance, they had rather to reckon upon her hostility. Admitting that this important point was not ascertained before the Russian army began their march, it was at least established before the first movements of Austria, and before her rupture with France was irrevocably declared; for the court of Vienna continued to hold a pacific language to the French government in its declaration of the third of September, and its armies did not cross the Inn till the seventh*. It is manifest,

* See Second declaration of the court of Vienna—"The court of Vienna has no other motive than that

therefore, that war was not inevitable for some time after the hostile views of the cabinet of Berlin were apparent, and that even the hasty steps which had been taken by the allies might still have led to no fatal consequences, if they had paused as soon as the unfavourable dispositions of Prussia were displayed. To all the measures of rashness and imprudence, however, which marked this unhappy confederacy from the beginning, the fatal error was now added, of throwing away the last chance of accommodation, when new obstacles to the success of the war daily arose; of finally breaking the peace, at the very crisis when the hostility of Prussia rendered the war utterly hopeless.

But, in the *next* place, when the sentiments of the court of Berlin received a sudden change, from the violation of

of maintaining peace and friendship with France, and securing the general tranquillity of the Continent."—Also Proclamation, Sept. 21, 1805, of the Archduke Charles to the army in Italy.

Anspach, and when they became, upon the whole, unfavourable to France, if not favourable to the coalition, it seems wonderful that no attempt should have been made by England to avail herself of this happy revolution ;—not indeed for the vain purpose of inducing Prussia to join the league, which the very day before she had been prepared to oppose—but in order to use her new enmity towards France as a means of regaining the ground which the allies had lost by their rashness, and of submitting the whole dispute to Prussian mediation, before it went further, at a time when France would have listened to whatever came from Berlin ; while the forces of Austria were not irreparably injured, and the armies of Russia were still unimpaired. It never could be expected that Prussia would at once take the field, how much soever her dispositions might have been suddenly improved. Before she could prepare either her resolution or her forces, the French were sure to push their successes against the Austrians the more

stremously that they had a prospect of opposition from a new quarter. Nothing, therefore, was more obvious than the policy of obtaining some delay at least, if not a safe retreat from our dangerous position, through the sudden good wishes o Prussia. But the same blind zeal for mere fighting prevailed, which had led to the occupation of Bavaria. The allies continued in the field without any attempt to attain what alone could save them; and England intoxicated with the chimerical hope, that the events of one day would root out the policy which had been growing up at Berlin for twelve long years of various fortune, anxiously urged on the work she had begun, and counted upon Prussia as a sure resource.

It is indeed highly probable that the ancient jealousies of Austria and Prussia, awakened by the late transaction of the indemnities, opposed obstacles to any cordial union, even at this crisis of affairs, and might have prevented the measure of attempting an accommodation with France through Prussia.

which circumstances now suggested. But this rivalry formed no part of our estimate when we entered upon the war. No steps had been taken, indeed no time had been allowed, for any attempt to overcome it; and we have ourselves only to blame, if untoward circumstances, overlooked by our blind impatience to see the continent in arms, have eventually frustrated the calculations into which they did not enter: We have ourselves only to blame, if we formed a league which could not succeed without the cordial union of powers divided by long hatred and recent quarrels; hurried the allies into critical situations, where perfect unanimity alone could save them; and gave no time for those measures of conciliation, without which it was vain to expect even the semblance of cordiality*.

* It is inconsistent with the plan of this inquiry to cite any authorities which are not official; but a very extraordinary tract has lately been published by Mr. Gentz, which, from particular circumstances, deserves to be noticed. Its inferiority to all this gentleman's other writings is so striking, that nothing but the uncontradicted avowal of his name on the title page could have induced any one to think it the production of his pen.

5. Having now traced the fatal impolicy which gave rise to the late alliance, and precipitated the confederates into the war, we shall direct our attention to the particular errors that accompanied the operations of the league. Of these the most remarkable, and the most extensive in its effects, is a strange want of concert which appears from the commencement between the two principal parties—England and Austria: England the prime mover and soul of the union, and Austria its main support.

Among other singular assertions, it contains one which requires either a contradiction or acknowledgment by the members of the late cabinet—that a treaty was concluded between Russia and Prussia before last December. No such treaty has been mentioned in the papers laid before parliament; yet surely a full statement of its contents would have been much more decorous, than such an allusion to it as Mr. Gentz here makes. He adds, that he is placed in situations which enable him to "see into the secret movements of the different political springs, of which the events we now witness are the visible results"—p. 28. Now as his place of *counsellor at war* is merely nominal, (however creditable the title may be,) and as he is not in the confidence of the Austrian court, it is difficult to imagine what situation he can fill, except he may have enjoyed the confidence of the English cabinet. If he did—if a foreigner was admitted to this confidence, there is room for inquiry; and if a confidential agent has told the secret of a Prussian treaty, why is that still withheld from parliament?

It cannot fail to strike any one who peruses the documents laid before parliament, that throughout the whole of the late negotiations, Austria has kept herself studiously aloof from any direct intercourse with this country; until the moment that a subsidy is to be given, no communication exists between the two powers. We have treaties with Russia and with Sweden, but not one with Austria. Whatever comes from Vienna, comes through St. Petersburgh. Our correspondence with Austria is carried on by means of our Russian alliance; our relations with the emperor, the ancient ally of England, and the main-stay of her continental influence, shrunk into a sort of appendage to our concert with the Northern Powers—the inventors of the armed neutrality, the executors of the German indemnities, and the recent confederates of France. In order to be satisfied of the extent to which our alienation from Austria has proceeded, it is necessary to examine the whole of the treaties and dispatches that have been

made public. But we shall mention a few of the most remarkable proofs, as a clue to the more ample investigation of this alarming topic.

The uniform anxiety of Austria to appear wholly unconnected with England, is one of the most singular features in the conduct of the late continental alliance. By an article* added to the Treaty of Concert it is stipulated by Russia on the part of Austria, that in case those two powers should, at the opening of the campaign, disavow their connexion with England, yet as soon as the war is fairly begun, they shall acknowledge the connexion. Thus the appearance of a concert with England, was so odious on the Continent at the time which we chose for stirring up the new coalition, that our confederates stipulate for permission to begin their operations by asserting a direct falsehood in order to conceal it. Further, when England agrees to subsidize

* July 24, 1805. Treat. p. 24.

Austria, in case she shall come forward within a certain time, the stipulation is made, not with the court of Vienna—not in consequence of the relations subsisting between that court and the cabinet of St. James's—but with the court of St. Petersburgh, and "in consequence of engagements subsisting between Austria and Russia*." In the same spirit is the settlement of the plan of operations between Austria and Russia, by diplomatic correspondence, and conferences of military counsellors; from all which England is carefully excluded; nor, indeed, is she once mentioned in the course of them, except at the moment when subsidies are to be considered, and then some notice is taken of her †. This anxiety to appear unconnected with England, is so remarkable in the whole conduct of Austria, that even in the proclamation after the capture of Vienna, when the emperor is

* Treaty of Concert. Sep. Art. Treat. p. 11.

† Treat. p. 32. Sup. Pap. p. 39, et seq.

encouraging his people with a view of the hopes which still remain, he enumerates "the great and unexhausted resources which he finds in the forces of his high allies and friends, the emperor of Russia, and the king of Prussia," and makes no allusion whatever to England, the main spring of the war*.

But the anxiety to avoid the reality of such a concert as well as the appearance of it, until the moment that subsidies were required, is strikingly illustrated by the total exclusion of the English minister at Vienna, from all share in the negotiations carried on with the Russian minister at the same court: and so wonderfully well were the cabinet of London gained over to second this plan, that they seem to have kept their envoy in utter ignorance of what was going on both at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, until every Gazette writer in Europe was acquainted with the whole business. This forms so singular and so instructive

* Declaration of Brunn, Nov. 13, 1805.

a feature in the late negotiations, that we must refer more particularly to the parts of the papers which illustrate it, It appears from the dispatches of Sir A. Paget, (June 5, June 22, July 6, and August 3, 1805 *) that he was endeavouring all along to discover the views of the Austrian cabinet, as well as he could by his own observation, and his conferences with Count Cobenzel. In his dispatch of August 29 †, he informs our government that he has at length been put in possession *by Count Cobenzel,* of the negotiations carried on between Russia and Austria during the last ten months; and that about the same time, the same secret was communicated to him by Lord G. L. Gower. The reason of his being at length intrusted with the transaction speedily appears: the court of Vienna conceive that it will be more convenient to treat directly through him about the amount of the

* Sup. Pap. p. 1, 2, & 3. † Ibid. p. 4.

subsidies *. In his dispatch of September 5, the same envoy states, that he has learnt *from Count Cobenzel*, that he may soon expect a communication relative to the *British plans* respecting Naples †. From the declaration of the Russian cabinet, August 7, it also appears, that the terms upon which England and Austria were to treat had been discussed at Vienna, on the 7th of July, by the ministers of the emperor and the Russian envoy, while the British envoy, though upon the spot, was not even aware that any such intercourse was carrying on ‡. But the most singular of all the proofs which these documents afford of this point, is contained in Sir A. Paget's excellent dispatch of October 24, in which he enumerates with distinguished ability, the causes of the failure in Swabia. "In settling the plan of the campaign," says he, "it must have been calculated that previous to the opening of it the Russians

* Sup. Pap. p. 14. † Id. p. 7. ‡ Treat. p. 31 & 32.

would have joined. This, in truth, however false and extraordinary, was the calculation which was made. Upon what it was founded I cannot exactly say*." Now it happens that this calculation never was made; on the contrary, both in the Austrian plan of operations and the Russian answer to it†, the impossibility of the Russians arriving before the campaign should begin, and the necessity of the Austrians sustaining the first attack alone, is explicitly stated. The same admission is made in the calculations of the military conference, held July 16, to discuss the plan of the campaign‡. Therefore, it is clear, that as late as the 24th of October, our minister at Vienna was utterly ignorant of the military conferences carried on in that capital, upon the measures of the coalition, as far back as the 16th of July, and of the diplomatic correspondence upon the same subject,

* Sup. Pap. p. 12. † Id. p. 30. ‡ Id. p. 40.

which had passed between the two imperial courts at a still earlier period.

This is a very serious charge either against the British cabinet, or their envoy, or both. When the affairs of the league were discussed at Vienna, the proper person to attend the conference on our part was our envoy, and not the ambassador of Russia. Austria seems, indeed, always disposed to prefer treating with Russia; but our envoy ought at least to have been fully informed of the intercourse that subsisted, especially after Austria consented to hold a direct communication with him. If he was unworthy of such confidence, he was unworthy of his post, and the blame of the cabinet, which [illegible] him on so important a station during [illegible] critical a juncture, is aggravated tenfold. If he had from any cause become disagreeable to the court where he was sent to reside, he was not the person to represent the mover of the new league in the councils of the chief confederate; and the English cabinet instead of retaining him

at such a post, to the extreme detriment of the common cause, should have replaced him by a person against whom similar objections did not exist. But we are far from suspecting that this was the case: It remains then, for the cabinet who superintended this strange negotiation, to explain the reason of their unwillingness to confide in their own agent, and the aversion of the Austrian cabinet to communicate with him.

When we survey the whole machinery then, by which the grand coalition was to be moved and regulated, we discover nothing but weakness and confusion—a total want of strength in the materials; of skill in the arrangement of the parts; of harmony in their movements. England, the main-spring of the union, is not suffered to communicate directly with Austria the great moving power; while the intercourse with such a petty member of the system as Sweden, is constant and intimate. Russia, calculated by nature to operate as a grand auxiliary to Austria,

is first made the centre of the movement, and then the balance and director. The instruments of communication employed by England, are either distrusted by herself or by her allies, with whom they are nevertheless stationed to the exclusion of fitter instruments, and the increased derangement of the machine. But above all, though England furnishes the sinews of the war, and originates the whole operation, she is not allowed a single voice in directing or controuling it; she is excluded from all influence over the operation after it is once resolved upon; studiously repressed at all times, except when the wheels cannot move without her assistance, and even then only permitted to interfere with her services, and compelled to abstain from advice.

Now it may probably be stated that the powers of the continent would not coalesce with us on any other terms; that from dislike of our active interference in continental affairs, they refused to involve themselves in a more close connection with

us than the necessitous state of their finances required; that from dread of offending France before the scheme was matured, they would not acknowledge the extent of their intercourse with us; that from these motives they refused to give us any share of influence in arranging the measures of the league, and even declined admitting us to an intimate knowledge of their concerted scheme.—We believe there may be much truth in this statement, and that it will contain a just account of the matter, if to these motives of repugnance, we add a great distrust of our political wisdom in continental affairs; and perhaps some doubts of our good faith, arising from our conduct in former wars. But the existence of these prepossessions against us, is the very reason why this juncture should not have been chosen for a new coalition; and whatever may have been the motives, the repugnance of Austria and Russia to ally themselves with us, was a sufficient argument against pressing the formation of a league. Austria would not give us bet-

ter terms, you say—That is no reason for making a confederacy upon bad terms, but a perfectly good reason for waiting till better can be obtained. There was no absolute necessity for making war on France in the summer of 1805. It is to be hoped we were not in such fear of invasion, as to buy the short respite of a diversion at any price: There was no pressing occasion, so far at least as the country was concerned, for having a continental campaign finished before the session of parliament began: It is to be hoped that our representatives would have granted supplies without the stimulus of a war in the circle of Austria; and a confidence in the wisdom of government might have kept them in good humour, without the fearful amusement of battles between French and German armies. After we had unwarily begun a new coalition, we might have paused when we found the obstacles to its success so insurmountable. There was no fatality to make us persist in arming the continent, when we perceived that the powers of Germany would neither unite together nor

confide in us. We should have sacrificed nothing but our temerity, and lost nothing but our too sanguine hopes, had we put off the execution of our rash design, when we discovered that Austria would not treat directly with us; that she durst not avow our friendship, until Russia came up to protect her from the consequences of such an admission; that the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, could not be brought to forget Silesia and the indemnities. It was an ample ground for refusing to complete the league, that the allies would give us no voice in forming the plans of the campaign, or even in arranging the system of the war; that they for the first time recognised the enemy's favourite policy of excluding us from the continent, and would not hear a whisper from us until the moment when our money was wanted.

But every part of our conduct is marked with the same deplorable impatience which prompted the first step. Having in our rashness resolved to make a league, notwithstanding the unfitness of the times.

the same temerity made us persist in our scheme, in spite of the backwardness and distrust of our allies. We hurried on matters to a new coalition, at a moment when the enemy alone could lose by a delay; and pressed forward the coalition to a new war, when our allies, spiritless and inefficient in themselves, would neither suffer us to participate in the formation, nor in the knowledge of the common schemes. "Make war"—was our cry—"successfully if you can, but make war.—League against France—wisely and cordially if possible, with such a union among yourselves and such solid help from us, as may give some small chance of safety, if not of advantage—but at all events league against France." Thus a coalition and a campaign were the only objects in the contemplation of our government, and they fatally attained their wish; they got up the concert of St. Petersburgh, and the invasion of Bavaria. There was a convention and a war, however, which they did not bargain for; the enemy was as rapid in completing the pic-

ture as they had been in preparing the canvas ; the finishing, too, for so hasty a performance, was wonderfully harmonious with the original design—he gave them in a few weeks the conquest of Austria. and the treaty of Presburg.

6. We now proceed to follow the natural development of the errors which presided over the formation of the league, and mingled themselves in its composition. To the total exclusion of England from her just and natural influence in the arrangement of the war, the disasters which followed may in a very great degree be ascribed. We shall enumerate a few of the faults committed by the allies, which our interposition might effectually have prevented, and of which we must share the blame if we could have interfered and did not.

(1.) To some it may perhaps appear extravagant to maintain, that England should have interposed her voice in the nomination of the Austrian generals. Yet it is certain that upon former occasions she

used this privilege, and that she has frequently named the commander of an enterprize to which, besides her subsidies, she contributed in a very limited proportion. How attentively Russia was listened to on this point, we have clear evidence in the "Protocol of conferences." The Russian court expressly refuses to place her troops under the command of any one but an archduke *. There was no risk of England making such a stipulation: on the contrary, had she been allowed to concert upon this important matter, it would have been her duty to enforce the sacrifice of so absurd a condition. Were France to have such a connection with any of her allies as we attempted to form with Austria and Russia; were her interests closely involved with the success of the common operations; were she engaged to give for the troops employed, at the rate of twelve

* Sup. Pap. p. 41. Not meaning the Archduke Charles—but in the case of his being indisposed, providing that none but an Archduke shall succeed him

pounds ten shillings per man yearly, that more than treble the amount of their pay—can we doubt that she would insist upon a voice, in the great question of chusing to whose talents and fortunes, the fate of the enterprise should be committed ? The choice of general Mack was in every respect singularly injudicious ; from the authority of Sir A. Paget, we learn that he was ex tremely disagreeable to the archduke. He prabably owed his appointment to court intrigue ; but the archduke's strong prejudice against him, whether founded upon experience of his character, or upon mere personal dislike, if that illustrious prince can be suspected of such a motive, was an insurmountable objection to his employ ment. He had formerly been eminently unsuccessful in Italy. Those who served with him in Flanders thought meanly of his talents. That he was a man of military detail, an excellent quarter-master-general they admitted : that he understood his art in theory too, and could combine a good military plan, was not denied. But the

best judges in our own army, believed him to be devoid of that versatility of genius, which enables a commander to vary his preconcerted schemes with the sudden change of circumstances; they even knew him to be deficient in that presence of mind, which gives a leader the command of his personal recourses, under an unexpected turn of affairs; in other words, he was understood to have precisely those defects which most completely disqualified him for opposing the captains of France. This opinion of general Mack was stated by officers of high rank and great respectability in the British army, long before the surrender of Ulm. If our cabinet knew it and neglected it, their culpability was great: but still more have they to answer for, if they were ignorant of what might so easily have been ascertained.

(2.) A grand error was committed by the Austrians in passing the Inn, and carrying the war at once into Bavaria, before the Russians were near to support them. This has been fully exposed in

Sir A. Paget's dispatch of October 24*; and had he been admitted, like the Russian envoy to the conferences at Vienna, we are entitled to presume, that the influence of England would have been exerted to recommend a wiser plan. But it is not merely in this point of view that England should have interfered to modify the plan of the campaign. The violation of the Bavarian neutrality, with the circumstances of injustice affirmed to have attended it, would have called imperiously for the interposition of an ally, who, from her disinterested views, was the proper umpire between those neighbouring powers, and whose pure principles of continental policy were committed by the oppressive measures of her confederates.

The suppression of evidence prevents us from ascertaining the precise extent of the injustice done to Bavaria. The account given by the elector, is in a material degree at variance with that of the Austrian government. The former states his desire to remain neutral, and asserts that

* Sup. Pap. p. 11.

Austria rendered this impossible, by suddenly demanding an incorporation of the Bavarian with the imperial troops; refusing to hear of any alternative but the immediate dismission of the whole Bavarian army; and instantly following up these violent demands with seizing the electoral dominions *.

The emperor, on the other hand, affirms, that his Serene Highness had resolved to join France; that prompt measures were requisite to prevent this step—and that the Elector behaved with great duplicity while he was maturing his plan †. But it is distinctly admitted by the emperor, that without previously preparing the Elector, or attempting by negotiation to engage him in the league, a requisition was suddenly made of his assistance, and of the junction of his army with the allies. It is proved by a dispatch of Sir A. Paget ‡, that the

* Historical representation of the Elector Palatine, Sept. 29, 1805.

† Answer of Austria, Oct. 16.

‡ Sup. Pap. p. 7. The dispatch is dated Sept. 5, before it could possibly be known at Vienna what answer was to be given to the proposals of the Prince.

Emperor sent Prince Swazemberg, September 3, to intimate the march of his army through Bavaria. The Emperor acknowledges* that this prince was the bearer of his first proposal to the court of Munich, where he arrived on the 6th—that the Elector's answer was not given till the 8th, before which time all the arrangements for seizing Bavaria had finally been made.

Now it is manifest that, if the plans of the electoral court were doubtful, or if they leant towards neutrality, as the Elector states, this conduct of Austria was at once impolitic and unjust. But if the politics of that court were so decidedly French, as the Emperor asserts, then the sudden attack of Bavaria was the very worst expedient which could be devised for gaining her over to the alliance, and counteracting the influence acquired by France in the court of Munich, from the affair of the indemnities. In rearing up

* Answer of Austria Oct. 16.

that influence, Prussia had been chiefly instrumental—England had suffered it—Austria had but feebly opposed it. Its effects were likely to be felt for at least fifteen months after its establishment, and the confederates rashly hurry into a new war, where that influence must be highly detrimental, without making any preliminary attempts to counteract it, and before time has been given for its wearing away. At any rate the errors and improprieties of the manner in which Bavaria was attacked, were obvious, and England kept aloof at the moment when her councils or influence might have rectified them.

(3.) The arrangements of the campaign between the Austrian and Russian envoys, as detailed in the Protocol of conferences*, are evidently founded upon the most unaccountable mistakes with respect to the operations of the French troops. The combination proceeds on the supposition, that a Russian army marches nine German

* Sup. Pap. p. 36, et seq.—See particularly p. 46.

miles in four days at an average, or somewhat more than ten English miles a day; and upon the supposition also that a French army will march at the very same rate. It was imagined, then, by those generals, who had so often been opposed to the French, and so constantly been beaten by their rapid movements, that they could march no more than ten English miles a day!—It was conceived that a French army, unincumbered by baggage and heavy artillery, would march through their own territory—through Flanders—the country in the world best adapted to the movement of troops, as slowly as the cumberous armies of Russia could drag their way through strange and difficult countries—through the forests of Poland, and the mountains of Silesia! The event proved how grievously those planners of the campaign had erred. From Boulogne to the right bank of the Rhine, the French army spent only three weeks instead of five, the computed time; in a fortnight more the fate of the cam-

paign in Swabia was decided. It had been agreed that the Russians and Austrians should join on the Inn, and there wait for the French, who, it was calculated, would take sixty-four days to march thither from Boulogne, besides six days to put themselves in motion, and ten which were allowed for the priority of information. How long the French took to give their orders for beginning the march, we know not precisely—six days they certainly did not consume in this way. But one thing is too surely proved, that they arrived at the Inn, *after* completely destroying theAustrian armies, a fortnight sooner than the estimate supposed they could arrive in order to *begin* the campaign. Nor is this reasoning from the event unfair in the present question; that event is by no means unparalleled in the history of the French tactics. Had the Russian and Austrian counsellors any right to make such calculations of the French movements? Could England have failed to oppose blunders on the face of the matter

so enormous, if she had been permitted to partake in the consultations, upon the common cause, at Vienna ?

(4.) But although such errors as we have been contemplating had not entered into the details of the campaign, there was a fundemental omission in the concerted plan, which must have proved fatal to the success of any attempt against France. No measures were taken beforehand for the occupation of Switzerland, or the encouragement of the Austrian interest in that country; and one of the first acts of the court of Vienna, when the war commenced, was an acknowledgment of its neutrality*. It is manifest, that, if the war was not offensive against France, it had no object: and few points seem now to be more clearly ascertained, than the impossibility of making any successful attempt to penetrate into that country on the north of the Alps. The vulnerable part of the French territory, is that which can only

* Sup. Papers, p. 9 and 10.

be commanded by the possession of Switzerland, *Franche Compte*—an open country, naturally weak, entirely unprovided with strong places or works of art, leading by a short march into the very heart of the empire, surrounded by several of the provinces best affected towards the cause of royalty and the league. If France wished at any time to commence offensive operations against Austria, the occupation of Switzerland might be necessary for their success; not only from the command which that country has of the communication between Germany, as well as France and Italy, and from its commanding posture towards the Austrian possessions; but also because, if not occupied by France, it must either be seized by Austria, to the incalculable danger of *Franche Compte*, or remain neutral, to the great and hazardous diminution of the French line of attack. But if France changes her usual mode of invading Austria, and pushes on with her main army, not in Italy but Swabia, while the possession of Lombardy and the Genoese, and

the command of Lower Italy allows her to support that operation by an army on the Adriatic; it is certainly of less consequence that the neutrality of Switzerland should narrow her line of attack; and she gains more by the certainty of avoiding any danger from that quarter, than she loses by the sacrifice of one additional point of invasion. On the other hand, if France is to act only on the defensive, the neutrality of Switzerland is absolutely necessary for her safety. If that country is rendered impassable, all fears for the only valuable part of France are removed. If it is left open to Austria, while her armies are making advances from Lombardy, through Piedmont and the Genoese, and by threatening an attack upon the southern departments of France, are drawing the French troops towards the Mediterranean, and forcing them to fall back upon France, not by the side of Switzerland, but by the Col di Tende and the Var; and while the armies on the Rhine are supporting the southern operations by defending Germany, or even

threatening Alsace, the occupation of Switzerland by the allies, must give the enemy a line of weak country to defend, from Hunningen to Lyons, in an arch of which the allies have possession of the cord. The grand fault of the directory in 1799, was their first neglecting to secure, and then themselves violating the neutrality of Switzerland: they occupied it, and when their inadequate means of attack compelled them to resume the defensive, France was exposed in consequence of Switzerland not being neutral, to such imminent danger of a formidable [illegible] sion, that nothing saved her but the violent remedy of calling out the second and third conscriptions.

The neutrality of Switzerland, then, is of all points the most important to France, whether she wishes to carry on a defensive war, or to attack in a single point on the North of the Alps. So sensible of this were the French government, and so well aware of the error which had almost proved fatal in 1799, that their first anxiety

on a near prospect of war, was to establish the Swiss neutrality. To this the cabinet of Vienna unhappily consented; forgetful of the evils which must result from such a step in all offensive operations against France, and of the impossibility of securing that neutrality against the French one moment longer than *they* might find it beneficial to their own cause. Although, therefore, the beginning of the campaign had not proved fatal in consequence of other errors; although France had then been foiled, and the Austrians had been required to follow up their first successes in Germany or Italy, by carrying the war into France; the neutrality of Switzerland would have destroyed every chance of pursuing the offensive with success, by reducing the French frontier to the strong country between the Lake of Geneva and the mouth of the Var, the impregnable bastion of Holland, and the iron wall of the Netherlands and Rhine. When we find such a grand omission as this in the com-

binations of the allies, we are intitled to maintain that the addition of one other counsellor would have supplied it; and that counsellor ought to have been England, the soul and support of the confederacy.

But the conduct of England relative to Swiss affairs, was indeed unfortunate in other respects. She seems to have joined with the allies in misconceiving at all times the importance of the Alpine territory. Her treatment of the cantons when France invaded them in 1802, and the misfortunes which befel her allies in those countries, through the unskilfulness of the English agents, during the whole of the last war, will not soon be forgotten by the Swiss. But a more recent impolicy on our part, has thrown away all the advantages which the coalition might still have expected from the tried valour of that people, and their unconquerable hatred of France. We granted pensions to many of the Swiss officers who had entered our service dur-

ing the last war, and always on the express condition that they should *not* reside in Switzerland *. These brave men, whose influence with their countrymen was powerful; whose fidelity to our cause had never been suspected; who only panted after the moment when their rage against France might once more shew itself at the head of their peasantry, were thus deprived of the only means by which they could maintain their personal authority, and support the good cause in their own country. Had they been allowed to receive at home a pension, earned by the utter ruin of their fortunes in our service, and not forced to earn it over again by submitting to banishment; and had a similar bounty been extended to the other reduced officers, who were left at the peace without means of subsistence, unless they entered the French or Helvetian service; the means would have been pre-

* This fact will not be denied by any agent of the English government.

pared—in generosity and prudence prepared—of rousing the whole Alps from Constance to the Rhone, in hostility to France, as soon as the war should break out; and the allies would then have had some prospect of invading that powerful empire, on the side where alone it can be attacked. It must, however, be admitted, that such a conduct on the part of England would have been anomalous, and sufficiently inconsistent with the rest of her foreign policy. To have looked forward beyond the next year; to have taken measures in silence for the slow preparations of distant events; to have gradually disposed the minds of a people in our favour by kind treatment, for which no immediate return was expected, or won them by any other means than a manifesto from a commander at the head of a paultry force; to have laid plans of war beforehand which should not for some time burst into view, with glare and noise; out of our millions to have given a few pounds for the support of our firmest

friends, ruined in our cause; to have spent what we did give, in a manner grateful to them, or really beneficial to our interests; in our countless subsidies, to have had a single guinea bestowed, which should not be repaid by the defeat of the receiver immediately, and his utter ruin, at six months credit—all this would have indicated a strange, unaccountable deviation from the system which has been unremittingly at work, since the treaty of Pilnitz, by day and by night, during war and during truce, in aggrandizing the proud, and crushing the humble; and which has at length, by the most persevering constancy of operation, happily compleated the ruin of our allies, and triumphing, it must be confessed, over various and mighty obstacles, established our enemy in universal empire.

These four capital errors in the arrangement of the late war, are, we think, either to be ascribed to England not having been consulted, or else to her having par-

taken in the infatuation of the allies. But it will be said that those allies would give her no voice in such matters as the choice of a general, the march of troops, and the plan of a campaign; and that they would have persisted in adhering to their own errors, even after England should have pointed them out. This is not improbable; but it only shews for the hundredth time, that things were not ripe for a new war. If Austria persisted in preferring a general, from court favour, to the great prince who had twice saved the monarchy; if she insisted on calculating her plans upon the supposition that French armies can only move ten miles a-day through Flanders; if she shut her eyes to the value of Bavaria, and refused to learn the paramount importance of Switzerland in any war against France—then it was manifest that nothing could be hoped for, and that Austria had not been subdued to a sense of her interest, nor felt her real situation. It was the province of England to prevent her from

beginning a league for which she was so ill prepared. It was madness in England to hurry on the continent to a war, which, if unsuccessful, must be its last struggle for independence, in circumstances that made it madness to hope for success.

7. It remains to inquire what direct assistance Great Britain afforded to the coalition which she had formed—how far her co-operation with the measures of hostility, was either well-planned or well-timed.

An expedition was prepared for the north of Germany, at a time when the cause of the allies might have been materially aided by a diversion either in Holland, or the north of France, and the country of Hanover was chosen as the scene of our operations. It is needless to remark, how very trifling the benefit of such a scheme was to the advantage of making a powerful diversion at the beginning of the campaign. Admitting that Hanover should be occupied after a short defence—the most critical moment for distracting the French

force was thrown away, and our allies had a right to complain that our co-operation was limited to an object purely British, while they were risking their existence for the independence of the continent.

When the army of invasion left Boulogne almost defenceless, surely we might have made an attempt upon its works, by landing a force; and had some chance of destroying the flotilla which has given so much uneasiness to this country, but which is chiefly to be dreaded as it will always form a popular ground of objection to a peace with France. The enemy had withdrawn his army suddenly, and the first step which he was likely to take was to supply its place by marching from the interior new troops, better fitted for garrison duty than for the service of the field. The opportunity, therefore, of attacking Boulogne was transient, and must be seized at once. Our government, engaged in projects of new arms, and fireworks, and arrows, and the other resources of the

chymical method of war, allowed an opportunity to pass by which assuredly will not soon return.

But, when an expedition was resolved on to Germany, means were taken to [illegible] its utility and narrow its chance of success as far as possible. The departure of the army from Boulogne took place in the beginning of September, and our troops did not arrive in Hanover before the middle of November. This delay is most unaccountable. The moment that the invasion was put off, our forces should have been ready to set sail: the preparations should have been made before that time, because we knew perfectly well, that, as soon as the war broke out, the Boulogne army must leave the coast. But, besides forcing the continent to begin the attack unprepared, it appears that the war, of which we were the planners and instigators, found us after all our negotiations still less prepared than our allies. Accordingly the armament lost the fine season, and sailed, as British expeditions generally do, in a month when storms must be

expected. Some of our best troops were lost; the rest arrived in time to make a shew of retaking Hanover, after every chance of doing any thing more than defending that electorate was gone*. The allies saw that nothing could be gained to the common cause by such an operation; and Austria has since ascribed part of the general disasters † to our delay in making any diversion.

But still worse contrived was our co-operation in Italy. Had the English and Russian army in the Mediterranean landed in Lombardy, or the Venetian territory, so as either to join the Archduke (a benefit incalculable to troops commanded by inferior generals ‡) or to hang upon Mas-

* See General Don's Proclamation, Nov. 20, 1805.

† Count Sathremberg's note, Sup. Pap. p. 52.

‡ It cannot be reckoned any disrespect to the meritorious officer at the head of the allied army, to presume that great advantage would have arisen from his not opposing the ablest general of France, without the assistance of Prince Charles. General Craig's services in the East are certainly very eminent; but the Mahrattas, with all the improvements which they have reaped from our East Indian policy, are still a very different enemy from the French, and General

sena's rear; the best effects might have followed. The inferiority of the Austrians in point of force was clearly the cause of their not making head against the enemy in that quarter: still greater was the disparity of numbers after the defeats in Germany caused the Archduke to detach a large body of his army to reinforce General Mack*. That was the moment when the assistance of twenty thousand English and Russians was likely to be of eminent service: but, instead of adopting this plan, we landed an army in Naples, than which no measure could be more injudicious.

We affected to defend the King of Naples, yet we forced him to give our troops admittance, immediately after he had solemnly engaged himself not to admit any English or Russian forces into his territories, or any ships of war into his ports†. In return for this strict neutrality which

Craig would unquestionably have found the Italian campaign a new scene. "*Longe alius Italiæ quam Indiæ, per quam temulento agmine commissabundus incessit, visus illi habitus esset, saltus Apuliæ et montes Lucanos cernenti.*"—Tit. Liv. ix. 17.

* Sir A. Paget's dispatch, Sup. Pap. p. 21.

† Treaty of Portici, Oct. 8, 1805.

he promised to observe, France withdrew her troops from his dominions. As soon as they were gone, England compelled him to break his engagements, and to receive her army. But admitting that the measures were not compulsory on our part, we ought to have respected his neutrality, if he himself did not; and, knowing his engagements with France, we ought to have taken no advantage of any disposition which he might betray to break them. Indeed we gained nothing by this rash and unjust conduct. The French army was gone at any rate, and Naples freed for the present. We did not venture to land an army until every thing had been done which could be gained by a victorious campaign. The French troops were sure to return as soon as the affairs in the north should be settled, and then we must fly as speedily as possible. A landing in the Adriatic, and a junction with the Archduke, would have had the effect of freeing Naples from the French, had they been willing to remain there, just as certainly as landing in the bay of Naples.

By pursuing the former plan, effectual service would have been performed in the north, besides the liberation of the south. The latter plan, which unhappily we adopted, without doing any good to the Archduke, only protected Naples so long as it was the interest of France to withdraw her troops, and kept a large army unemployed, so long as it was the interest of the allies to have every soldier in their service brought into the field against the enemy. The occupation of Naples, then, after the French had left it, could never assist the campaign in the north. If the allies were successful in that quarter; Naples was freed at any rate. If they were unsuccessful, our army could not long defend it. We managed with our usual skill to unite all disadvantages in one plan: we hurried on one ally to the ruin which has since befallen him, for the purpose of rendering our army useless at a time when another ally might have been saved by its co-operation. So uniform, so harmonious in every quarter have been

the schemes of England throughout the late coalition !—And can we wonder that our affairs have been ruined amidst the waste of our resourses, and the squander of our opportunities, when we have been consistent only in impolicy, lavish of every thing but vigour, and strenuous in pursuing all varieties of plan, all sorts of system, except those which border upon prudence and wisdom?

It remains before closing the melancholy history of our misconduct, that some notice should be taken of the strange proceeding adopted by his majesty's late ministers, in publishing dispatches relating to some of the most delicate subjects imaginable.

The treaties laid before parliament are not given entire: several articles are suppressed; but one is inserted for the avowed purpose of binding the contracting parties to act in a certain event contrary to their public declarations *. Why a stipulation, which convicts the parties of deliberately

* Additional Art. July 24—Treat. p. 24.

laying the grounds of a positive falsehood, should not have been kept concealed, as well as other separate articles*, it would be difficult to determine. How far Russia and Austria will approve of the disclosure, it is easy to conjecture. There is the same indiscretion in publishing a secret article, binding England to subsidize Austria and Sweden, if they came forward within ten months—when the treaty itself threatens to withhold all subsidy, unless those powers take the field within four months†. It is obvious, that, for the future, all such threats from Russia and England will be of no avail ; their precise meaning is now ascertained. It is probable, too, that the Austrian cabinet will not be much pleased with the publication of Sir A. Paget's dispatch of 20th August, in which he states, that Count Cobentzel had insinuated to him, that the language of the

* Articles 3, 7, 9, and 10, are suppressed, possibly more.

† Compare first Separate Art. (public) with second ditto (secret) Treat. p. 11, 20.

Emperor would be heightened or lowered in proportion as he should be subsidized by England *.

We may also form some conjecture of the Archduke Charles's feelings, when he finds himself held up to the world, by the official papers of the English cabinet, as the slave of ill-temper and jealousy; fearful of reinforcing the army of his rival; taking umbrage at such reinforcements being given, when the fate of the monarchy depended on it: and this rival too—the object of all this jealousy and umbrage in the mind of Prince Charles of Austria—General Mack!—When Sir A. Paget gave such information † to his court, he only repeated lightly what he had been told falsely; but surely he never expected that his communication would be laid before Parliament as a public document. Count Rasumofski, too, when he transmitted his free strictures on the cabinet of Vienna to his court, did not probably conceive that our government,

* Sup. Pap. p. 4. † Ibid. p. 11 and 12.

getting notice of them through their minister at St. Petersburgh, would publish them to all the world. It is possible, that he may feel it rather unpleasant to communicate with a ministry who are now aware of his contempt for their character*. The same ambassador is convicted of having deceived our minister at Vienna, as to his knowledge of the Russian army's destination. Sir A. Paget's dispatch of September 5, states that Count Rasumofski knew nothing about it†, but the Protocol of Conferences proves that in July he knew the whole matter‡. The publication of the Protocol, too, clearly proves that the allies had reason to reckon upon the cooperation of the Neapolitans, as soon as their army should land from Corfu ‖ ; and this information, thus communicated to the French government, would have ensured the total ruin of the Sicilian court, if the more active efforts of our friendship had

* Sup. pap. p. 16. † Ibid. p. 7.
‡ Ibid. p. 43. ‖ Ibid. p. 43 & 44.

not already effected that object in a more direct way.

It was not enough, then, that our fatal activity accomplished at last the subjugation of the continent; that our allies were by our exertions brought to utter discomfiture; we must hold them up to contempt after the struggle is over, by divulging secrets which the most limited discretion would have respected. Not content with sacrificing the foreign interest of England, by the compendious events of one short campaign, we must cut it up by the roots, and prevent its ever growing again, by taking such steps as may naturally beget distrust and alienation; by ruining in the eyes of Europe, our character for discretion and good faith, which had survived the wreck of so many continental leagues. And to what purpose have those disclosures been made? Whose cause have they served? Which of the measures that produced the downfal of Austria have they elucidated? Which of the British statesmen who planned those measures

have they exculpated? To thoughtlessness alone can this conduct be imputed, or to the fatuity of despair; to the unheeding temerity, the impatience of rest, which devised and directed the third coalition; and the despair which those always feel most under disappointment, whose hopes are the most extravagant, and whose resources are the most paltry.

From contemplating the progress of our late fatal misconduct, it is difficult to avoid casting behind us a look at the better times of English history; when the affairs of this country were administered by the vigour of Cromwell, or her fortunes and the liberties of Europe entrusted to the sagacity of William; when the name of England was dreaded on every sea, her alliance courted as the badge of honour, and the pledge of safety in the remotest parts of the continent, and her protecting wisdom revered by all the nations, as their common shelter from oppression. How mightily have things been since changed! How little is *that* England now to be re-

cognized! How plainly may the revolution in her destiny be traced to the alteration of her conduct! It is indeed highly instructive to pause for a moment, and contrast the policy which gave birth to the conquest of Germany, with that which, after preparing the grand alliance, was developed in the victories of Marlborough, and ended in the subjugation of France. From such a comparison we may learn why the event was so different.

The overgrown power of Louis XIV, was ably but unsuccessfully resisted by the allies, during the war which ended so favourably to France in the peace of Nimeguen. After that treaty, his insolence knew no bounds, and scarcely a month passed without some aggression, which would have amply justified a renewal of the war. But William, then the soul of the alliance, exerted all his influence in repressing any premature opposition; wisely judging that the justice of a war—the extent of the provocation—is only half the question; and must always be subordinate to the prospect of succeeding by

an appeal to arms. In a few years, Spain rashly began hostilities, which William having in vain tried to prevent, endeavoured by all prudent means to assist. He applied to every court in order to combine a new alliance : but finding that the time was not come, he continued to prepare measures, which he knew must lead to a happy result at a future period. As he foresaw, the usurpations of the French king, and his religious persecutions, in a few years excited a universal disposition to oppose him, and waiting until this spirit had reached its highest pitch, he availed himself of it, to form the league of Augsburg, which united the catholic as well as protestant interests of the empire, in one common cause against France. In 1681, he might have gained one of the rival parties, but he knew how inadequate such support would prove to the exigences of the occasion. He waited until the course of events had prepared both the contending interests, the Austrian and Prussian factions of those days, and he

succeeded in uniting them all under his standard. The whole Empire was now combined against France; Spain and Holland acceded to the league; Savoy soon after joined it; Sweden and Denmark warmly favoured the cause; and the court of Rome itself, was by the able negotiations of William, induced to support a contest most essential to the Protestant Church. This great confederacy was animated with one spirit of resistance to France, and submission to the counsels of their leader. All Europe was cordially united in the league, with the exception of England: and yet, on this single account, William delayed putting the allies in motion, notwithstanding the continued insults and increasing aggressions of France: he waited until he had undertaken that enterprise which secured the liberties of this country, and which enabled him to complete the alliance for restoring those of Europe. It was not till after he had effected the *Revolution*, and could add England to the league, that he allowed the confederates

to take the field; and then, he continued to be the mover of the whole operations, not by manifestoes or subsidies, but by active assistance, and by superintending in person at repeated conferences of the combined powers, the whole arrangement of their plans for the war. By the success of this system the tide was at length turned against France; and though the peace of Ryswick still left her a formidable neighbour, it succeeded in repressing her encroachments and securing the independence of other states, which, since the peace of Nimeguen, she had been constantly attacking. "There was not one of the allies, (says Bishop Burnett), who complained that he had been forgot by him, or wronged in the treaty: Nor had the desire of having his title universally acknowledged, raised any impatience in him, or made him run into this peace with any indecent haste."*

His moderation and good sense in making the best peace he could, notwithstanding

* History of his own Times, ii. 117.

his rooted antipathy to France was equally eminent. "The terms of it," says Burnett, "were still too much to the advan-"tage of France; but the length and "charge of the war had so exhausted the "allies, that the king saw the necessity of "accepting the best conditions that could be "got*." He well knew that the next war must complete the victories which his policy and prudence had begun to atchieve. His measures were accordingly planned with a view to new resistance; and after his resources, and those of his allies had been recruited by an interval of quiet, they revived the league, under the well known name of that Grand Alliance, which led through a series of brilliant exploits to the utter humiliation of the common enemy.

To complete the contrast between the character of this great Prince's policy, and that which produced the late continental war, it would be necessary to detail the whole particulars of his public life. It may be sufficient to finish the parallel at

* History of his own Times, ii. 117.

present attempted, if we add, that he was eminently distinguished by a certain slowness to passion in his closet, as well as by uncommon ardour in action; that his judgment was prompt and alert, in proportion as his temper was cold. His schemes conceived in sobriety of mind, were calculated to attain some great and solid end, and not to strike the vulgar by their gaudiness. Their execution was delayed until the moment when success was most likely—not adjusted to the time when popular applause might be grateful, or convenient for other purposes. In planning them he was close and reserved; but when he had matured them, and when his time came, there was no wavering, no procrastination, no vapouring of hopes; finally, after the threat was made, not one moments' delay of which the enemy could avail himself; the noise never went before the stroke *.

* The promoters of the late continental war appear all along to have mistaken passion and precipitancy for energy and promptitude on their own part; and on the part of foreign powers, they uniformly confounded forbearance with spiritless submission—prudence with weakness, and prudence with timidity. The example of one great monarch is quoted above,

It is remarkable how universal the contrast to which we are alluding, is observable even in minute particulars. "He was," says the Historian, "an exact observer of men

whose conduct formed so mighty a contrast with that which we have been contemplating. The authority of another able and successful prince is equally decisive against such a line of policy. The following passage from the King of Prussia's "Memoirs of his own Times," contains advice so very applicable to the case in question, that it is difficult to believe it could have been written before the war of 1805.

"*La raison nous prescrit une règle sur ce sujet, dont, ce me semble, aucun homme d'Etat ne doit s'écarter; c'est de saisir l'occasion, & d'entreprendre lorsqu' elle est favorable; mais de ne point la forcer en abandonnant tout au hasard. Il y a des momens qui demandent qu' on mette toute son activité en jeu pour en profiter; mais il y en a d'autres où la prudence veut qu'on reste dans l'inaction. Cette matière exige la plus profonde réflexion, parce que non seulement il faut bien examiner l'état des choses, mais qu' il faut encore prévoir toutes les suites d' une entreprise, & peser les moyens que l'on a avec ceux de ses ennemis, pour juger lesquels l'emportent dans la balance. Si la raison n'y décide pas seule, & que la passion s'en mêle, il est impossible que d' heureux succès suivent une pareille entreprise. La politique demande de la patience, & le chef-d'œuvre d'un homme habile est de faire chaque chose en son temps & à propos.*"

"*L' histoire est* (continues the Royal Author) *l'école des princes; c'est à eux de s'instruire des fautes des siècles passés, pour les éviter, & pour apprendre qu' il faut se former un système & le suivre pied à pied, & que celui qui a le mieux calculé sa conduite est le seul qui puisse l'emporter sur ceux qui agissent moins conséquemment que lui.*"

Fred. II. Hist. de mon Temps.

and things, but he did not descend even to the humours of his people, to make himself and his notions more acceptable to them. He knew all foreign affairs well, and understood the state of every court in Europe very particularly—he instructed his own ministers himself—his only two favourites, Portland and Albemarle, were men in all respects, of opposite characters, agreeing only in *secrecy* and *fidelity*."* It was by such a system, and so eminent a capacity for affairs, that this illustrious person laid the foundation in Europe, of that independence from French dominion, which his successors reared up. The fabric was indeed strong, and has withstood many shocks: but, like all the works of man, it is made of perishable materials; and new systems having gained ground under statesmen of opposite characters, it may now justly be questioned, whether there yet exists a wreck of what king William bequeathed.

* Burnett ii. 176 and 177.

We have now completed the examination of the late continental policy of England, and have been enabled, from a review of the facts presented by the official documents, to estimate the merits of those who conceived and prosecuted that fatal system. Many of the errors which we have noticed, are only extravagant forms of mistakes not unknown in the past history of the country; and the fruits of a policy radically defective as to external relations, which has long been growing up to maturity. The details of such misconduct are not uninstructive. They expose, by exhibiting an extreme case, the evils of the general principles; demonstrate the necessity of administring a remedy; and lead us towards the quarter from whence it may be obtained. This inquiry, too, has occasionally opened to us such views of the situation of the Continent, as may suggest the absurdity of expecting any improvement in its fortunes for a long course of years. The arguments which have been urged to shew the folly of pressing forward towards

a new league in 1805, operate with manifold force after the fatal changes which have ushered in the present year, and have flowed from the errors of the last. We are thus prepared for the remaining part of the discussion—the present state of continental affairs, and the new, and necessarily moderate and pacific system which it prescribes to this country.

Having, therefore, fully explained to what causes England and Europe owe the misfortunes which have lately happened, we now proceed to take a view of the extent of those misfortunes.

II. Consequences of our late Foreign Policy.

1. The actual changes of dominion which the third Coalition has already produced, are in the highest degree alarming—whether we consider them as losses to Austria or gains to France.

At the last peace, the Venetian territory had even been imagined by some to be a

fair compensation for the loss of the Netherlands. In several points of view, its importance was certainly of the very first rank. Besides a large extent of the most fruitful country, a population of nearly two millions, and a revenue of a million sterling; it gave Austria a line of sea coast, studded with excellent harbours, in the immediate neighbourhood of those rich provinces, which had long been checked in their progress, by their scanty means of foreign commerce. The acquisition of Venice easily rendered the power which also possessed the extensive dominions on the north of the Adriatic, mistress of that sea. The country to the East of the Gulf, was valuable in case any views might hereafter be formed respecting Turkey;—or might become necessary from the policy of other states in relation to that defenceless neighbour. The footing which the Venetian territory gave Austria in Lombardy, added to her dominions in the Alpine Country, served to retain somewhat at least of her former sway in the affairs

of Italy; gave her a certain security against any further changes being attempted by France in that quarter; and secured, when an opportunity might offer, the means of regaining the ascendant she had once possessed in those fine countries. All these valuable possessions are now lost; and all the prospects of which they were the foundation—the hopes of external influence, and the more solid expectation of domestic improvement, are vanished for ever. France, or her dependency, the Italian Republic, has completed the conquest of Lombardy. From the Gulf of Genoa to the Gulph of Istria, all is French.

To estimate how much France has gained by the acquisition of the Venetian provinces, it is only necessary that we should reflect on the importance of those territories to the Italian Republic, from their position, and the facilities which they afford of increasing the naval power of the enemy. The commerce of Venice, now very considerable, and only checked since the revolution by the impolitic preference

given to Trieste, will increase rapidly, when at least equal exertions are made to encourage it. At present it does not occupy less than 400 vessels belonging to the port of Venice alone. In its better days the number of these was tenfold. The naval arsenal of that city is famous, and the neighbouring harbours perfectly well adapted to the purposes of trade. The coast of Dalmatia, with the islands, possesses perhaps more fine ports, with strong fortifications, than any in the world. Nona, Zara, Sebenico, Trau, Spalatro, Castel Nuovo, Matero, Lesina, Corcyra—are but a few of the harbours impregnable to attack, and commanding every commercial advantage, which have now fallen into the hands of the Cisalpine and its masters. It is unnecessary to state how prodigious an accession of trade and force this must, in a short time, secure to France; and how paramount it must render her superiority in the Mediterranean. Whether we now attempt to defend Sicily, or avert the downfall of Turkey and the seizure of Egypt, we

shall feel the consequences of the treaty of Presburg in every operation of the war.

The loss of the Tyrol, and its annexation to the new kingdom of Bavaria, is, though not from the superior territorial value of that province, yet certainly from its relative situation, of still greater detriment to Austria than her sacrifices in Italy. The natural strength of the country, the loyalty and valour of its inhabitants, and the skill which their mode of life gave them in the warfare adapted to mountainous countries, made the Tyrol altogether invaluable as a barrier against the invasion of the hereditary states; had the house of Austria but learnt the right use of those resources. Unhappily, there prevailed a constant jealousy of the Tyrolese, and an inclination to check them in those pursuits which were their most favourite occupation, and which formed the habits, of all others most necessary for the successful defence of their country. Even in a war which threatened the throne of the monarchy, the same

evil policy continued to curb the exertions of this high spirited people; and, after weakening, during peace, by absurd restraints, the force which they could have opposed to the enemy, the court of Vienna, now, at the moment of invasion, persisted in refusing to avail itself of their services. In several places, the peasantry were deprived of arms, and checked by the army, least they should defend their mountains irregularly, while the old tacticians were retreating from the strongest holds, according to rule. Frequently, in spite of all resistance from their own master, these brave and skilful mountaineers made out the point of being allowed to fight; they generally made a successful stand, sometimes gained signal advantages over the French troops, while all their exertions were systematically thwarted by the Austrian commanders. But it is manifest, that while the province remained under the dominion of Austria, she might at any time have turned it to full account, by reforming so obviously pernicious a

system of management. During a short interval of peace, she might organise its natural force so as to render it quite impregnable; and then, whatever successes the enemy might, on any future occasion, gain in Lombardy and the Frioul, or on the Danube, his progress was effectually checked by the natural garrison which he left behind him; which must be taken, not turned; which preserved unbroken the communication with Italy and with Switzerland; which must always, if properly managed, have been the main theatre of any war, where Austria acted on the defensive. Such were the incalculable advantages, in a defensive point of view, which Austria lost by the cession of the Tyrol.

If we keep in mind the remarks formerly made upon the importance of Switzerland, we shall be enabled to perceive still further advantages for defence, which Austria has lost in the Tyrol, and to estimate the extent of this loss in an offensive point of view. The complete establishment of France

in Lombardy and the Genoese, would of itself have augmented the dependence of Switzerland upon her power. But though the passes on the West and South would have been open to her, while the Tyrol and the Voralberg remained in the hands of Austria, the Swiss might always reckon upon her powerful support; their country might be defended by its native forces against the inroads of the enemy from the other sides*, until assistance was poured in from the East; even if overpowered, their natural allies might still hope to effect their liberation, by attacking from that quarter the French who should have established themselves in the Alpine territory, as was done successfully by the Rhinthal and Engadine in 1799: and at all events, the subjugation of Switzerland would not have proved altogether fatal to Austria, when she had the strong outwork of the Tyrol on

* There are only four passes into Switzerland, from the French side, and seven from the Italian. The Swiss could easily defend these for a month or six weeks.

that side, both to oppose the new position of the enemy, and to interrupt the communication between his Italian dominions and the new acquisitions in the North, which the occupation of the Alps might give him.

But still more important, for offensive purposes, was the communication which the Tyrol afforded between Austria and Switzerland. The Swiss were beyond any other people hostile to France. Of this hatred they had given undoubted proofs in the last war; their skill in defending their own passes was truly wonderful; and no instance is on record of successes equal to theirs, won by individual dexterity and courage over numbers and discipline. While this character continued to adorn that virtuous and unconquerable peasantry, there was always a prospect of their making such a resistance to France, in the event of a wisely arranged scheme of invasion, as might enable Austria to come up, and thus attack the enemy upon his most vulnerable side. Even if she unfortunately preferred the plan of invading France by the Rhine or the Var,

and for that purpose wished to secure the neutrality of Switzerland; the possession of the Tyrol enabled her to do so; because it gave France some inducement to acquiesce in that arrangement. All the advantages, then, which were most important to Austria, whether she intended to attack France, or to defend herself by means of Switzerland, depended entirely on her possessing the Tyrol.—With the Tyrol she has now lost them for ever. Switzerland is completely surrounded by France and the French dependencies; cut off from the only power which could enable her to stand out for a moment against her enemy; delivered up without the possibility of resisting; prevented from ever being employed in the invasion of France; but ready at any time to be used as the means of finally reducing Austria. In this employment of Switzerland, the Tyrol will not only be no hindrance; it will be made to assist. The peasantry of that country will be *organised* according to their *aptitudes*, *physical* and *moral;* their privileges will be extended

for the purpose of gaining their assistance against their former oppressors, and of rendering their exertions more powerful; and Austria will at length discover the value of the Tyrol, by the services which it may render to her invaders.

The loss of the Venetian and Tyrolese territory, with the confirmation of the French power over Switzerland, has now completed the dominion of France over the whole of Italy. Every avenue to that country is finally closed against Austria and commanded by her enemy with undivided authority. From Dalmatia and the confines of Turkey, round to Strasburg, France has drawn a line of strong possessions, by which she completely hems in Italy; cuts her off from every communication with the rest of the world; and opens to her the closest intercourse with herself. Her sway being so absolute, here, it is natural that she should lose no time in exercising all the rights of sovereignty. Accordingly, she models at pleasure the kingdom of Etruria; augments the Cisal-

pine; disposes at will of the court of Rome; and dethrones, by a common regimental order, the royal family of Naples; for which last proceeding England, be it remembered, took care to furnish also the pretext, after having given the power of accomplishing it.

Thus has the grand strife between France and Austria at length been settled, by the surrender of Italy, more absolute and unconditional, and in a far greater extent, than the courtiers of Charles, of Francis, or of Lewis, ever dared flatter their masters to expect. France has now become sole mistress of that splendid country, from the Alps to the streights of Messina—its position, which domineers over the Mediterranean; its mighty resources; the fruitfulness of the garden of Europe; the bays, and rivers, and harbours which open to its produce the uttermost ends of the earth; the forests which variegate its surface, and only break the continuity of culture to augment its powers, by preparing for this favoured land the dominion of the sea; the genius and fire of its numerous people; the monuments of art;

the remains of antiquity; the ground on which the glories of their Roman ancestors were atchieved;—all are now in the hands of the nation in the world best able to improve them—to combine them—to make them aid one another; and, after calling them forth, to the incalculable augmentation of her former resources, ready to turn them against those, if any such shall remain, who still dare to be her enemies.

The other changes of dominion effected by the treaty of Presburg—the emperor's cession of his possessions in Suabia*, and his submission to the further spoliation of the German empire†;—though important in themselves, and sufficient, in any former period, to alarm all Europe for their consequences; sink into insignificance after the entire surrender of Italy, which we have been con-

* These are chiefly the Burgaw, the Brisgaw, and Contance. The whole loss of Austria has been estimated at 1297 square geographical miles; 2,716,000 subjects, and 1,600,000*l.* sterling of yearly revenue; of which three fourths have been given to the Cisalpine.

† The seizure of Augsburg and Borndorff.

templating. All those changes have one simple view—the diminution of the Austrian monarchy; its separation from France by a number of petty kingdoms dependent on the French power; the transference of the Emperor's influence in Germany to his enemies; and his confinement to the politics of the East of Europe; where, also, he is closely watched by France and her creatures. Nor does it make any difference upon the relative situation of the powers, that the sacrifices of Austria have been made to aggrandize the dependants of France, and not France herself. That overgrown empire could not expect to keep together more nations and countries than it already counted within its limits*. The only feat which the French power has not attempted, is the conciliation of those peoples whom it has conquered; the only

* —"*Quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis; alius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope Dei essent: ita quodam uno vinculo copulaverit eos, ut nulla nec inte ipsos, nec adversus ducem seditio extiterit.*"—Tit. liv. xxviii. 12.

difficulties which it has not mastered, are those that natural boundaries present. France, therefore, finds it more easy to complete the incorporation of Europe by some intermediate process, which may assimilate its heterogeneous parts, and prepare them for a lasting, as well as an intimate union. In the mean time, her sway over the principalities and powers, whom she calls into existence, is absolute and certain; her influence is hourly gaining ground. Should the course of events maintain the nominal separation of those dependent kingdoms, they may, at some future period, revolt from her federal empire; but, for years to come, they are as subservient to her purposes, as if they had no separate names. Had she not acted upon such principles; had she taken more to herself at Presburg; she would have resembled the allies whose impolicy has laid Europe at her feet: she would have seemed to gain more, but she would not have been the formidable neighbour which a deeper policy has made her.

2. But the calamities of Austria are not to be measured by the cessions that have been wrung from her. The unhappy events of the Coalition War have had a more extensive and deep rooted influence, than can appear in the articles of any treaty which may have been made to terminate actual hostilities. There are certain effects of conquest, certain symptoms of subjugation, which escape the art of the diplomatist, and cannot be expressed in public instruments. In a little month, the finest army in the imperial service was annihilated without striking a blow. From the Rhine to the heart of the hereditary states, the French marched on with one uniform success, and had not even to fight their way. The progress of their forces through the best defended countries of the Emperor, resembled a regular movement through a subject and peaceable state. Every thing gave way before them, as if both armies were governed by the same word of command; and the Austrian cabinet can

only account for the defeat of its troops by stating, that two grievous errors were committed; one, in expecting the enemy would respect the Prussian neutrality, when it stood in the way of a decisive victory; the other, in being deceived by his bare assertion respecting the armistice*. The fruit of these rapid and easy conquests was the possession of Vienna. Nor did the progress of the French arms stop there. Prussia, unmoved, saw France surrounding her on every side, by the complete reduction of Germany; she allowed the conquerors to march on in all directions, to drive the Emperor from his capital, and pursue him out of the Empire. At last, on the verge of his hereditary dominions, a general engagement takes place, the first and the last of this eventful campaign, in which the battle has indeed been to the skilful, not the strong; which, from the

* See Count Stahremberg's Note, where he states these two mistakes of General Mack and Prince Aversberg, as fundamental causes of the defeats.—Sup. pap. p. 52.

beginning to the end, has been one constant illustration of the weakness of mere physical force, and the omnipotence of talents. Is it possible that such things should speedily be forgotten? Where is the nation so stout hearted as not to feel disasters like these? The very sights of unexampled humiliation to which the people have been witness; the strange events which within a few weeks have brought the Austrian monarchy so low; must leave an indelible impression on their minds; and prepare them for new defeats, while they efface the memory of past victories. "*Nec quisquam adeo rerum humanarum immemor, quem non commoverct illa facies, Romanum principem et generis humani paullo ante dominum, relictâ fortunæ suæ sede, per populum, per urbem, exire de Imperio—nihil tale viderant—nihil audierant**." If to the state in which their defeats have left the spirit of the Austrians, we oppose the natural effects of their new victories upon the minds of the French,

* Tacit. Hist. lib. iii. cap. 68.

we shall be able to estimate how far the recollection of this memorable war leaves the balance in favour of the conquerors, beyond the mere changes of territory which it may have occasioned. There is, indeed, no closing our eyes to the extent of the misfortunes entailed upon Europe by the projectors of the late coalition. We must not deceive ourselves. The house of Austria is completely humbled; she must receive the law, not from Vienna, but from Paris; she has sacrificed much; but more she must be prepared to surrender if required, rather than run the last of risks, that of a new war. Whatever the sacrifice demanded may be, she must make it—whether treasure, or alliances, or dignities, or territory, or what is worst of all, principles. If the enemy require her to join him in attacking Prussia, or turning against Russia, or sharing the plunder of Germany, or dividing and pillaging the Turk; she cannot now balance. *Agitur de imperio.* France has Italy and the Tyrol; the people of Austria are crushed; the

French are exalted and exulting. What though the treaty of Presburgh has bound them together by no secret articles, and that its public stipulations still leave to Austria the semblance of a great monarchy? Italy and the Tyrol are French, and the campaign of 1805, lives in the recollection of both French and Germans—Do we not know that the only extensive or durable conquests have been made gradually; that in treating with a humbled enemy, you raise him by exacting too harsh conditions; that the wisest policy is to take something, and by the present, to pave the way for future gains. One only chance of retaining even the name of independence, now remains to our unfortunate ally; she must listen no more to such counsellors as hurried her into the late alliance in spite of her better reason. By skill and steadiness she may possibly preserve some part of what is left, and improve it in peace. If she once more forsakes moderate counsels, she is undone.

Nor is it Austria alone that has suffered

by this unhappy coalition. The new victories of France; the actual aggrandisement of her empire; the subjection of her rival; and the dread of her invincible arms; have now rivetted the chains of the continent. No one ever supposed that the state of things as settled at the peace of Luneville, was to last longer than the necessities which made the different powers submit to the conditions then imposed. As soon as their strength should be recruited, and their sentiments united against the French yoke, we had a right to expect that attempts would be made to throw it off. Time, only—a prudent delay, and a judicious choice of the proper moment, was required to render such a resistance effectual. But all this prospect is now vanished; the chance is thrown away, and the only hope is gone which Holland, and Switzerland, and Italy had of once more knowing independence. Henceforth the object of these unhappy states must be not to oppose France, but to moderate, if possible, the violence of her oppressions. They have England to thank

for this reverse of prospects, and it is probably the last favour they will receive at her hands.

3. If from these effects of the late war upon the state of the continent, we turn to a view of its effects upon our own individual interests, we shall find, that we have suffered, as is most just, a great share of the common loss. Besides the injury which England ultimately receives from the disasters of the rest of Europe, she is more immediately affected by the aggrandizement of her enemy, from the increased danger of invasion to which it exposes her. The fate of the third coalition has in several ways augmented this danger; multiplying both the chances of the attempt being made, and increasing the probability of its success.

Nothing is more common than to hear thoughtless persons talk lightly of such dangers. They trust that the loyalty and courage of the country would carry it through greater perils than France has in store for us. The French have never yet

been engaged with a nation of Freemen. They would find us made of different materials from the Germans. They might over-run the country and take London; but London is not England, and they would soon be extirpated. Such well meaning persons seem even to be afraid least no attempt should be made; least they should not have an opportunity of conquering upon British ground. "Let the enemy come, say they, we desire nothing more, and not a man of his force shall escape." —But it is much to be feared that this zeal, so laudable in itself, "is without knowledge." With every disposition to exalt the valour of Britons, and to augur well of their efforts in defence of the greatest blessing which any people enjoy; we may be permitted to dread the event of a contest between courage and skill. Nor was the difference between the two ever so strongly marked as since the experience of the late campaign. It is no disrespect to our troops, and their commanders, to question whether their native talents are sufficient to supply

their want of experience, and to wish that, until measures are taken to improve them in their art, there may be no trial of generalship between them and the conductors of the late German campaign. That the country could be ultimately conquered, we cannot indeed for a moment allow ourselves to believe; but there are other evils attending an invasion, besides the greatest of all evils; there are injuries short of utter ruin which a nation may receive from it. We know nothing practically of war in this happy land: we have heard of its effects, and read of battles at a great distance; but we know it not from experience, and it is well we do not. Never was a country worse calculated for being the scene of military operations, for having the hazardous issue of war tried within its bounds. With its wealth, its crowded population, its multitude of artizans and traders, its paper circulation, its public debts, its commercial credit; with the various factitious qualities of a nice and complicated system of most artificial society;

and above all, without any experience whatever of a campaign on its own ground—how frightful to contemplate the mischiefs which so unusual a convulsion must occasion, admitting it should end in the total defeat of the invader! It is clear, that no wise man will desire to see such an experiment tried, and that however it may end, the attempt would of itself be an enormous evil.

Now the risk of this pernicious attempt being made, is greatly augmented by the late defeats of our allies. Before the new coalition, the enemy, at whatever time he might attempt to execute his favourite project, had always to apprehend great danger, from his continental neighbours seizing the opportunity of his forces being occupied in England, and attacking him at a prodigious advantage. Every year that the attempt was delayed increased the magnitude of this risk; and had he deferred it a few years longer, the certainty of the continent being recruited and ready to attack him, should he give them so fair an occasion,

would probably have made him finally abandon the scheme. But we have taken care to relieve him from all such embarrassment. He has now nothing to apprehend from continental wars. We have purchased a miserable respite from our alarms, (for in spite of our boasting we were the dupes of our fears) at the expence of whatever solid benefit we might have found in a coalition able to assist us at the moment of real danger. Another check upon the French government was, the fear of the odium which would have attended a failure in the threatened project. So great a source of hope was this consideration with some, that they believed it would for ever prevent the attempt. But this too is entirely at an end. The Swabian and Moravian campaigns have raised the French Chief so high in the eyes of his subjects—have given him such an unexpected accession of popularity, and so signally increased the fame of his arms, that he may now with perfect safety try whatsoever his ambition or his caprices shall dictate. He may bury ano-

ther army in St. Domingo, or squander a hundred thousand lives in Ireland, or even risk their entire loss at sea for the chance of some part of the armament landing; all will be forgotten by a people so elated with recent triumph, or if remembered will be chearfully forgiven to the conqueror of Austerlitz. Formerly, he dared not think of failing in the projected invasion; he could only contemplate its success. Now he may be content with taking his chance of conquering, and ensuring the certainty of injuring us. That he should make thisattempt then, in every way so hurtful to our interests, is become infinitely more likely, since the wretched policy of England, by effecting the subjugation of her continental allies, and compleating the achievements of her enemy, removed the two great impediments which stood in his way.

It is equally manifest that the danger of this attempt proving successful, or at least the probable amount of the injury which we may receive from it, has been greatly

augmented by the unhappy fate of the Continent. Not only has the discomfiture of the coalition enabled France to embark a much larger proportion of her disposeable force in the enterprise; the recent successes of her arms must produce a very sensible effect on every man in her service. The confidence in their superiority which always animated French soldiers, is now greatly augmented; and they have to oppose men who know little of war, but what they have heard of in the history of the French conquests. The service of the late campaign too, was peculiarly well adapted to discipline new troops, and to increase the proportion of good soldiers in the whole army.

But while the result of our impolitic measures has thus strengthened in every respect the hands of the enemy, it is strange that we have ourselves entirely neglected the short interval of quiet which the continental war gave us. At its commencement, upwards of two years had elapsed since the British government were filled with the constant expectation of a

descent upon our coasts. Our military system was extremely imperfect, and the fear of all men was least the invasion should be attempted, before any material improvements could take place. We were indeed, "counting hours and minutes," till the enemy should land; and at this critical juncture, a respite is suddenly obtained by means of the campaign in Germany. The invasion is now necessarily delayed for half a year at least. Would not any one have conceived that such an interval was valuable beyond all price; that it gave us the very time so much wanted for the completion of our defensive preparations; that it might be the turn of the balance in our favour, when the attempt should at last be made. Yet strange to tell, this opportunity was utterly thrown away; our cabinet, as soon as the army left Boulogne, seem to have thought the whole project of invasion at an end; and never contemplating the possibility of the allies being once more beaten, they chose rather to remain spectators of the continental war, than to prepare for our

own battles, should it prove unfortunate. Their military system had been tried above a year, and might be said to have failed more egregiously than any plan that ever was devised. It had not during the whole of that period produced 1500 men in the whole island, and not five hundred of these for general service. The volunteer army, as it has been called, had relaxed in its most valuable quality of ardour and alacrity; and had been losing the only advantage which such a force can possess over regular troops, without making any sensible progress in discipline. The recruiting for the army was at a stand, and nothing whatever had been done to improve its constitution. Yet did the government allow the whole interval between the departure of the Boulogne army, and the dissolution of the late cabinet, to pass over without taking a single step for the general reform of our defensive measures, or even for the new modelling of that plan, which a fair trial had shewn to be nugatory in its original shape. They did not even assemble the parliament, with-

out whose interference no such improvements could be made. They avoided every thing which could have turned their impolicy in making the coalition, to the smallest account; and persisted in rejecting the one solitary benefit which their new war might have produced, in compensation of so many calamities. Thus, after the best possible opportunity of augmenting the strength of the country, they have left it to their successors, feeble and confused, at the very crisis when the necessary consequences of their other measures are hurrying on its fate. With such an army, with our volunteers and our defence bill, with our regular forces weakened by the conflicting tendencies of the militia and reserve, with our volunteer system counteracting all the other branches, we are now left to contend alone against the undivided force of our enemy, and his allies. "*Is autem valet exercitú, tenet multos spe et promissis, omnia omnium concupivit. Huic tradita urbs est, nuda presidiis, referta*

copiis. Quid est quod ab eo non metuas, qui illa templa et tecta, non patriam sed prædam putet? Commissum quidem a nobis certe est, sive a nostro duce, ut, è portú sine gubernaculo egressi, tempestati nos traderemus."*

Such are, in a general view, the lamentable effects of that foreign policy which we have minutely traced through its different errors, in the former part of this inquiry. We might have enumerated other evils, which have flowed from it both to Europe, and to our own individual interests. We might, for example, have stated the loss of character and influence which has attended so plain an exposure of our incapacity for continental affairs; the contempt into which our assistance has fallen with every ally, reduced as it now has been to the mere payment of money; the pains we have taken to make them underrate even those supplies which they were willing to receive, by pressing our gold upon all the

* Cic. Epist. Lib. vii.

world, and running from door to door, to beg it might be accepted; and above all, the odium which we have incurred with the less enlightened part of the continent, with the people in every foreign state, in whose eyes we have appeared only as instigators of war, and as corruptors of their rulers for their destruction. From the effects of these impressions our name will not soon recover, and we may rest assured that the Continent is at last heartily sick of our interference, and prepared to join with the enemy in his plan of excluding us from any voice in its affairs. But it was the less necessary to enter upon such topics, that they are naturally suggested by the previous discussions, and that they tend in no way to modify the picture formerly drawn of our affairs: for it is our misfortune that we look around in vain for any circumstances which may soften its features, while it is impossible to imagine any addition which can aggravate them.

III. State of Foreign Affairs, independent of the late Coalition and its Consequences.

Although the effects of our last exertions on the Continent have almost entirely new modelled it, yet there are several particulars in its present state, which have not been directly influenced by the fate of the war, partly because they lay beyond the sphere of its operation, but chiefly because our former impolicy and mismanagement had done as much detriment as was possible, to our interests in those quarters. An inquiry into the state of our foreign affairs would be imperfect without some notice of these points.

1. The unfortunate circumstance of having Spain against us, and given up entirely to the alliance, or rather the service of our enemies, during the present war, is a consequence of the impolicy of the British cabinet, previous to the commencement of the late coalition. After our rup-

ture with France, and down to the formation of the late ministry, in May 1804, it clearly appears, that the dispositions of Spain towards this country, and against our enemy, were as favourable as could have been desired*. Our popularity was never so great, either with the Court of Madrid, with the confidential ministers of the crown, or with the nation at large. France, always disliked by the Spaniards, had become still more odious from her insolent and rapacious demands; and from the intemperate conduct of her representatives. The wishes of the Spanish cabinet accorded with those of the people, in leaning plainly towards an offensive alliance with England against France. But the state of our continental relations, and our inability to give Spain any effectual support in the dangers to which such a conduct must expose her, rendered it necessary for her to delay all measures leading to a rupture; and she submitted to a convention of

* Additional Spanish Papers, presented 2d. February, 1805.—No. II. to XX.

neutrality, by which she became bound to pay a considerable subsidy to the French government. To this the English cabinet consented as a temporary measure, "intended to give time till the disposition of the great powers of Europe should be more decidedly known."* That the subsidy was extorted from Spain, by the imminent fear of seeing a French army in Madrid; that the dispositions of Spain in our favour, and her enmity to France were increased by this compulsory submission, is clearly demonstrated by the dispatches of the British Envoy†. Of these dispositions we ought doubtless to have availed ourselves. We were engaged in planning the new coalition, nothing could be more important than to include Spain in such a league. Her position with respect to France, must always render her hostility extremely hurtful to that power. Her frontier on the Pyrennees is strong, and well

* Additional Spanish Papers, presented 2d. February, 1805—No. VII.

† Ibid. No. VIII.

defended by fortified places. The French frontier is only protected by Perpignan, and France has no way of removing the danger of an attack from Spain, but by attacking her in the first instance, and forcing her to conclude a separate peace. This would have been rendered impracticable by the preparations of the allies on the East side of the French territories, and a most important accession would thus have been gained to the measures of the offensive league. By the hostility of Spain, too, France would have lost the benefit of her subsidies, and the still greater advantage of that controul over her councils, which enabled her at any time to involve every branch of the Spanish monarchy in a war with her enemies. The allies would have secured the independence of Spain, while they profited by her assistance; and prevented the subjection of the whole of her resources to France, while they converted a just and moderate proportion of them to their own use. By going to war with Spain, they necessarily threw her into the

arms of France; armed her whole force against themselves; sacrificed the benefits of a commercial intercourse, the most lucrative and even necessary to their prosperity; extended the sea-coast of the enemy from Bourdeaux round to Toulon; increased his predominating influence in the Mediterranean; and laid Portugal entirely at his mercy.

Yet this was the very line of conduct which the allies; or rather which England, in the infancy of the alliance, chose to pursue. She delayed objecting to the Spanish subsidy until she should sound the dispositions of the other Powers. Those she found to be favourable, or at least she conceived that they warranted her in expecting a new coalition against France. Instead of delaying her objections to the subsidy a few weeks longer, and then offering Spain a place in the league, when she might declare herself with impunity, England demanded that she should produce the subsidiary convention, which every one knew she was bound to conceal, at the peril of an imme-

diate war with France; and she made this bootless demand at a time when matters were not ripe for assisting her in such a war*. The pretext of armaments at Ferrol was mere trifling; they lasted exactly nine days, and were intended for quelling an insurrection in Biscay. But this pretence, with the refusal of Spain to produce the convention, were made the grounds of that unprecedented violation of justice, the capture of the frigates without any declaration of war; accompanied with circumstances of individual calamity, which have not failed to injure the English cause irreparably among the Spanish people.—Thus did our government sacrifice to the paltry object of a few cargoes of silver, its character; its prospects of assistance from Spain, at the moment when that assistance would have been most valuable; its hopes of weaning her entirely from French connexions; its expectations of the security derived from lessening our

* The point here at issue, was a mere matter of form; the tenor of the convention was publicly known.

enemy's sea coast, and the advantages connected with the Spanish commerce; above all, its chance of continuing the high favour enjoyed by England in Spain, and the influence in her councils to which it must have led. One of two plans were clearly pointed out by the state of our relations with Spain; either we should have connived at her compulsory submission to France until we could protect her in resisting the French dominion, and added her to the new league; or, if unfortunately we preferred hostilities, we should have taken care to make the war as advantageous as possible, by liberating the Spanish colonies from the galling monopoly of the Mother Country, and opening a most profitable inlet for our commercial speculations. Neither of those schemes was adopted. With our accustomed ingenuity, we contrived to find a line of policy which should avoid the benefits, and combine the disadvantages of all the others. We managed to lose the alliance of Spain at present, and her friendship for

ever; and at the same time gave up all chance of turning her hostility to our advantage. Her trade so beneficial to all the branches of our domestic industry, so essential to some of them, we abandoned for a few barrels of dollars. To prevent her from paying a subsidy to France, we incorporated her whole resources with those of our enemy; and rather than allow a neutrality, which might give a trifling aid to him, we rushed into a kind of hostility which could procure no assistance for ourselves. The total alienation of Spain from our interests; the ruin of our ancient popularity in that country; the absolute subjection of her power to that of France; has been the price paid for our acquisitions of silver bullion; and next to the evils produced by the new coalition, this is the most serious misfortune which her fatal impolicy has brought upon the continental affairs of England.

2. If we cast our eyes on the other states, who are confederates, or rather depen-

dants of France, we shall find that the hopes of their deserting her, or attempting to throw off the yoke, with the assistance of England and her allies, are slender indeed. Partly from circumstances never within our controul, and partly, no doubt, from our former impolicy, those countries are as firmly united in fate with our enemy, as if they formed integral parts of his extensive dominions.

Holland has always been regarded as the natural ally of this country. Her proximity to France, and consequent exposure to the power of that formidable neighbour; her commercial relations, the nature of her civil and religious establishments, and the character of her people, have been esteemed, in the better times of European affairs, a sufficient pledge of her inclination to connect her interests with the cause of Great Britain. Accordingly, except during the impolitic alliance of Charles II. with France, and the no less unwise enmity of the Dutch towards us in the American war, Holland has uniformly been our firm ally in all our dis-

putes with France, and our cause has never failed to gain by the connexion. But since the Dutch Revolution, this alliance has been entirely dissolved. The arms of France having over-run the Netherlands, soon established the French power in Holland. The government, the armies and fleets, the trade and the revenues of that rich and populous country, have been delivered over to our enemy, not by an offensive and defensive alliance, but by an entire conquest and subsequent acknowledgment of the yoke. From this important increase of the French power, have arisen many serious accessions to the dangers to which it exposes us. A great extent of sea-coast; a numerous body of men accustomed to maritime affairs, and eminently skilled in the navigation of the North Sea; a commercial navy, next to our own, the greatest in the world —these are but a few of the advantages which France has derived from Holland, and may turn against us in her projected attack upon our European dominions.

But many well-informed persons have imagined that the Dutch are discontented with their yoke; that they earnestly desire an opportunity of regaining their independence; and that these dispositions would both insure the success of any attempts to assist them, in freeing themselves from French influence, and deprive France of any material benefit from their services in her attempts upon England. It cannot be doubted that such hopes as these are altogether vain—that they are founded upon a mistake of the Dutch character, and upon gross exaggerations of the French policy towards Holland. A country, in the circumstances of Holland, depending entirely upon commerce for its wealth, and for its support; crowded beyond all others with a population of industrious and skilful inhabitants; covered with warehouses, manufactories, canals, docks, wharfs, and all the other acquisitions of ingenuity and labour; its very land saved from the sea by monuments of their perseverance, through a long course of ages;

its vast accumulation of riches depending entirely upon the preservation of order, and the safety of commercial credit among its citizens—such a country must always dread a change as the greatest of evils; must prefer the certainty of being indifferently well, to the chance of being better, coupled with the risk of being worse; and of all revolutions must fear those the most which may involve it in the calamities and the uncertainties of domestic warfare. An invasion, or a civil war in England, would indeed be dreadful, whatever event it might have; but Holland is in all respects less fitted for sustaining such a shock; and the Dutch are not so dull to their interests or their dangers as some persons formerly alluded to in this country; for no man in the United Provinces will be found hardy enough to contemplate an invasion as matter of exultation, or even of indifference, however sure he may be of its leading to the emancipation of his country, and however zealous to see her once more independent.

Much will be borne of real loss, and much more of degradation and insult, by every Dutch patriot, before he will rashly consent to hazard the existence of Holland in the most promising schemes for her liberation. Whatever may be the prospect of succeeding in such attempts, he will judge, and wisely judge, that the maintenance of things in their present state, is preferable to the certainty of their being improved, when that certainty must be purchased by the complicated evils of a war in the heart of the Republic. It is the nature of commerce to dread revolution and war as the last of dangers; and the Dutch depend too much upon their trade, to put honour or glory in competition with it. These considerations may, in part, account for the cold reception which our attempts to free Holland from the French yoke have hitherto met with; and may explain the reason of our being unpopular in a country formerly so much attached to us, merely because we have endeavoured to save it from op-

pression. In truth, however little the Dutch may like their French masters, and however much they may regret the changes of dominion which have altered their alliances, there is one thing which they must always dislike still more strongly than the yoke of France itself, and that is the struggle which is necessary to shake it off. We, who have forced them to undertake this struggle, by carrying the war, uninvited, into their territories, and who are always suspected of still retaining the same intentions, are not treated as real friends to their interests; and though they would not hesitate for one moment in preferring our dominion to an alliance on equal terms with France, were the original choice in their power, yet now that the French have subdued them, they have as little hesitation in preferring their present masters to those who would annoy them with attempting their emancipation.

But, in fact, the accounts of the Dutch oppressions are greatly exaggerated. Many capitalists have been ruined and forced to

emigrate. Many persons have had their wealth diminished, and the whole riches of the state are greatly impaired; but the profits which are still drawn upon the remaining stock are necessarily higher, and this of itself tends to alleviate the burthens of the capitalists who are left behind. The French have wisely confined their plunder of the state to public exactions; they have not, as in Italy, (where the Directory never intended to establish a permanent dominion), allowed the individuals of their armies to pillage the country at large. Contributions have been levied, but not by the conqueror from the people. The government have been required to furnish so much money, or support so many troops, and have been left to devise the means of raising those supplies, and to enforce their measures in their own way. It need hardly be remarked, how much lighter it is for a people to pay a very large tribute in this regular manner, than to be robbed in a disorderly way, of the smallest sum, by the licence of individuals. If any proof

were required, we might notice the violence of the hatred borne towards the French all over Italy, contrasted with the moderate dislike in which they are held by the Hollanders; though no one can believe that the Italians lost nearly so much by the invasion of their country, or that the Dutch have less regard for their property.

It deserves further to be remarked, that the wars with England, in which the revolution has engaged the Dutch, however injurious to their commerce, have greatly enriched their colonies by the prodigious influx of British capital, which has uniformly attended their falling into our hands; and among the branches of the community most likely to feel the weight of their subjection to France, the most important is Amsterdam, which, from ancient antipathy to the Stadtholder's party, would at all times have embraced any alternative for the certainty of ruining his power. If to all these considerations, we add the utter despair with which the Dutch are filled, of ever seeing their country re-established

in its independence, whatever attempts they may make for it, so long as Belgium is in the hands of France, and their conviction that the time is yet far off when any change of affairs may reduce the French power; we shall be satisfied that they are indeed lamentably deceived, who cherish the hope of assistance from the Dutch, in driving the French out of Holland, or even of maintaining the popularity and influence of the English name, among a people who reflect on our exertions in their affairs, as on so many injuries to their prosperity. We must, therefore, make up our minds to the uncomfortable prospect of Holland remaining intirely and inactively subject to our enemy and averse to us, until changes shall have been wrought in the face of affairs, which it would be idle to guess at, and pernicious to reckon upon.

The fate of Switzerland was by no means so unpromising as that of Holland, before the last campaign. How completely the changes produced by that dreadful

contest have given up the Swiss to the dominion of France, has been already demonstrated. The most short-sighted of all policy in England, or her allies, would now be to think of agitating that unhappy country with any further hopes of regaining its liberties, by new struggles against France. Were the Swiss thoroughly united together as one man, and resolved to resist the power of the masters who now surround them on every side, nothing could be expected from their efforts, but new scenes of bloodshed, and an intolerable augmentation of their burthens. While France possesses Savoy and Piedmont, and while Swabia and the Tyrol belong to her dependants who exist during her pleasure, as by her pleasure they were created; all the exertions which the Swiss can make, is inadequate to prevent them from being overwhelmed, long before any allies could break through the strong French provinces that surround them, and come to their assistance. The Cisalpine, and the petty states in Germany, are, if pos-

sible, still more dependent on France. Their disposition to revolt unhappily signifies nothing. For a long course of years they must submit in silence, however well inclined to rebel; and the worst service that the well-wishers of European independence could render them, would be to stir up any premature attempt at effecting their deliverance. We may rest assured then, that the petty states by whom France has surrounded herself, as well as the more powerful dominions which she has succeeded in subduing, are firmly united to her fortunes, some by their weakness, others by their disinclination to exert their strength in a way which they deem hurtful to their interests; that from Holland to Switzerland, and from Switzerland to Turkey, she has covered a frontier almost every where strong by nature, with dependent nations, whom there is no chance of our seeing revolt, and who will always bear the first shock of a war waged against her, if they do not actively assist in her offensive operations. What remains for the

rest of Europe to undertake, in its own behalf, may not be very easily discovered: but nothing can be more plain than the course of policy which should, at the present juncture, be avoided—the vain attempt to force those subject nations into new and ruinous efforts at regaining their independence.

3. If from a view of the dependencies of France, we turn to the contemplation of that prodigious empire itself, we shall find as little to cheer our prospects of the future fates of the European commonwealth. The resources which she draws from Spain, Italy, Germany, and Holland, are trivial when compared with the mass of real and rapidly increasing power by which she has added those states to her dominions. A population of above thirty-two millions; a revenue of twenty-five millions sterling, in spite of the ruin of her commerce, with a diminution of only three millions and a half for the interest of debt, notwithstanding the wars she has been engaged in; a regular army of five hundred

and fifty thousand men, known in almost every corner of Europe by the rapidity of their conquests, and commanded by the first generals in the world; a force not less formidable, of men whose skill in negociation has completed the victories of her troops; a spirit, the most turbulent and restless, the most impatient of peace, and fearless of war, animating all ranks of her people, and produced, in a great degree, by the long continued hostility of all her neighbours—these form together a foundation of military superiority, sufficient to alarm more powerful states than any that yet remain in her neighbourhood.

But a change has within these few years taken place, in the constitution of the French nation, still more formidable in its natural consequences to the tranquillity and prosperity of Europe, than any of those well known particulars which we have just now enumerated. We allude to the system of military conscription, by which their forces are now recruited, which has slowly grown up with the revolutionary govern-

ment, which has of late been carried into complete effect all over the country, and now forms a part of the establishment, likely to mingle itself in a short time with all the views and habits of the people, and scarcely to occasion more inconvenience or discontent, than the milder expedients of the militia law do in this island. This conscription affects all ranks of the community; every man in France, with a very few exceptions in favour of certain public functionaries, is a soldier from the age of twenty to twenty-five, not merely by inrolment as in Austria and Prussia, but in actual service; whatever be his rank or his fortune, or his pursuits in life, he must give up every other view as soon as he reaches his twentieth year, and devote his life for five years to the profession of arms alone. As there are no exemptions, unless in cases of former service, a substitute cannot be procured under an enormous sum, frequently so high as 700l. sterling, never lower than 400l. and if more than a very

small number required substitutes, it would be altogether impossible to procure them: so that in fact there are scarce any exceptions to the rule of strict personal service. The rigour of the police established all over France renders it quite impossible for any one within the specified years to escape. In every quarter the *gendarmerie* have authority to arrest all the young men whom they can find, and detain them until they can prove themselves to be exempt from the conscription. The people are now learning to submit quietly to their fate, and with the happy levity of their national character, try to make the military life agreeable. The pay is extremely small; but the rich and poor all live together, and the former contribute to improve the common fare. Every one endeavours in the first place to make himself master of the military art, in order to qualify him for being promoted; officers are chosen from the ranks without any regard to birth or fortune; the emulation and interest of the common soldiers

are kept up by their chance of promotion, and by the voice which they are allowed, to a certain degree, in the choice of their officers. The Imperial guard, which has many privileges, and is composed of persons possessing a certain fortune, constitutes a species of aristocracy of extensive influence in this system. The military schools, the only branch of public instruction which is much attended to, secure the constant supply of the higher branches of the science; and the excellent organization of the *Etat-Major General*, to which the victories of the French arms are perhaps more owing than to any other improvement in their military affairs, keeps alive during peace the practice of their scientific acquirements, while it prepares the most valuable collection of practical information, so essential to the success of warlike operations. Add to this that the great offices of the state are all in the hands of military men; that honours as well as power and wealth are almost confined to this favoured order; and that all places of trust, from the command of armies to the

management of negociations, are their patrimony.

Thus, we find, that it is no exaggeragération, no metaphorical language to denominate France a great military empire; to say that the government now calls forth the whole resources of the state, and that every Frenchman is literally a soldier. Nothing like this has ever appeared since the early days of the Roman people. The feudal militia had not the same regularity, the same science and discipline. The insurrection of Hungary, the rising *en masse* of Switzerland and America, were all confined to particular emergencies. The national guards and first conscriptions of France herself, which approach nearer to the new order of things, were still far inferior to it in systematic arrangement and extent of operation; yet by their aid, imperfect as they were in the comparison, she gained all that she had conquered previous to the last campaign. But her present system is in truth, a terrible spectacle. The most numerous and ingenious people in the world have abandoned the arts of peace, not for

their defence, but after having conquered all the nations around them. They have betaken themselves to the military life as their main pursuit, almost their exclusive occupation, not from impatience of a long continued quiet, but at the end of various revolutions and a series of the most destructive wars. With a government purely military, a stock of science peculiarly adapted to the same pursuits, and a species of wealth not likely to be immediately ruined by such a change, they have established a regular system of discipline, which draws every arm into the service of the country, and renders the whole surface of the most compact, extensive, and best situated country in Europe, one vast camp, swarming with the finest soldiers—

" Ubi fas versum atque nefas: tot bella per orbem:
" Tam multæ scelerum facies: non ullus aratro
" Dignus honos. Squalent abductis arva colonis,
" Et curvæ rigidum falces conflantur in ensem.
" Hinc movet Euphrates, illinc Germania, bellum:
" Vicinæ ruptis inter se legibus urbes
" Arma ferunt: sævit toto Mars impius orbe.

VIRG. GEORG

4. So formidable being the aspect of France, both from her federal relations and from her own internal resources, let us turn our attention towards the situation of the powers yet unsubdued by her arms; to Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who, though by no means beyond her controul, are, however, still in appearance independent. That the resources of Austria are naturally most splendid, cannot be denied. If her external commerce were more extensive, or even the general policy towards her provinces more enlightened, she might still view the strength of France without dismay. The extent and natural fertility of the countries already subject to her, renders any acquisition of new territory on the side of Turkey a vain and unprofitable injustice. While she possesses Bohemia, Gallicia, and above all Hungary; while those noble kingdoms remain almost in a state of nature, and so neglected, made her before her late disasters one of the first powers in Europe—what folly could be so great as to seek for new countries, and

persist in neglecting her ancient possessions? To explain the various measures by which she has already, not merely neglected, but stunted the growth of her hereditary provinces, would form a volume, by no means uninstructive to the political economist, who wishes to contemplate the errors of statesmen; or the practical politician, who would be warned by the example of his predecessors. We shall confine ourselves to the statement of a few particulars, which may serve to shew in how lamentable a situation the resources of the Monarchy are, and how vain all new exertions against France must prove, until time shall have been given for their gradual improvement by the adoption of a wiser system.

In some parts of the Monarchy the peasants are a great deal too much oppressed by their landlords; in others they pay too small a rent, and the land is in consequence neglected. Thus in Austria and part of Styria, the feudal services were commuted for a certain fixed sum yearly,

above thirty years ago: it was reckoned too small a compensation then, and now it is almost a nominal rent. In Hungary, on the other hand, the abolition of villenage has been legally effected by the famous *Urbarium* of Maria Teresa; but the lords retain in practice, especially in the remoter parts, a most exorbitant power over their vassals.—All over the monarchy, except in Hungary, the system of military enrolment presses very severely upon the people; every person, not noble, or exempted by his office, is liable to serve; if a person leaves the country and returns at any distance of time, he is stopped in his passage through it, and sent to the army because he had missed his turn of service during his absence. When Joseph II. wished to encourage settlers in Poland from other parts of Europe, he thought he gave them a great exemption by promising the fathers of families and their eldest sons a freedom from military service.—The crown not only carries on, upon its own account, a great variety of extensive, (it

is needless to add) ruinous speculations in trade and manufactures; it has also some of the most oppressive monopolies, of useful or necessary articles. In the towns a licence must be bought to sell almost every article of commerce; and for entering a new line of business a high price must be paid.—Except in Styria and Gallicia, salt is every where a Royal monopoly; and except in Hungary, tobacco is strictly subjected to the same oppressive restriction. The effect of these monopolies on the prosperity of the state, and their trifling utility to the revenue, may be estimated from the price to which they raise the articles in question, and the amount of net income which they yield the crown. The fossil salt, which forms nine tenths of the consumption in Hungary, and is yielded in such abundance, that in the neighbourhood of the mines, it costs but twopence a hundred weight to the crown, costs in the market nearly forty times as much, or about six shillings and sixpence. The

yearly consumption of this article in Hungary exceeds a million of hundred weight; yet this oppressive monopoly yields the crown no more than 200,000*l.* a year. The effects of the monopoly of tobacco are nearly similar; but we may judge more accurately of them by remarking, that in Hungary, where it does not exist, the best tobacco is sold ten times cheaper than the vile tobaccoes of Austria and Bohemia, are in those provinces * ; and that when the whole profit of the monopoly was farmed,

* Tobacco, on the Hungarian frontier, is not seized; but the person attempting to bring it into Austria is fined above two hundred times the price of it; and the search for tobacco is accordingly as strict as for diamonds at the mines of the East Indies. Foreign tobacco may be imported for use on paying 60 per cent. duty, but not for sale. All the manufacture and sale, without exception, is carried on upon Royal account. The degree in which Hungary is oppressed by these strange regulations, may be estimated from this, that she only exports annually 70,000l. worth of tobacco, all of which goes to the Emperor's account. The Austrians use much more of that herb than the French, and yet the total importation of tobacco into France, used, before the revolution, to exceed ten times that sum.

it yielded only 150,000*l.*—Hungary, indeed, the finest of all the provinces, and sufficient, if well managed, to render Austria the richest country in Europe, is studiously oppressed, because its free constitution prevents the crown from laying on arbitrary imposts, and monopolizing all its produce. In revenge, its tobacco is prevented from being exported (except on royal account) under the severest penalties. Its excellent wines are oppressed with duties, amounting almost to prohibitions, in order to encourage the undrinkable produce of the Austrian vineyards; but those duties are exacted even in countries where no Austrian wine ever reached, as in Croatia. Even the grains which cannot bear the expence of carriage to Fiume, if brought round through the other provinces, are loaded with the heaviest duties, and the merchant annoyed with regulations still more vexatious. To conclude this melancholy picture of impolitic conduct; the same jealousy of the people which delivered up the Tyrol to the enemy last war,

prevails with respect to the peasantry of Carinthia and Styria, in spite of past experience, in spite even of the success which attended a just confidence in the people of the frontier towards Turkey, who, since the earlier times, have been freed from vassalage, and embodied as a feudal militia. —If, to these examples of the impolicy which has weakened Austria, we add her perseverance in an inadequate military system, always ill devised, but least of all calculated to oppose the light troops and young officers of France; and the unfortunate confusion which prevails in her finances, partly from bad management of the revenue, partly from an excessive issue of paper, and the want of any bank beyond the controul of government, and partly from the signal marks of bad faith which have at different times, so late even as 1805*, been given to the public creditor;

* The discount of the paper, which formed the only currency, was, during peace, from 28 to 32 per cent. and during war much greater. The credit of the Government suffered extremely from the unfair treatment of the subscribers to the Francfort Loan, in January 1805.

we shall be prepared to judge, whether any hope can yet be placed in the speedy efforts of Austria against France—whether the wit of man can figure a season more calculated for repose, or worse adapted to the smallest movement of a warlike nature.

Having proved beyond dispute that Austria, from the natural weakness of her resources, independently of her late misfortunes, is for the present quite incapacitated from going to war with France; it is not necessary to stop long in order to consider the resources of her neighbours. Without her assistance, it is manifeſt that no project for the restraint of French encroachments can be one moment entertained; and were Russia as powerful as is vulgarly supposed, and Prussia as solid in her general strength as she appears to be strong from her excellent army; still it would be the extreme of infatuation to think of leaguing them in the common cause, alone. Yet it may not be useless to remark, that the resources of both these powers are commonly overrated. Russia possesses, indeed, an immense

empire, if we only view its extent, and the absolute numbers of her inhabitants; but that something in the situation of affairs prevents her from calling forth a large proportion of these, is sufficiently proved by the comparatively small armies which she has ever been able to send abroad. With the most noble and disinterested inclinations to support the common cause, his Imperial Majesty has not sent, by any means, such armies into the field as the Emperor of Germany, whom we are accustomed to think a much less powerful ally. There has been, too, a serious defect of talents, and chiefly of prudence, the best of talents in a statesman, among the Russian counsellors. Prussia, it may also be remarked, has a scattered territory, feeble commercial resources, and in some parts a discontented population. Her Polish provinces, like those of Austria, are sources of constant anxiety. Russia alone, of the three partitioning powers, has a secure hold of her share; and, without running any risk herself, may at any time create a revolt in either of the other por-

tions. If this gives her some influence over her two neighbours, it also tends to alienate them from her friendship, by keeping their jealousy always awake. Nor can there be a doubt, that Prussia in particular, is generally less inclined towards Russia than towards France herself*. But, in truth, the mutual dissensions of these three great powers, upon various grounds, are of too long standing to leave us any hopes, that a cordial union of them all can be formed for the defence of Europe, before time is given to adopt a conciliatory system, and to sink past differences in oblivion. At present their disunion forms the best security of the enemy. Were France, contrary to all present appearance, to shew symptoms of decline; were her strength to fail suddenly, and her approaching dissolution to afford hopes to her enemies that the crisis of European subjection was arrived; still she might trust for safety in those discords which the hand

* Since the two first editions of this Inquiry were printed, a fatal confirmation of this prediction has been exhibited in the conduct of Prussia.

of time had not yet healed; and looking at the three powers whose relations and resources we have just now been contemplating, the favourite of fortune might justly exclaim with the Roman patriot in the decline of his country, "*Maneat* "*quæso duretque gentibus, si non amor* "*nostri, at certe odium sui; quando ur-* "*gentibus imperii fatis, nihil jam præstare* "*fortuna majus potest quam hostium dis-* "*cordiam**."

5. Having taken a general survey of the present state of our enemy, of his allies, and of those powers which are upon the whole friendly to us; it may be proper, before concluding this branch of the subject, to consider the relations of England with the few powers which have preserved a strict neutrality in the present unfortunate contest, more particularly with the United States of America—the chief, indeed the only considerable nation of this description.

*. Tacit. De Mor. Germ.

It is the uniform consequence of a long continued war between the principal states of Europe, that the nations which take no part in the dispute, are employed to carry on much of the commerce of the belligerent countries, with the permission of all parties, and that they also engage in branches of trade which those belligerents wish, if possible, to prohibit. When France and England, for example, are at war, the custom of privateering, or in general of permitting the vessels of the state to capture merchantmen, renders it dangerous for the English and French traders to sail as often as during peace; and much of the business which they used to carry on must be transferred to the neutral merchants, the Danes or Americans. The mere interruption of direct intercourse between the belligerents, imposes the necessity of admitting neutrals to the trade which they used to carry on together, and to the trade which each used to carry on between the other, and third parties. The admission of neutrals to the former branch of

commerce, has seldom been objected to, except during the heat of national animosity, and even then the objection was directed, not against the neutral, but against the other belligerent. The admission of neutrals to the latter branch of commerce, the carrying trade of the one belligerent between the other and third parties, has been restricted by certain rules, tending to prevent the neutral from directly assisting the belligerent in his hostile operations. These rules have prohibited the neutral from dealing with the belligerent, in articles immediately subservient to military operations, or as they have thence been denominated *contraband of war*. In order to enforce this law, a right of searching neutral traders at sea has been claimed by belligerent powers, and on some remarkable occasions, submitted to by the government of the neutral nation. None of these points are at present an object of discussion. Neither the right of search nor the prohibition of contraband, nor the power of blockade, have for some time

past been called in question. But a branch of ordinary commerce has, during the course of the present war, passed into the hands of neutrals, so important from its extent and so unequally beneficial to the belligerents, from its being confined chiefly to the weaker party, that a disposition has appeared in the councils of the stronger party to dispute the neutral right.

In no maritime war before the present has it happened, that the superiority of one party was so decisive as to deprive the other of every chance of keeping the sea. England may generally have had the better, her fleets may have gained signal advantages, and her cruizers or privateers have annoyed the enemy's trade. But still France was not so crippled as to lose all chance of protecting her commerce. She was not so completely beset as to view a voyage and a capture with the same apprehensions. Accordingly her merchants ran the risk, which was not enormous; and continued to freight vessels for foreign ports, or to bring home their colonial pro-

duce, with the chance, but not the certainty of their being taken. Some part of this commerce fell into the hands of neutral traders; some part was carried on fraudulently under the cover of the neutral flag: but the risk was not sufficient to make the merchant give up the profit of direct traffic on his own account, with vessels and crews, and flag of his own country. But the unexampled increase of the English marine, and the almost total ruin of the French navy during the last and present wars, have augmented the risk of capture to the French trader so greatly, that he can no longer undergo it, and must be content to give up much of his traffic to neutrals, and endeavour to screen the rest by fraudulent devices. The unprecedented length of the last war, too, and the renewal of hostilities after so short an interval of peace, has increased still further the inducement, or rather the necessity of employing neutral nations, in the commerce formerly carried on by the belligerent alone. For a few years of war the privation of certain articles

of necessity or luxury may be endured; but this becomes at length intolerable, and overcomes every restraint which either government or the opposing interests of traders ca create. Those traders themselves, too, when a war has lasted long, gradually shift their capital into new channels, and withdraw more and more from the hazardous speculations, in which, during a short period of hostility, they might be contented or compelled to continue. The lines of employment which they thus leave, become, in consequence, open to neutrals, who now carry on the various branches of foreign trade, from which they were formerly excluded. Thus it has happened from the combined effects of our astonishing naval superiority, and the unprecedented length of the war, that almost all the foreign commerce of France, and a large proportion even of the coasting trade, have fallen into the hands of neutral nations, and particularly of the Americans, who have the greatest facilities of maritime carriage, and the most rising commercial sys-

tem. Among other branches of the French commerce now engrossed by American traders, with the permission of both governments, is that of the colonies. As this trade, during peace, was subject to the strict rules of the Navigation Law, common to all the maritime powers of Europe, a peculiar objection has been taken to its being suddenly laid open by the enemy to neutrals during war, for the evident purpose of screening it from our just hostility. And this interference of the Americans, in order to assist such a scheme, has been supposed inconsistent with the relations of neutrality which their nation professes to maintain.

It is in vain, the supporters of the belligerent rights contend, that England conquers the French marine, nay, reduces it almost to annihilation. Her ships of war may be captured, but the commerce of France is safe. She may declare war when she pleases; and without a ship that can make head to our weakest cruizer, she has a sure method of at once protecting

her whole trade, more certainly than if she had the entire command of the seas. She has but to suspend her Navigation Law, to admit the Americans into her colonial and coasting trade, and to fit out no vessel for sea under French colours. The English cruizers may domineer over the seas, and yet they are unable to touch a ton of her trade. She has millions floating on the vessels of neutral nations, which no enemy can reach. She reaps the whole benefits of commerce and of colonies without the risks of capture or detention. She may fit out nothing but privateers or cruizers to attack our trade, and distress our colonies, while her own are beyond the efforts of our armed vessels. She unites the whole benefits of war with all the security of peace. The rule, it is contended, which should guide us in this question, as the fairest measure of justice to all parties, is, that neutrals can only take part during war, in such branches of commerce as the domestic regulations of the belligerent allowed them to partake in during peace. This doctrine

was recognised, we are told, in the war of 1756, and has never since been disputed, though England has frequently departed from its rigour by voluntary concessions. Its policy is as obvious as its justice, say the enemies of the neutral claims. Were the present principle of unlimited neutral trade to be recognized, England might give over every pretension to naval power, abandon the hope of curbing French commerce, and despair at once of gaining any thing by a continuance even of the justest war. Should the support of our maritime rights lead to a rupture with the neutrals, which, however, is said to be most improbable, we can lose little by such an addition to the number of our enemies, in comparison of the vast detriment which we now sustain, from those neutrals tying up our hands against all the enemies we have to contend with. Better, say they, have America as well as France hostile, and exposed to our fair attacks, than France openly hostile, and America covertly protecting her from every effort of our

enmity. This will give us a chance of speedily terminating the war, or at least secure the opportunity of rendering it both safe and lucrative.

Such is the main body of the argument, in favour of the justice as well as the policy of our reviving the rule of the war 1756. The chief point at issue is the application of that rule to the colonial trade of the enemy; and, without at all entering into the question of right, we shall proceed to offer a few simple considerations, which may tend to shew that the view of the case, in point of policy, taken by the supporters of the above doctrine, is by no means a correct one, and that the importance of the whole matter at issue in the dispute has been enormously exaggerated. The following observations proceed upon the further admission, that the facts stated by the advocates of belligerent rights are accurately given, and also that wherever a neutral flag is assumed as a cover to the ship and cargo of a belligerent power, so evident a fraud is excepted from the argument. The points

to be maintained are, that, whatever right England may have to prevent the interference of America in the French colonial trade during war, no material advantage could be gained from the enforcement of such a prohibition; that the real difference between the former and the present method of carrying French colonial produce, and supplying the French colonies, is extremely trifling in its ultimate consequences; and that other reasons of a very positive nature enjoin a departure from such claims in the present situation of affairs.

To prevent a supply of colonial produce from reaching France, if not directly, at least by a roundabout importation, exceeds the power of the British navy, numerous and victorious as it is. Unless we can surround every port of the French coast with ships, and the land frontiers also with troops; and unless we are still further resolved to prohibit neutral nations from trading with France in their own merchandize, or in merchandize of our colonies, the French people must

continue to be supplied with sugar and coffee, whether we are at war with them or not. If we prevent those articles from being carried directly to France from her colonies, a small increase of the price will enable neutrals to import them into their own countries, and then re-export them to France. If we maintain that the mere importation and re-exportation, though accompanied with re-landing of cargoes and payment of duties, is still a collusive transaction, and must be prohibited, as a continuation of the original voyage; then a further increase of price enables the same produce to reach France in different vessels, while the vessels that imported it take other freights. We in fact only oblige the neutrals to have two sets of vessels, one employed between the French colonies and America, the other between America and France. The total gain of England upon these prohibitory operations, is the causing Frenchmen to drink their coffee some sous a pound dearer, which is a most pitiful advantage to us;

and creating inconvenience to America, which is no advantage at all.

But suppose we go a step further, and prevent the Americans from exporting the French colony produce at all, upon the plea that this trade was not open to them during peace; let us consider what consequences will follow. One of three things must happen if such a prohibition is rigorously enforced; either the French will be compelled to carry their produce in their own ships—or the English will be allowed to purchase it, and then sell it to neutrals in Europe, who will carry it to France—or the produce will be condemned to remain in the colonies. If the French venture at first to freight their own vessels with the produce, the British cruizers will infallibly take them, or at least the risk of capture, which made the French throw open this traffic to neutrals, will continue to be so enormous, that neither the planter nor the merchant can afford it. This expedient will therefore speedily be abandoned. If the English traders are allowed to purchase and carry the pro-

duce, it may be remarked, that such a proceeding, such an intercourse with the enemy, would be contrary to all the general rules of war, and would be a compromise of our character for the gain of the trade. But, after all, what great national end would be gained by such a commerce? The French would pay somewhat higher for the produce than if neutrals carried it; and a few English merchants would gain a certain commission upon the sale of it. The capital required to carry on this new and suddenly created branch of trade, would leave other branches in which it had formerly been employed; and those branches would be filled by the capital of neutral nations. At a peace, a new change would be necessary, the capital must partly shift back again, and must in part be thrown out of employment altogether. Such changes are rather upon the whole hurtful than beneficial in a general view. Lastly, if the produce of the French colonies is prevented from being exported, it must rot there, and the colonies must be ruined; the supplies

of provisions must fail; the work of the plantations be suspended; the Negroes revolt, and the whole be involved in ruin. Besides the cruelty of a plan which would expose to ruin and massacre, individuals whose misfortunes would have little influence on the policy of France; besides its total repugnance to the practice of civilized warfare, which never attacks private property except at sea; the evils of this system would be shared by ourselves, not only from the loss of customers, which we should feel when so much wealth and industry was destroyed in the country of our nearest neighbours, but also from the incalculable dangers of having scenes of rebellion and confusion in the immediate vicinity of our finest colonies. The plan therefore of preventing all exportation of French colonial produce, though the only consistent one in those who attack neutral rights, and the point to which all their support of the rule of the war 1756 necessarily leads them, is clearly objectionable on the most established principles, both of policy and justice.

There is, moreover, a very essential distinction to be made, between the ordinary branches of trade and that commerce which is employed in transporting the produce of the colonies to the mother country; which is rather the remittance of their rents to the great body of non-resident proprietors, than the exchange of colonial for European commodities. If Guadaloupe or Cuba were countries unconnected with France and Spain, except by the intercourse of traffic; if no further relation subsisted between them, than that the Weſt Indian territories produced commodities, which the European nations required, and must either purchase directly, or procure by a roundabout commerce—then it might be of some importance, according to the views with which maritime war is now carried on, for England to harass this branch of Spanish and French trade, and to profit by taking it into her own hands. The people of Cuba and Guadaloupe would then be paid for their produce by English merchants, and France and Spain would be obliged to buy them circuitously from England. But

this is by no means the nature of the navigation between those islands and Europe. The proprietors of the colonies reside almost entirely in the mother countries. The carriage of West Indian produce, is not on account of merchants, who are to sell it again after having bought it in the colony, but on account of absent landholders, who have no other way of receiving their rents but by having the produce of their estates brought over to them. They live not at their farm, but at the market; and their income is transmitted in goods, which they there dispose of.

Now by intercepting this communication, what would England effect? She cannot intend to stop it altogether, to prevent the colonial agents from sending any of their revenue to the proprietors, or to intercept it on the way. This would be a kind of warfare quite contrary to the spirit of modern customs; it would be more hurtful to individuals than the entire capture of the colonies where their estates lie, for in that case the conquerors never interfere with private property, and only

carry the rents of the planter round for them by a channel somewhat more circuitous. England, then, by interfering in the remittance of those rents, without capturing the enemy's colonies, can only mean to trade with the planters, to purchase the produce, and bring it home, where it will be sold again, and reach at last the consumer in the enemy's country, while the agents of the proprietors remit their rents, not in kind, but in money or bills. The same effect will be produced, if, instead of buying the produce, we only cause it to be consigned to English merchants, who, for a certain commission, sell it, and account to the planter or his agents. In either case, the colonial proprietor loses absolutely nothing. His produce is carried by English, instead of French or American merchants; the freight cannot be much greater; the commission will probably be less; he is paid by bills upon London or Liverpool, instead of Bourdeaux or Nantes, or New York; and a few mercantile houses in England gain a profit upon the consign-

ment instead of the same number of French or American houses. Surely it is neither for the gains of these individuals, nor for the sake of effecting such a change as this upon the wealth of French colonial proprietors, that we are to insist on the exclusion of neutrals from the colony trade of our enemies. We injure the enemy sufficiently by forcing those neutrals to carry the produce round by their own ports, instead of allowing it to be transported directly from the colony to the mother country, as during peace. This may raise the price of the goods to the consumer in the enemy's country; to the planter, who is most interested in the traffic, we can do no injury whatever, unless we can take the colonies where his estate lies, and then choose to violate the rights of individual proprietors; or until we discover a method of compelling people to ship cargoes in vessels which are absolutely certain of being captured.

If we can only look calmly at the whole bearings of this question, we shall discover

that the advantages which the enemy derives from the assistance of neutrals in carrying on his colonial remittances, and all the other branches of his distant commerce, are by no means unmixed with serious injuries to his prosperity, and that the neutral flag can by no means cover him from the effects of our maritime superiority.

In the *first* place, the superiority of our navy, which forces him as soon as a war breaks out, to employ neutrals in almost every branch of his commerce, has the obvious effect of creating a great shock to his mercantile affairs. Nothing is more to be dreaded in a trading country, than such sudden and extensive changes as this. Scarcely a merchant in France but must feel the consequences of our instantly transferring all the navigation of the country to the hands of neutrals, and compelling its foreign imports and exports to be entirely carried on circuitously, instead of directly. What should we not expect in this country, if, by the sudden occurrence of any event, our whole foreign, and part

of our coasting trade were thus new modelled, and, if by the occurrence of another event a few years afterwards, it were as suddenly to be drawn back to its former state? We should undoubtedly tremble for the whole mass of our commercial establishment; and if France were as mercantile a country as England, she too would be nearly ruined by so violent a succession of changes.

In the *second* place, the total suspension of the enemy's navigation is an injury of the greatest moment to his general power. It is precisely the sort of injury most desirable to our own interests, and the natural consequence of our naval superiority. While neutral ships and seamen alone are employed in carrying on the commerce of France, her only nursery of maritime power is destroyed; she loses her whole chance of gaining a navy; she can neither procure a stock of merchant vessels nor breed a race of seamen to man her ships of war. We are told indeed, that the exclusion of her seamen from trade, gives her a

great command of recruits for her vessels of war; but is this any thing more than a mere temporary supply? When the English navy has taken or destroyed the crews thus procured, or when, in a few years, they have died out, whence are their places to be supplied? The trade of France must revive, it must be re-established for some years, before her navy can be placed on the footing which it had when the neutrals began to lend her their assistance, by engrossing her foreign commerce. The ruin of all her hopes of ever acquiring maritime strength is as effectually secured by our naval superiority driving her trade into neutral hands, as it could be by our preventing her from trading at all. And let it be remembered that this is all the injury which it is our interest to make her feel from the war. The destruction of an enemy's trade is not to be desired, in order to annihilate his national wealth. By the individual prosperity of his subjects we ourselves gain; by their progress in riches we improve our own; and though his pub-

lic revenue may be augmented by the increase of his public wealth, we must necessarily augment our own revenue by the increase which our wealth receives from his. It is the "*terra potens armis*" that we have to dread, not the "*ubere glebæ.*" It is his progress in arms, not in arts, that is formidable; and there cannot be a doubt that an expedient which renders him richer and weaker—which augments the opulence of his people, and makes them harmless to their neighbours—which preserves their trade, but stunts the growth of their navy—is of all others the contrivance best suited to our interests. The surrender of the French commerce to the neutral nations, is this expedient. It preserves whatever of that commerce is beneficial to England, and destroys whatever might injure us; it gives us all the advantages of a rich neighbour, and all the security of a weak one. This is the reward of our unexampled naval superiority; it is the glorious fruit of our numerous victories; it is a benefit which provides of

itself the means of retaining it; it is a prize which we shall assuredly lose, as soon as we surrender by our impolicy the commercial greatness that makes us powerful at sea. We may prevent it from passing into the hands of France, indeed; but some other nation must take it from us, if we sacrifice our real prosperity to a foolish jealousy of the good as well as the bad; a shortsighted desire of annihilating the advantageous with the dangerous branches of our rival's commerce.

But, *lastly*, the operation of our maritime power upon the naval affairs of the enemy, besides destroying that part of his system which alone it is our interest to injure, confers important benefits upon those whom it is our interest to assist. Not only does the ruin of the French navy, by the neutral interference, produce the greatest injury to the government of France, with which alone we ought to be at war, without ruining the unoffending and peaceable inhabitants, whom we should have no spite against; but it transfers a

large portion of commercial wealth, and a capacity of acquiring maritime power, to nations naturally allied to us, by blood, by the relations of political interest, and by the intercourse of trade. The Americans, in particular, with whom our most extensive and lucrative traffic is carried on, and whose friendship in a political view we ought to court, as the only respectable state beyond the influence of our enemy, are gainers by the commerce in question, to an astonishing degree, both as a mercantile and military people. How much their commercial gains are our gains, need scarcely be pointed out; neither need we shew how greatly it is for the advantage of England, and of the world in general, that what the French power loses should pass into the hands of a state where no undue bias, either towards schemes of ambition, or measures of submission to the common enemy, has ever been shewn—a state where so many circumstances concur to establish the influence of English principles and con-

nexions; where the other powers of the continent, without having any ground for alarm, may always expect to find assistance, as soon as its means are commensurate with its inclinations.

It is in vain, then, to represent the neutral trade as a complete security to our enemies, against the effects of our maritime superiority. The injuries which it is our interest to inflict upon France, are in no wise diminished by the interference of America in her commerce. The French navy is destroyed by ours, and the chance of restoring it may be considered as at an end, during the war. The revenue of France, in so far as it depends upon colonial produce, we might wish to cut off, but we cannot; for so long as the French people have a taste for that produce, and money to pay for it, they will buy it: it will enter France, and pay duties to the government. The commercial prosperity of France we have no interest to destroy; but if we had, we could not, and the transference of the trade to neutral carriers, must always pro-

tect it in one way or another, when a long war, and a total ruin of their naval force, compels the French to embrace this last alternative, as the only chance that is left of importing and exporting commodities.

But by going to war with America, we may exclude her from the enemy's trade, prevent the further emigration of our seamen to her service, and acquire a right to reclaim those who are already gone. By turning all our vessels into armed cruizers too, and engaging in an universal piracy, we might still further enrich ourselves. We have the first navy and bravest people in the world. We may take the sea, as France has seized upon the land; and thus find our profit in preferring war with the whole world, to peace with a single nation, which has rights and advantages repugnant to our supposed interests. —After all, however, laying justice out of the question, is it our real interest to quarrel with the only power which remains unhurt by French influence, to lose our intercourse with the nation best calculated

for our commercial relations. At this moment, France and America seem of themselves disposed to a rupture; and possibly, before this time, war is declared by the United States against Spain. Ought we not to think well both of the consequences of the contest, and of the value of the matter in dispute, before we abandon so fair an opportunity of adding America to the number of our allies, and of establishing our influence there, upon the only durable foundation of alliances, mutual sacrifices, and mutual benefits? The trivial importance of all that could be gained by excluding the neutral traders from the enemy's commerce, has already been shewn. No words are required to prove, that the blanks occasioned by some sailors leaving our service will speedily be filled up; that the number of British seamen at the end of a given period will be greater, in consequence of our breeding for the American navy, just as the number of our people is on the whole augmented by the demand for men, which our colonies create.

We may feel some inconvenience in the mean time, from the progress of the enemy's commerce, and the desertion of our seamen to neutral powers. But our general policy can never surely be modelled according to such temporary considerations. The evils or difficulties in question, are the necessary consequences of the long war in which we have been engaged. They are part of that succession which the new administration have fallen heirs to—a succession made up of all the dangers and difficulties, which a long course of mismanagement and misfortune has accumulated upon the country.

We have now taken a general survey of the relations of England with foreign powers, and have viewed in detail the hopelessness of her situation, if she still

persists in building upon the chance of an immediate resistance to the influence of France. Very few words are required, to deduce from the investigation which has just been closed, the lessons of political conduct pointed out by the experience of the past, and by the actual state of affairs. That the high, unbending, unaccommodating tone, which we have been accustomed to hold all over the world, and which the personal behaviour of our foreign ministers has generally rendered still more unpalatable, is in the extreme foolish at all times, and particularly unfit for the present aspect of things, needs not be proved by a single argument, or illustrated by one example. Nor is it less obvious, that the feelings and the language of conciliation, of moderate views, of calm and temperate dignity to our enemies, of friendly sincerity and frankness to our allies, are the feelings and the language most subservient at all times to our highest interests; most consistent with our true honour; and most agreeable to the situation

in which the affairs of Europe, as well as of England, are placed in the present crisis.

The whole concerns of this great and invincible people are now committed to the care of an administration which unites the largest portion of talents, experience, rank, and integrity; the most ample share of all the qualities, whether natural or acquired, intrinsic or accidental, which ever enabled a government to secure influence with its subjects, and command respect among foreign nations. The ministers have taken upon themselves the management of public affairs, at a juncture of unprecedented difficulty and peril. For all the errors of their predecessors, in peace and in war, at home and abroad, they have become in some sort responsible. The natural consequences of those errors must be warded off by their efforts. No compromise of principles, no paltry, half measures, no incongruous mixture of big words and little doings, will bear them out in redeeming their pledge to save the coun-

try. The world will judge fairly, however, of their conduct, while it scrutinizes their measures strictly. Miracles will not be expected from them; and in all the departments of our national concerns, the magnitude of the losses which have already been sustained—the extent of the dangers which at present surround us, from no fault of theirs, will be justly taken into the estimate of their attempts to better our condition.

There are, it is true, some reforms in our practical policy which the inquiry now concluded, has plainly dictated, and which will peremptorily be expected from the new administration. We may expect that the important branch of our intercourse with foreign nations will be entrusted to men of talents and acquirements, adapted to so weighty and difficult a department of affairs; that we shall now see extended to those situations of high trust upon which depend the alliances, nay, the questions of peace and war with our neighbours, the same enlightened principles of

preference for real merit and tried integrity, that has presided over the formation of the new ministry in all its other branches.—A careful review of our colonial affairs forms another fair subject of expectation at the present crisis. Nothing can be more gratifying than the beginnings which have already been made, towards the attainment of security for our establishments in the West Indies; a security which can only be attained, by the utter destruction of the grand evil that hourly endangers our existence in those rich settlements, and the gradual relaxation of the prohibitory system, that has produced of late so many serious inconveniences.—The state of affairs in the East is no less delicate and urgent. By an unhappy departure from the only system of management which can give us a chance of security, amidst the rivals of our power, and the natural enemies of our enormous empire in those distant countries, we have arrived at a point where it is difficult to determine whether the pursuit of the path before us,

or the retracing of our steps, be attended with the greatest perils. Our measures, unfortunately successful at first, have now produced their natural effects; and even the external circumstance of military triumph has begun to forsake us; while the whole consequences of our impolicy, in the ruin of our Indian finances, the extension of our untenable conquests, the union of our implacable enemies, hitherto happily for us divided among themselves, have been exhibited by symptoms too plain to be mistaken. The details of these questions belong to another branch of this Inquiry. The subject is only alluded to here, as an additional presumption in favour of the moderate and pacific system, which every other view of our present situation concurs to recommend.—Neither is this the opportunity for discussing the various questions of domestic policy, which now press upon the attention of government. Yet, when by the most general survey of our situation in this department, we discover such radical defects in our

military system as were formerly hinted at, we may deduce a new argument in favour of the reforms which the country has a right to expect; the improvement of our military economy confessedly inadequate to the emergency; and the adoption of such moderate councils, as may give the requisite time for carrying that improvement into effect.—The state of our finances, the burthens to which the people have long been exposed, the accumulation of our debts, lead to the same conclusion.—Moderate councils are still more strongly recommended by the situation of Ireland; the difficulty of adopting at present the great measure so desirable for the prosperity of that valuable dominion; and the propriety of taking all the steps short of complete emancipation, which may assimilate the catholics with the rest of the people. An interval of peace would, indeed, be invaluable for that important branch of our empire; nor can a doubt be entertained that it would be improved in the way best adapted to restore real con-

tentment and substantial obedience by the confidence and kind treatment which can alone establish solid authority—" *Tri-* " *umpho multo clarius est, senatum judicare,* " *potius mansuetudine et innocentiâ impe-* " *ratoris, provinciam, quam vi militum aut* " *benignitate deorum retentam atque con-* " *servatam esse.*"*

It is, indeed, abundantly clear, that the state of our affairs, domestic as well as foreign, enjoins a strict regard to the conciliatory system in general, and prepares us more especially to expect in such a peace as may be consistent with our real honour, the highest advantages both to our own interests and those of Europe at large. With regard to the continent it has already been demonstrated, that nothing but mischief can possibly accrue from a renewal of the late unhappy war. What then is likely to result from things remaining in their present unsettled state? Will the enemy, so long as we refuse to give him peace, so long as we prevent our allies from treat-

* Catonis Epist. apud Cic. Ep. lib. xv.

ing, so long as we do not use our influence to bring about a negotiation—will he abstain from reaping the thousand advantages of his present situation? Will he submit to all the evils of warfare and forego all its gains? Will he unite in his plan all the losses of war and all the constraints of peace? This would be too close an imitation of our own conduct with regard to Spain. Unhappily we cannot expect to be imitated in our European tactics. Our East Indian policy will suit him better. He will go on conquering such of our allies as continue hostile; uniting with those whom he may intimidate, or allure to share in the plunder of the rest; stretching his creations of kings over the North of Germany; aggrandizing those whom he has made in the South; extending his dominion in Italy over the islands, and from Italy striding onwards to the East.

"*Jam tenet Italiam, tamen ultra pergere tendit*
"*Actum, inquit, nihil est.*"*

To all this prospect of loss, from a senseless prolongation of a war which has un-

* Juven.

fortunately reached its natural conclusion, the enemies of peace can only oppose certain vague, indefinite fears, of the dangers with which they conceive a peace to be pregnant. First they imagine that good or even fair terms cannot be expected; then they think the enemy will not be sincere; next, they dread his taking the opportunity of recruiting his resources, and especially of restoring his navy; lastly, they expect that he will take us by surprize, and attack us when he is sure to succeed. In all these apprehensions, however, there is a great deal of misconception, and no small inconsistency. As to the terms, we must first see what he offers. It is indeed very evident, that we cannot expect such favourable conditions for the Continent, as if we had not plunged it into the late war, and occasioned the ruin of Austria, the conquest of Naples, and the aggrandisement of France and her dependencies. We cannot hope for such terms as the present Administration would have gained, had it been formed two years ago. We cannot imagine that

the disasters already occasioned by our impolicy should have no influence upon our future success, whether we treat for peace or continue the war. But it is equally clear, that if the enemy finds his advantage in peace (and if he does not, we need neither expect it nor desire it) and if he estimates, as he must, the high spirit and unconquerable valour of this country, he will make no proposals which can dishonour us. He will even tempt us to overcome our repugnance towards him, and our contempt of his new authority, by some favourable concessions.—At any rate we can lose nothing by offering to treat upon fair and equitable terms; by obtaining for the first time, the favourable character of moderation and pacific dispositions; an acquisition which all must admit to be next to peace itself—which some may even prefer to it; in fine by putting our enemy, for the first time, obviously in the wrong, should the negotiation unhappily fail. Then, with regard to his sincerity, we may safely conclude that the same motive which leads

him to think of making a peace, will induce him to keep it—the motive of interest—for what can he gain by a transient peace, except the paltry cession of a few islands, which we shall always be able to retake, with the troops and shipping he may send thither, so long as our marine is superior to his.—Next, as to his recruiting his resources, and particularly his navy, this he most undoubtedly will attempt to do. We must lay our account with it. We mean to recruit our own army, and he must lay his account with that. But does it follow, that he will be able to acquire a navy equal to ours during the peace? Where are his seamen? Where are his officers and pilots? Where are his Nelsons? Should the peace last for ten years, which is unfortunately a high estimate, how much would England gain in her commerce, her finances, her colonial and domestic economy, her military system, her foreign policy! And France, too, would gain somewhat in several of these particulars. Her trade would increase, and she would acquire colonial establishments. Would not this make her

much less warlike? Would it not be utterly incompatible with the military conscription, the most formidable feature in her present aspect? Would it not render her less military in peace, and more averse to war, the greatest of evils to a mercantile and colonial nation? But could her navy in ten, or even twenty years of peace possibly grow up so as to match our own? Should we not at the end of such a happy period, enter upon the war with our commerce augmented, our finances cleared from debt, our wealth more able to supply our necessities, our navy more numerous? And would not this be the very same thing with beginning a new series of brilliant victories over the navy of our enemies? Besides, with the restoration of our continental relations and the improvement of our army, might we not fairly expect even success on shore, as well as at sea? Why is not France averse to peace from her fears of our commerce increasing, and our army being established on a new system? Why then should we, who are as

courageous as herself, dread the progress of her trade and the re-establishment of her marine? But to all such fears one answer may be given—they prove too much—they prove that peace can never be made, if they dissuade us from making it now; they have no application to this particular time, they are apprehensions of all times, and they go to involve the world in one eternal war*.

Let us hope that the distinguished

* Though no authority is requisite to prove that the position is absurd which leads to such a conclusion, it may be proper to remark that Mr. Burke, in the midst of his celebrated arguments for war with the French Republic, quotes Vattel in order to shew that, if a belligerent power fails repeatedly in obtaining the object of the war, it must at length "give peace to its people, nor wage eternal hostilities." Burke, vii. 209. Vattel, B. ii. chap. xii.—— Some persons seem disposed to view the late conduct of Prussia as a new obstacle to negociation.—It should be recollected, however, that this unfortunate difference only increases the difficulties of our situation so long as the war lasts. It is a new consequence, but surely not an unforeseen one, of the late disastrous league, and an addition to the perplexities in which the present ministers have found the country—perplexities which had been thought almost incapable of augmentation.

statesmen, who are now happily placed at the head of the government, will judge better, as they see more clearly than such desponding and narrow views permit the multitude to do; that they will justly estimate the sum of affairs, nor timidly shut their eyes to the misfortunes in which they have found the country; that with all their efforts to carry on a vigorous war, they will keep in mind how peculiarly the great end of all warfare is desirable at the present crisis, for our allies as well as for ourselves; that, without abandoning one point which the honour of England requires them to maintain, they will abjure all those false notions of honour, by which nothing but eternal hostility with all the world can ever be obtained; and that, whether we are to be blessed with peace, or compelled to prepare for new battles, they will pursue those plans of moderate and salutary reform in the various branches of our national policy, without which no glory, no safety, not even the inheritance of a name will remain for England.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

Treaty of Concert between his Majesty and the Emperor of all the Russias, signed at St. Petersburgh, the 11th of April 1805.

(Usual Preamble.)

ART. 1. AS the state of suffering in which Europe is placed, demands speedy remedy, their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of all the Russias, have mutually agreed to consult upon the means of putting a stop thereto, without waiting for farther encroachments on the part of the French government. They have agreed in consequence, to employ the most speedy and most efficacious means to form a general league of the States of Europe, and to engage them to accede to the present concert: and to engage them, in order to accomplish the end proposed, to collect together a force, which, independently of the succours furnished by his Britannic Majesty, may amount to five hundred thousand effective men; and to employ the same with energy, in order to induce or to compel the French government to agree to the re-establishment of peace and of the equilibrium of Europe.

ART. 2. The object of this league will be to carry into effect what is proposed by the present concert, namely;

(a) The evacuation of the country of Hanover and of the north of Germany.

(b) The establishment of the independence of the Republics of Holland and Switzerland.

(c) The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances will permit

(d) The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, the island of Elba included, by the French forces.

(e) The establishment of an order of things in Europe, which may effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different States, and present a solid barrier against future usurpation

ART. 3. His Britannic Majesty, in order to concur efficaciously on his side to the happy effects of the present concert, engages to contribute to the common efforts, by employing his forces both by sea and land, as well as his vessels adapted for transporting troops, in such manner as shall be determined upon in the general plan of operations; his Majesty will moreover assist the different powers who shall accede thereto by subsidies, the amount of which shall correspond to the respective forces which shall be employed; and in order that the said pecu-

niary succours may be proportioned in the manner most conducive to the general good, and to assist the powers in proportion to the exertions they may make to contribute to the common success, it is agreed that these subsidies (barring particular arrangements), shall be furnished in the proportion of one million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, for each hundred thousand men of regular troops, and so in proportion for a greater or smaller number, payable according to the conditions herein after specified.

Art. 4. The said subsidies shall be payable by instalments, from month to month, in proportion to the forces which each power shall employ in pursuance of its engagements, to combat the common enemy, and according to the official report of the armies employed at the opening of the campaign, and of the several reinforcements which may join them. An arrangement shall be made in conformity with the plan of operations, which shall be forthwith regulated as to the period when these subsidies shall begin to be paid, and the mode and place of payment shall be settled, so as to suit the convenience of each of the belligerent parties. His Britannic Majesty will likewise be prepared to advance within the current year, a sum for putting the troops in motion. This sum shall be settled by particular arrangements to be entered into by each power, who shall take part in this concert; but his said Majesty understands that the whole of the sums to be furnished to any power within the current year, as well on account of the said advance as for the monthly subsidies, is in no case to exceed the proportion of one million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, for every hundred thousand men.

Art. 5. The high contracting parties agree that the different members of the league shall respectively be permitted to retain accredited persons with the commanders in chief of the different armies, to carry on the correspondence, and to attend to the military operations.

Art. 6. Their Majesties agree, that in the event of a league being formed, such as is pointed out in the first article, they will not make peace with France but by the common consent of all the powers who shall become parties in the said league; and also that the continental powers shall not recal their forces before the peace; moreover, his Britannic Majesty engages to continue the payment of the subsidies during the continuance of the war.

Art. 7. The present concert which is mutually acknowledged by the high contracting parties to be equally valid and binding as the most solemn treaty, shall be ratified by his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at St. Petersburgh within the space of ten weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In testimony whereof, &c. &c.

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower.
(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartoryski.
(L. S.) Nicolas de Novossiltzoff.

No. I. (A.)

First separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, 11th April—30th March, 1805.

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, having made known to his Britannic Majesty his arrangements with their Majesties the Emperor of Germany and the King of Sweden, his Britannic Majesty engages to fulfil his stipulations of the present Treaty of Concert towards each of these Powers, if, in the space of four months, reckoning from the day of the signature of the present Instrument, both those Powers, or one of them, shall have caused their forces to act against France by virtue of the engagements they have taken with his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias.

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, and shall be ratified at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.
(L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI.
(L. S.) NICOLAS DE NOVOSSILZOFF.

No. I. (B.)

Fourth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, 11th April—20th March, 1805.

THE collecting of 500,000 men mentioned in Article f. of the Treaty of Concert signed this day, not being so easy as it is desirable, their Majesties have agreed that it should be carried into execution as soon as it should be possible to oppose to France an active force of 400,000 men composed in the following manner; Austria will supply 250,000 men, Russia not less than 117,000 men, independently of the levies made by her in Albania, in Greece, &c.; and the remainder of the 400,000 will be made up by the troops of Naples, Hanover, Sardinia, and others.

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, and shall be ratified at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.
(L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI.
(L. S.) NICOLAS DE NOVOSSILZOFF.

No. I. (C.)

Fifth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, 11th April—30th March, 1805.

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias engages also to march as soon as possible an army of not less than sixty thousand men to the frontiers of Austria, and also another of not less than eighty thousand men to the Prussian frontiers, to be ready to co-operate with the said courts in the proportion established by the Treaty of Concert signed this day, and to support them respectively in case they should be attacked by France, who might suppose them to be engaged in some negotiation tending towards an object contrary to her views; but it is understood, that independently of the one hundred and fifteen thousand men, which his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias will cause to act against the French, he will keep bodies of reserve and observation upon his frontiers.

It is moreover agreed, that as the forces promised by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, shall all, or in part, quit the frontiers of his empire, his Britannic Majesty will pay them the subsidies at the rate established by the present Treaty of Concert, until the return of the said forces to their homes; and moreover, the equivalent of three months of subsidy as a *Premiere mise en Campagne*.

The Russian troops already stationed at the Seven Islands, or which may be intended to be transported thither, will not enjoy the advantage of the subsidies and of the *Premiere mise en Campagne*, stipulated in the present Article, before the day of their leaving the Seven Islands to commence their operations against the French.

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, and shall be ratified at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.
(L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI.
(L. S.) NICOLAS DE NOVOSSILZOFF.

No. I (D.)

Sixth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, 11th April—30th March, 1805.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias being disposed to form an energetic Concert, with the sole view of insuring to Europe a lasting and solid peace, founded upon the principles of justice, equity, and the law of nations by which they are constantly guided, are aware of the necessity of a mutual understanding at this time upon several principles, which they will evince in pursuance of a previous Concert, as soon as the events of the war may render it necessary.

These principles are, in no degree to controul the public opinion in France, or in any other countries, where the combined armies may carry on their operations, with respect to the form of government which it may be proper to adopt; nor to appropriate to themselves, till a peace should be concluded, any of the conquests made by one or the other of the belligerent parties; and to take possession of the towns and the territories which may be wrested from the common enemy in the name of the country or states to which by acknowledged right they belong, and in all other cases, in the name of all the members of the league; and finally, to assemble, at the termination of the war, a general congress, to discuss and fix the provisions of the law of nations, on a more determined basis than unfortunately ha hitherto been practicable; and to insure their observance by the establishment of a federative system calculated upon the situation of the different States of Europe.

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, and shall be ratified at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.
(L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI.
(L. S.) NICOLAS DE NOVOSSILZOFF.

No. I. (E.)

Eighth Separate Article.

IT being possible that the bias which the French government tries to give to the counsels of the different States of Europe, may determine one or other of those States to throw obstacles in the way of the attainment of the salutary effects which are the object of the present Concert, and even to have recourse to hostile measures against one of the high contracting parties, in spite of their endeavours to establish an equitable and permanent order of things in Europe, his Britannic Majesty and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias agree to make common cause against every power, which, by the employment of its forces, or by too intimate an union with France, may pretend to raise essential obstacles to the development of those measures which the high contracting parties may have to take, in order to attain the object proposed by the present Concert.

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity, as if it were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, and shall be ratified at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.
(L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI.
(L. S.) NICOLAS DE NOVOSSILZOFF.

No. I (F.)

Eleventh Separate Article.

THE High Contracting Parties, acknowledging the necessity of supporting the propositions of peace, which it is their intention to make to Bonaparte by energetic demonstrations, have resolved to invite his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to put his armies in a state of readiness for action without delay, by completing their numbers, and by concentrating them in the neighbourhood of the borders of France. His Britannic Majesty, considering the extraordinary expences which this measure will render necessary, promises and engages to furnish to his Imperial and Royal Majesty, immediately after his accession to the present Concert, the sum of one million of pounds sterling for *Premiere mise en Champagne*, which the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland will not reclaim, in case the negotiations for peace should be crowned with success, provided that, in a contrary event, Austria would take the field immediately.

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, and shall be ratified at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.
(L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI.
(L. S.) NICOLAS DE NOVOSSILZOFF.

No. I. (G.)

Separate and Secret Article.

ALTHOUGH the High Contracting Parties have agreed by the first separate Article of the Treaty of Concert established this day between them, that Austria and Sweden shall not partake of the advantages of the said Concert but in the event of their bringing their forces into action against France, four months after its signature, by virtue of their engagements with his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; yet his Britannic Majesty, considering the advantage to the future security of Europe, which results from an union similar to that formed by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias with their Majesties the Emperor of Germany and the King of Sweden, for the purpose of opposing the further encroachments of Bonaparte, promises to fulfil the stipulations of the present Concert, in the same degree towards either of those powers, if, in the course of the year 1805, both or one of them should bring their forces into action against France, in virtue of their engagements with his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias.

This separate and secret Article shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, and shall be ratified at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.
(L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI.
(L. S.) NICOLAS DE NOVOSSILZOFF.

No. I. (H)

Additional Article.

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having, in pursuance of his sincere desire to insure success to the enterprize concerted against France, determined, in case the circumstances should require it, to augment the forces which he has promised to bring into action, to an hundred and eighty thousand men, his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland promises and engages to pay, in that case, to his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, for the troops which he may thus add to the 115,000 already agreed upon, a subsidy and a *Premiere mise en Champagne*, at the same rate as is agreed by the fifth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert established between his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias the 30th March—11th April 1805.

This additional Article shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted word for word in the aforementioned Concert, and shall be ratified by the two High Contracting Powers; and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the space of ten weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.
(L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI.
(L. S.) NICOLAS DE NOVOSSILZOFF.

No. I. (I.)

Additional Article of the Treaty of Concert, signed at St. Petersburgh, the 11th April, 1805.

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, purposing to concert measures with the Court of Vienna, by which considerable Russian armies may be approximated to the frontiers of France, by crossing the Austrian and Prussian territories, while it is declared that the object of these movements is to obtain securities for the continent, promises and engages to his Britannic Majesty, in his own name and in that of his allies, that, should even circumstances require, that at the moment when the Russian troops began their march, they should declare that this movement was in no way connected with an existing Concert with his Britannic Majesty, but that the powers of the continent reclaim the fulfilment by France of her immediate engagements with them, yet as soon as the war shall have broken out, they will no longer pursue a particular object, but that which has been determined by the Concert of the 30th March—11th April, with all the clauses incorporated with it:

In return for this assurance, his Britannic Majesty promises and engages, in the first place, to fulfil towards the Emperor of all the Russias, the stipulations of the abovementioned Concert, in all their parts, as soon as the war shall have broken out between Russia and

France, and especially to furnish for the Russian troops the subsidies agreed upon, payable from the day on which they shall have quitted the frontiers of the empire, and moreover the three months stipulated subsidy under the name of *Premiere mise en Campagne*: with this condition, nevertheless, that however long may be the term between the epoch of the departure of the Russian troops from their frontiers, and that of the commencement of hostilities, his Britannic Majesty shall not be bound to pay to Russia for that interval more than six months subsidy at the most, the *Premiere mise en Campagne* being therein comprised.

In the second place, to fulfil, with regard to Austria, all the stipulations of the abovementioned Concert, and especially all that relates to the subsidies, as soon as the ambassador of his Imperial and Royal Majesty shall have signed the act of accession of his court; and lastly, in the third place, to pay in the like manner to the other allies of Russia, who shall assist in this enterprize (except in the case of special arrangements), the subsidies which have been allotted for them by the abovementioned Concert, and on the conditions therein specified.

This additional Article shall have the same force and validity, as if it were inserted word for word in the abovementioned Concert, and shall be ratified by the Two High Contracting Parties, and the ratifications exchanged at St. Petersburgh, in the space of six weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In faith of which, &c. &c.

(L. S.) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.
(L. S.) ADAM PRINCE CZARTORYSKI.

(No. II.)

Extract from a dispatch of Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated St. Petersburgh, 29th June, 1805. (No. 27.)

MY LORD,

THE annexation of the Ligurian republic to the French empire, executed at the very moment when a Russian plenipotentiary was expected in France, charged with propositions of which the professed object had been the general arrangements of the affairs of Europe, is considered as so great an insult to both sovereigns, whose sentiments that plenipotentiary was empowered to declare, that his imperial majesty has judged under these circumstances, he could not consistently, with what is due to his own dignity, or to that of his august ally, permit M. Novossilzoff to proceed to fulfil the object of his mission.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.

The right hon. Lord Mulgrave, &c.

Extract of a dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated Petersburgh, 22d July, 1805. (No. 30.)

My Lord,

I WAS on the point of dispatching yesterday the messenger to England, when I received an invitation from Prince Czartoryski to a conference, in which he read to me some very important dispatches he had just received from Count Razoumofsky and General Winzingerode. By these it appears that the emperor of Germany is at last awakened to a sense of his true dignity, and the real interests of his empire; and that foreseeing the inevitability of war, he is determined not to leave to Bonaparte the choice of the moment to commence hostilities.

The right hon. Lord Mulgrave, &c. &c.

Extract of a dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated St. Petersburgh, 3d September, 1805. (No. 38.)

My Lord,

THE last dispatches from the Russian ambassador at Vienna speak in strong terms of the warlike temper of that cabinet; certain communications had been made from Paris, which indicated a yielding disposition on the part of Bonaparte, but to these indications Count Cobentzel seems to attach no credit, and Count Razoumofsky represents that the present character of the Austrian ministry is a direct contrast to its former timidity and indicision, and that a firm conviction seems now to prevail at Vienna, that it is through war alone that any security can be obtained against the ambition and power of France. There is just ground for expecting, that his imperial and royal majesty, being persuaded that war is inevitable, may be induced not to wait the issue of the proposed negotiations with the French government, but that he will commence hostilities at the time when the superiority of the allied forces promises the best prospect of success. Towards the beginning of October, the Austrian army upon the Venetian frontier will be completely to its full establishment, and will without doubt be greatly superior in numbers to the French forces in Italy, and the Russian armies will be sufficiently advanced into the hereditary states to ensure their arrival upon the frontiers of Bavaria, before the French troops from the coast and the interior of France can reach the German empire; I have, therefore, in several conversations lately with Prince Czartoryski and Comte Stadion, urged the expediency of losing no time in beginning the war. The prince informs me, that he has already instructed Comte Razoumofsky to press this consideration upon the attention of the court of Vienna, but that he will not fail to repeat the instructions to the Russian ambassador.

I have great satisfaction in observing the encreased energy and vigour of this court. The Emperor, foreseeing the possibility of Bonaparte effecting a large augmentation to the French army in consequence of

the menaced attack by the allied powers, has resolved to be prepared to meet such an effort, by a corresponding exertion on his part, and he has ordered a levy of four men out of every five hundred, which will produce above 150,000 men.

A corps of above ten thousand men, under the command of his Imperial highness the Grand Duke Constantine, and composed chiefly of the garrison of St. Petersburgh, began their march towards the Prussian frontier on Thursday the 22d. The troops destined for Pomerania are ready for embarkation, and will probably sail in about six or eight days; they amount to twenty thousand men. No dispatches, however, have been received from M. Alopeus, who was charged to negotiate with the King of Sweden the necessary arrangements for the landing of the Russians at Stralsund, and the augmentation of the Swedish garrison at that port.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.

No. III. (A.)

(Translation.)

Plan of Operations proposed by the Court of Vienna.

FRANCE, upon the new organization of her army, has on foot,

112 regiments of the line, - -	404,828 men.
30 regiments of light infantry, -	107,540
85 cavalry, - - - -	64,226
16 artillery, - - - -	21,430
	598,024

This number, with the addition of the different corps in Corsica and the islands, of 21 regiments of Dutch soldiers, 11 Swiss regiments, 18 auxiliary troops from Italy, and the Imperial guard, which consists of 15,000 men, makes a total of 651,964, the whole military force now on foot in France. These troops are for the greater part already on the war establishment. Any grand descent from England, upon the coast of France, with the probability of decided success, is scarcely to be expected. France may therefore venture to draw almost all her troops from her interior, and from her coasts. Besides, a well arranged national guard, in perfect discipline, would enable her to spare her troops of the line, even from where they had been employed in preserving domestic order and security. It follows, that France might employ 500,000 men in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany.

In opposition to that force, the 250,000 Austrians, and 115,000 Russians, stipulated in the last treaty, compose a total force, which is, in comparison, so much the less to be depended upon, because very little effective assistance is to be expected from the Swedes and the English. The following are the necessary conclusions from the statement.

1st. Considering this estimate, and the advantages which France enjoys in its geographical situation, whether for defence or for aggression, the maintenance of peace, till a more favourable conjuncture shall arise, seems to be infinitely desirable.

2d If, however, war should become inevitable, not only to ensure its success, but to avoid likewise evils more alarming than those of the present moment, it would become indispensibly necessary, that the allied courts should use their most vigorous efforts to oppose those of the enemy, and bring into efficiency means at least equal to theirs, if not superior.

The military arrangements, the financial, and the general policy of the allies, must concur in putting forth those energies, by which alone we can hope to give success to our efforts.

1st. Military arrangements. This co-operation in these three branches could be of very little effect, if the Austrian armies should not come into the field more than 300,000 strong. The first of the papers subjoined shews, what would be the deficiencies to be supplied in the Imperial and Royal army, in recruiting, in appointments, and in remounting the cavalry, beisdes other augmentations, necessary to raise it from its present weak state, upon a peace establishment, to the number abovementioned; and, at the same time, to leave the number of troops requisite for service in the interior of the Monarchy, and for the observance of the movements of Prussia.

The difficulties which strike upon a first view will appear still more considerable upon a due attention to the manner in which the Austrian troops are now distributed. The line formed to prevent the introduction of infectious disease, has indeed contributed to obviate, in part, that disadvantage, as it leaves the Venetian dominions of the empire no longer in danger of a surprise from the French. But, if it were necessary to take measures to oppose a great force to that which the enemy might bring against us from the interior of his dominions, then would dispositions the most prompt and vigorous be requisite, to the seasonable concentration of the Austrian troops which are, in great part, at a distance from the frontiers in danger, to put them upon the footing for war, and to bring them to act upon the points which are the most exposed. This first measure would require to be carried into effect with the greater activity, because it could not be expected that the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia should, from such a distance, arrive on the scene of action, till after the Austrian troops should have sustained the first attacks of the enemy. His Majesty will not be deterred by these great difficulties, if war should become unavoidable; he will, in that case, use his most strenuous endeavours to surmount every difficulty, and fulfil his engagements. But to give effect to this steady resolution, it is necessary;

2dly. That there should be adequate financial resources, and that the difficulties which present themselves under that head should be removed; the imperial court of St. Petersburgh has already been informed of the vast and necessary expenditure required to put the infantry, the cavalry, the carriages and artillery, the objects of the commissaries' Department, the magazines and stores, in short, every thing belonging to the army, upon the full war establishment. The succour of fifteen millions of Florins, which has been asked from England for this primary service, is not more than one-half of what is actually wanted. The expense of each campaign of the last war was from one hundred

and ten to one hundred and twenty millions. The subsequent rise of the prices of commodities would render the expense of the same objects, now, considerably greater. But, suppose it even not to exceed the former, yet the subsidy of thirty millions of Florins, which is asked from England, added to the ordinary peace expenditure of the army, would leave still an enormous deficit, which the burthened finances of Austria could hardly make good. It follows that, unless England grant the subsidy which has been demanded, it must be impossible for the Court of Vienna, notwithstanding its determined inclination, even to make those preparations for war, which are not to be attempted without an assurance of being able to follow them up, and maintain them.

These considerations being stated, it is next to be examined, what would be the detail of the operations of the armies in Italy, the Tyrol, Switzerland, and the frontiers of Germany, if they should make all their movements in perfect mutual concert. It is this concert of operations which must meet the first plans and marches of the enemy. Its prompt or tardy success, its favourable or unfavourable result, will determine, in fact, the whole fortune of the war, and of course, the fate of Europe.

Considering the geographical position of France; its German frontiers, Switzerland, which is in subjugation to it; and the Italian republic; and observing, on the other hand, the position of the hereditary dominions of Austria; it is impossible not to discern, that it would be imprudent to make any attempt from Germany, against France, in Alsace, or on the Rhine. Such an attempt could be made, only, by passing the Rhine at Manheim, or by laying siege to Mentz.

In the first of these enterprizes, there would be the vast disadvantage of advancing, from the very first step, amidst fortified places of the greatest strength; of being forced to carry on a war of sieges, with an enormous consumption of men and money, and without a prospect of any happier issue of the campaign, even at the best, than by the reduction of one of those strong places. To undertake the siege of Mentz, at least 50,000 men would be necessary to blockade the place, and to cover the operations of the siege. The extent and strength of Mentz are such, that we should be detained before that place alone for half the campaign; and no operation subsequent to its surrender, could lead to any but very uncertain and insecure results; because the places upon the Meuse on the one side, and in Alsace on the other, would every where arrest the progress of our armies. Add to these another consideration of not less weight, that, since neither of those operations could be carried into effect but by great armies, there would be few troops left to cover the Upper Rhine. The enemy might avail himself of that local weakness; might direct his attack there, while we should be occupied in the siege of Landau or Mentz; and might thus advance in a line of operation shorter than ours; might possess himself of our communications; and might get between us and all our supplies. To avoid being cut off from these, we should, in that case, be obliged to abandon every thing without striking a blow.

An attempt through Switzerland, against Franche Comte, would be, indisputably, the most formidable to the enemy. His frontiers are there open. But, as such a plan of operation could not be carried into effect but through Swabia, by the Voralberg, or below the Lake of Constance, on account of the impossibility of having supplies conveyed through the

Tyrol; it would be necessary, before attempting it, to have made considerable progress in Swabia, and to have an army of observation opposite Strasburg, to watch the enemy. It would even be necessary to have obtained some advantages in Italy, before hazarding an attack in Switzerland. A retreat of the army in Italy towards Klagenfurt, would prevent the army in the Tyrol from joining in the operations in Switzerland. The enemy would possess themselves of the Puster-Thal, (the Puster-Thal is the Tyrol between Brixen and Lientz, and communicates with the vale of the Adige), on the great road for our communications and conveyances to and from the Tyrol. We should be compelled to detach troops from the army in Germany for the interior defence of Austria, and not only to relinquish all offensive operations, but even to confine ourselves within the line of the Lech, or, possibly, the Inn in Germany, and there to take a defensive position, in order not to be at too great a distance from Austria, and to be ready to supply with due promptitude the assistance which might there be wanted. It follows, from all these considerations, that the war should begin with vigorous offensive operations in Italy. It is there we should act with the superior force of our army. A victory gained there, would afford us the same advantages for the prosecution of offensive operations against France, which France would acquire from our loss of a battle, in order to penetrate into the Austrian hereditary dominions. If the difficulties of our situation render it even impossible for us to arm and advance to act upon the frontier as soon as the enemy, how much less is it to be expected, that the troops of the Emperor of Russia could arrive in time to act at the very commencement of the war?

It would be the interest of France to use every means to anticipate their arrival, by an early and decisive superiority. Any concentration of our troops, or the march of the Russians, would not fail to afford Bonaparte a specious pretext to declare war. The force of this observation is, to prove, that, in case of war with France, the plan of operations, first distribution and disposal of the troops, the commencement and the first progress of the military movements, must be arranged, on the supposition that war will be begun by the Austrians alone.

It would be requisite, that the army in Italy should begin its movements with forcing the passage of the Adige, dislodging the enemy from the Mincio, investing Mantua and Peschiera, detaching a body of troops to the Po to observe the South of Italy, and open its way to the Adda, in order to cover the blockade or siege of these places. Only the reduction of these two fortresses, or some such great and fortunate events, as are not to be reckoned upon, could induce the commandant of this army to push his operations farther.

The army in Germany would commence its operations by passing the Inn, would enter Bavaria, and would there await on the Lech, the movements of the other armies, and in particular, the arrival of the troops from Russia. The army in the Tyrol would be determined in its movements by those of the armies in Italy and Germany

In the case of operations against Switzerland, a part of the troops in the Tyrol would be employed in an attack on the Grisons and the other small cantons; and the rest would, in the case of the success of the army in Italy, advance from its defensive positions, and join that army. This is all that, with our greatest efforts, and upon the supposition of decided success, we can expect to accomplish, till the whole

of the plans and powers of the coalition shall be in full activity. If Italy be the grand point of operation at the commencement of hostilities, Switzerland must become such, as soon as we shall have obtained successes in that quarter, and shall have advanced through Swabia. Switzerland offers to a conqueror the advantage of the shortest communication between Italy and Germany; it gives the facility of sending supplies and reinforcements with promptitude to the one or the other of these countries; and it is only through Switzerland that an entrance can be effected into France on the side of Franche Comté. It would then be necessary to cover ourselves on the side of Alsace, by taking Befort and Hunningen, and leaving, at the same time, a considerable body of troops in Swabia, to cover the right wing of the army in Switzerland from any of the attempts by the French from Strasburg, and to protect our communications, and ensure the conveyance of supplies.

The reasons have been explained, on account of which, in the general plan of operations, it is not indicated in what manner the troops of the two Imperial courts might co-operate, either in union under the same standards, or by a Concert in their movements. We must look forward to the case of Austria being attacked by France before the arrival of the Russians in Germany. The combination of the operations of the two Courts would then depend upon the resolution of Prussia. And, thanks to the wise measures of the Emperor Alexander! we are soon to learn decisively how far we may or may not reckon upon Prussian co-operation, upon the neutrality of that power, or its rejection of our propositions. We shall then be enabled to present to the Imperial Court of Russia, upon the request which it has communicated, proposals for its co-operation towards the common and general object.

We may here previously submit the consideration, that the line of operation in Italy is the most remote, and that it is there the campaign must be opened with the greatest vigour; that the Court of Vienna will therefore send a great army into Italy, in order to act with rapidity upon that line; and that therefore the march of the Russian troops, and their substitution for those of Austria, amidst the movements of the war in Italy, would be impossible.

As soon as we shall certainly know the result of the great and important step which his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias has taken at the Court of Berlin, we shall add, without delay, whatever remains to be communicated farther upon the subject of the friendly propositions here explained, and upon the plan of operations for the two Courts, in Germany, and shall forthwith submit it to the Court of Russia.

TREATY OF PRESBURGH.

(USUAL PREAMBLE.)

ART. I. There shall be from the date of this day peace and friendship between his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, their heirs and successors, their States and subjects respectively, for ever.

II. France shall continue to possess to property and sovereignty the Dutchies, Principalities, Lordships, and territories beyond the Alps,

which were before the present Treaty united and incorporated with the French Empire, or governed by the Laws and Government of France.

III. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, for himself, his heirs, and successors, recognises the dispositions made by his Majesty the Emperor of France, King of Italy, relative to the Principalities of Lucca and Piombino.

IV. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria renounces, as well for himself, as for his heirs and successors, that part of the States of the Republic of Venice, ceded to him by the Treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville, shall be united in perpetuity to the kingdom of Italy.

V. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria acknowledges his Majesty the Emperor of the French King of Italy; but it is agreed that, in conformity with the declaration made by his Majesty the Emperor of the French, at the moment when he took the Crown of Italy, that as soon as the parties named in that declaration shall have fulfilled the conditions therein expressed, the Crowns of France and Italy shall be separated for ever, and cannot in any case be united on the same head. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany binds himself to acknowledge, on the separation, the successor his Majesty the Emperor of the French shall appoint to himself as King of Italy.

VI. The present treaty of peace is declared to comprehend their most Serene Highnesses the Electors of Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Baden, and the Batavian Republic, allies of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, in the present war.

VII. The Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg having taken the title of King, without ceasing nevertheless to belong to the Germanic confederation, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria acknowledges them in that character.

VIII. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, as well as himself, his heirs and successors, as for the Princes of his House, their heirs and successors respectively, renounces the Principalities, Lordships, Domains, and Territories herein-after specified:—

Cedes and abandons to his Majesty the King of Bavaria, the Margraviate of Burgau and its dependencies, the Principality of Eichstadt, the part of the territory of Passau belonging to the Elector of Salzburg, and situated between Bohemia, Austria, the Danube and the Inn; the county of Tyrol, comprehending therein the Principalities of Brixen and Botzen, the seven Lordships of the Voralberg, with their detached dependencies; the county of Hohenems, the county of Konigsegg, Rotrensels, the Lordships of Tetnany and Argen, and the town and territory of Lindau.

To his Majesty the King of Wirtemberg, the five cities of the Danube, to wit—Ehingen, Munderkengen, Rudlingen, Mengen, and Susgaw, with their dependencies, the city of Constance excepted, that part of the Brisgaw which extends in the possessions of Wirtemberg, and situated to the East of a line, drawn from Schlegelberg to Molback, and the towns and territories of Willengen and Brentingen.—To his most Serene Highness the Elector of Baden, the Brisgaw (with the exception of the branch and separate portions above described, the Ortenaw and other dependencies, the city of Constance, and the commanding of Meinau.

The Principalities, Lordships, Domains, and territories above-men-

tioned, ſhall be poſſeſſed reſpectively by their Majeſties, the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and by his moſt Serene Highneſs the Elector of Baden, as well in paramount as in full property and ſovereignty, in the ſame manner, with which they were poſſeſſed by his Majeſty the Emperor of Germany and Auſtria, or the Princes of his Houſe, and not otherwiſe.

IX. His Majeſty the Emperor of Germany and Auſtria acknowledges the debts contracted by the Houſe of Auſtria, for the benefit of private perſons and public eſtabliſhments of the country, making at preſent an integrant part of the French Empire, and it is agreed that his ſaid Majeſty ſhall remain free from all obligation with reſpect to any debts whatſoever which the Houſe of Auſtria may have contracted, on the ground of the poſſeſſion and of ſecurities on the ſoil of the countries which it renounces by the preſent treaty.

X. The county of Salzburgh and of Berchtolsgaden, belonging to his Royal and Electoral Highneſs, Prince Ferdinand, ſhall be incorporated with the Empire of Auſtria, and his Majeſty the Emperor of Germany and Auſtria ſhall poſſeſs them in full property and ſovereignty, but by the title of a Duchy only.

XI. His Majeſty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, engages himſelf to obtain, in favour of the Archduke Ferdinand, Elector of Salzburgh, the ceſſion of his Majeſty the King of Bavaria, of the Principality of Wurtzburgh, ſuch as it has been given to his ſaid Majeſty by the recess of the Deputation of the Germanic Empire, of the 25th Feb. 1803.

The Electoral title of his R. H. ſhall be transferred to this Principality, which to his R. H. ſhall poſſeſs in full property and ſovereignty, in the ſame manner and on the ſame conditions that he poſſeſſed the Electorate of Salzburgh.

And with reſpect to debts, it is agreed, that the new poſſeſſor ſhall ſtand charged only with thoſe debts reſulting from loans formerly agreed to by the States of the country, or the expences incurred for the effective adminiſtration of the ſaid country.

XII. The dignity of the grand Maſter of the Teutonic Order, its rights, domains and revenues, which before the preſent war were dependencies of Mergentheim, the chief place of the Order; the other rights, domains and revenues, which ſhall be found to belong to the grand maſterſhip at the preſent time of the exchange of the ratification of the preſent treaty; as well as the domains and revenues in poſſeſſion of which the ſaid Order ſhall be, at the ſame epoch, ſhall become hereditary in the perſon and deſcendants in the direct male line, according to the order of primogeniture, in which ever of the Princes of the Imperial Houſe as ſhall be appointed by his Majeſty the Emperor of Germany and Auſtria. His Majeſty the Emperor Napoleon promiſes his good offices to obtain, as ſoon as poſſible, for his Royal Highneſs the Archduke Ferdinand a full and entire indemnity in Germany.

XIII. His Majeſty the Elector of Bavaria ſhall occupy the city of Augsberg and its territory, and unite them to his States, in full property and ſovereignty. In the ſame manner the King of Wirtemberg may occupy, to his States, and poſſeſs in full property and ſovereignty the county of Borndorff; and his Majeſty the Emperor of Germany and Auſtria engages himſelf to give no oppoſition.

XIV. Their Majeſties the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and

his most Serene Highness the Elector of Baden, shall enjoy over the territories ceded, as well as over their ancient estates, the plenitude of sovereignty, and all the rights resulting from it, which have been guaranteed to them by his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, in the same manner as his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, over their German States. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, both as chief of the empire, and as co-estates, engages himself not to oppose any obstacle to the execution of the acts which they may have made, or will make in consequence

XV. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, as well for himself, his heirs and successors, as for the Princes of his House, their heirs and successors, renounces all the rights as well of sovereignty, as of paramount right to all pretensions whatsoever, actual or eventual, on all the States, without exception, of their Majesties, the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and of his most Serene Highness the Elector of Baden, and generally on all the states, domains, and territories comprised in the circles of Bavaria, Franconia, and Suabia, as well as to every title, taken from the said domains and territories; and reciprocally, all pretensions, actual or eventual, of the said States, to the charge of the House of Austria, or as Princes are, and shall be, for ever extinguished; nevertheless the renunciations contained in the present article, do not concern the properties which are by the 11th article, or which shall be by virtue of the 12th article above, conceded to their Royal Highnesses the Archdukes, named in the said articles.

XVI. The titles of the domains and archives, the plans and maps of the different countries, towns and fortresses ceded by the present treaty, shall be given up in the space of three months from the date of the exchange of the ratifications, to the persons that shall have acquired the property of them.

XVII. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon guarantees the integrity of the empire of Austria in the state in which it shall be in consequence of the present treaty of peace, as well as the integrity of the possessions of the Princes of the House of Austria, pointed out in the 11th and 12th articles.

XVIII. The high contracting parties acknowlege the independence of the Helvetic republic, as established by the act of mediation, as well as the independence of the Batavian republic.

XIX. The prisoners of war made by France and her allies from Austria, and by Austria from France and her allies, and who have not been yet restored, shall be restored within 40 days from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

XX. All commercial communications and relations are re-established in the two countries on the same footing as before the war.

XXI. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, and his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, shall maintain between them the same ceremonial as to rank and etiquette as was observed before the present war.

XXII. Within five days from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, the town of Presburg, and its environs, to the extent of six leagues, shall be evacuated. Ten days after the said exchange, the French, and the troops of the allies of France, shall evacuate Moravia, Bohemia, the Viertel Unter Vienner, Wald, the Viertel Unter

Manhertsberg, Hungary, and the whole of Styria. In the ten following days they shall evacuate the Viertel Vienner Wald, and the Viertel Ober Manhertsberg; and finally, in the space of two months from the exchange of the ratifications, the French troops, and the troops of the allies of France, shall evacuate the whole of the Hereditary States of his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and of Austria, with the exception of the place of Braunau, which shall remain for one month at the disposal of his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, as a place of dep ot for the sick and forthe artillery.

No requisition, of whatever nature, shall be made of the inhabitants during that month. But it is agreed that at the expiration of the said month, no corps whatever of Austrian troops can be stationed or introduced within a circuit of six leagues around the said place of Brannau. It is in like manner agreed, that each of the places which are to be successively evacuated by the French troops within the times above-mentioned, shall not be taken possession of by the Austrian troops till eight and forty hours after the evacuation. It is also agreed, that the magazines left by the French army, in the places which they shall successively evacuate, shall remain at its disposal; and that the high contracting parties shall make an arrangement relative to all contributions of war whatsoever imposed on the different hereditary states occupied by the French, an arrangement in virtue of which, the raising of the said contributions shall cotirely cease from the day of the exchange of the ratifications. The French army shall draw its provisions and its sustenance from its own magazines, established on the routes by which it is to proceed.

XXIII. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, commissaries shall be named on both sides to give up and receive in the names of their respective sovereigns, all parts of the Venetian territory, not occupied by the troops of bis Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy. The city of Venice, the Lagunes, and the possessions of Terra Firma, shall be given up in the space of fifteen days; Venetian Istria and Dalmatia, the mouths of the Cattaro, the Venetian Isles in the Adriatic, and all the places and forts which they contain, in the space of six weeks from the exchange of the ratifications. The respective commissaries will take care that the separation of the artillery belonging to the Republic of Venice from the Austrian artillery be exactly made, the former being to remain entirely to the kingdom of Italy. They will determine by a mutual agreement the kind and nature of the objects, which being the property of the Emperor of Germany and of Austria, are consequently to remain at his disposal. They will agree either on the sale to the kingdom of Italy, of the objects above-mentioned, or their exchange for an equivalent quantity of artillery, or other objects of the same, or a different nature, which shall have been left by the French armies in the hereditary states.

Every facility and every assistance shall be given to the Austrian troops, and to the civil and military administrations, to return into the Austrian states by the most convenient and sure ways, as well as to the conveyance of the imperial artillery, the naval and military magazines, and other objects which are not comprehended in the stipulations of sale or exchange which may be made.

XXIV. The ratifications of the present treaty shall be exchanged within the space of eight days, or sooner, if possible.

Done and signed at Presburg, the 26th December, 1805

THE END.

C. Stower, Printer, Paternoster-row.

EIGHTH EDITION.

AN

ANSWER,

&c.

Printed by C. Stower,
32, Pater-noster Row, London.

Lane, Joseph

AN ANSWER

TO THE

INQUIRY

INTO

THE STATE OF THE NATION;

WITH

Strictures on the Conduct of the present Ministry.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

A SUPPLEMENT

ON THE

PROSPECTS AND TERMS OF PEACE.

Ubi sunt, C. Pansa, illæ cohortationes pulcherrimæ tuæ, quibus a te excitatus senatus, inflammatus populus Romanus, non solum audivit sed etiam didicit, nihil esse homini Romano fœdius servitute?

CIC. PHILIP. 12.

EIGHTH EDITION.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JOHN MURRAY, FLEET STREET.

1806.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Inquiry into the State of the Nation appears, on a cursory perusal, the production of a superior mind. The reader is induced to believe, that the author has successfully illustrated general principles by the evidence of facts, and that his performance exhibits a combination of the enlightened views of the philosopher with the experience of the statesman. Had it possessed in reality this merit, had the soundness of argument equalled the elegance of its stile, that work would have deserved the patronage not of a minister

merely, but of the country—the attention not only of the present generation, but of posterity.

A second and more scrupulous perusal, however, will dispel the illusion. An attentive investigation of the arguments on which the author of this Inquiry has rested his opinions, will discover their fallacy in many cases, and their over-strained application in all. This work, which has been so generally circulated, and by some so much admired, will be found to prove a splendid superstructure on a false basis—like the newly-discovered relics of antiquity, interesting to contemplate, but which, when touched, crumble into dust.

In an inquiry into the state of this rich and powerful nation, it is singular that, except the character of our present mi-

nistry, there should not be discovered a single favourable circumstance in our situation—no cheering ray to diversify a picture of the most gloomy colouring. A melancholy note is struck at the beginning, and the doleful cadence continues to the end. The state of our public funds has entirely escaped the notice of this *impartial* writer. Our naval victories, although only a few months old, appear to have fled from his recollection. Perhaps he is prepared to argue, that flourishing finances, and unparalleled naval triumphs, have no connexion with our foreign relations, or with the state of the country.

Let us examine, in the first instance, the plan of the work before us, and how far its substance fulfils its title. The author confines himself almost entirely to

our *foreign relations*, and divides them into the following heads.

I. The late continental alliance.

II. The consequences of our late foreign policy.

III. The state of foreign affairs, independent of the late coalition and its consequences. Under this head the author discusses the origin of our war with Spain, and the neutral ques ions.

It is apparent from this outline, that the work under review is only nominally an Inquiry into the State of the Nation. In reality, it is an exposition of every unfavourable circumstance in the state of our relations with foreign powers. In other words, it is a most gloomy catalogue of

the difficulties under which the Right Honourable Secretary for the Foreign Department is desirous that the public should believe he has entered upon office. It concludes with lavishing the most profuse encomiums on the talents, experience, rank, and integrity of the Right Honourable Secretary and his friends.

Before proceeding upon an examination of the work, it is natural to inquire in what light Lord Grenville views its publication. We believe it is without example in the history of those constitutional parties which have divided the attachments of our countrymen, that a minister should lend his sanction to a pamphlet replete with the most bitter censure of his colleagues—a colleague who is not only a distinguished member of the cabinet, but the head of administration. The allusions

to the former conduct of the Noble Lord, are direct—the condemnation they convey is unqualified. The author dwells on the "high, unbending, unaccommodating tone which we have been accustomed to hold all over the world." Now, Lords Hawkesbury, Harrowby, and Mulgrave, the successors of Lord Grenville in office, have never even been accused of giving offence to foreign courts by haughty or unbending conduct. The reprobation so pointedly expressed in the Inquiry, is applicable, therefore, in a particular manner, to Lord Grenville. Indeed the author leaves us in no doubt in this respect. I shall quote his own words—"To have looked forward beyond the next year; to have taken measures in silence for the slow preparations of distant events; to have gradually disposed the minds of a people in our favour by kind treatment, for which no immedi-

ate return was expected, or won them by any other means than a manifesto from a commander, at the head of a paltry force; to have laid plans of war beforehand, which should not for some time burst into view with glare and noise: All this would have indicated a strange, unaccountable deviation from the system which has been unremittingly at work *since the treaty of Pilnitz**, by day and by night, during war and during truce, in aggran-

* Such were the expressions in the first edition of this work; but the author thought proper subsequently to strike out the words, "since the treaty of Pilnitz." Was Lord Grenville galled by the pointed censure of his conduct, which was thus spread abroad by his colleagues in office? Did Mr. Fox and his friends shrink from the just indignation they had roused, and attempt to eat their words? But was this mere withdrawing of so pointed an allusion a sufficient reparation for this public and gross insult? Or, indeed, does the mere omission of these five words in any degree alter the correctness of the censure?

dizing the proud and crushing the humble."

These expressions require no comment. Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville are the acknowledged leaders of the cabinet, and I leave the reader to judge of the prudence of the minister who can give circulation to such unqualified accusations of the former conduct of his colleague.

The answer I propose to the present Inquiry may be properly divided into two parts,

I. An examination of the arguments adduced against the late ministry in regard to the last campaign as well as other continental affairs; and

II. An inquiry how far the present mi-

nistry have verified the predictions of our author, or justified the lofty encomiums he so confidently bestows on them.

In the first part, I will discuss, in succession, almost every important topic in the Inquiry. Without disputing with its author the superiority of rhetorical embellishment, I will fairly meet him on the legitimate ground of political disquisition —in a contest not of words but of facts— not in a stile of studied declamation, but in the direct and candid language of solid argument. Truth in politics, as in other subjects, generally lies in a narrow compass. She is to be found, not by indulging the excursive flights of imagination, but by a diligent, a scrupulous, a rigid exercise of reason.

In disproving the fallacies with which

this work is replete, I shall feel much satisfaction in lending my humble aid to the vindication of our late illustrious statesman. While I repel the aspersions of party, I shall not, however, attempt a complete illustration of his character. For such a task, I should feel my talents feeble and inadequate. Nor does his memory stand in need of panegyric, for it will remain engraven on the hearts of his countrymen. But there is a living character of less imposing aspect, the discussion of whose merits is intimately connected with the object of my work. The "Inquiry into the State of the Nation" has been industriously patronised by the Right Honourable Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It would be inconsistent with his reputation for manly conduct to circulate what he did not believe; and I shall not, I presume, be contradicted, when I

consider as his the sentiments expressed in a work which has been currently termed the Manifesto of the new Ministry. In the Answer to the Inquiry, the Right Honourable Secretary, therefore, becomes a conspicuous object of attention. He has treated with ridicule the claims of his predecessors to public confidence—it is now time to examine his own. He has pourtrayed the late ministry as the most deficient of mankind in judgment and information. Let us scutinize the validity of his own pretensions to these qualities by an inquiry into the consistency of his opinions on several subjects of high interest—into their origin, their accuracy, and their depth. Such an inquiry will aid us to ascertain whether he is equally wise in Government as formidable in Opposition; whether he is in reality the great man he has been called; and whether his opinions

bear the stamp of reflexion and judgment or are the genuine offspring of a mind which conceives in precipitation and brings forth in error.

AN

ANSWER,

&c.

THE Author of the Inquiry begins by remarking, that previously to the commencement of hostilities, no attempt at negotiation was made. He enlarges on our having taken no step to procure "the mediation of Russia, a power equally favourable to us and the independence of Europe." But this disposition, while it afforded to us the strongest inducement to desire her mediation, was an insurmountable obstacle to its adoption by France. Bonaparte, in January, 1805,

soon after committing the grossest outrages against the laws of nations and the independence of neutral powers, in the seizure of Sir George Rumbold and the robbery of our Messenger, suddenly transmits to us a pacific overture. Our cabinet return an answer, at once manly and temperate, declining to enter into any negotiation until they should consult their allies, and particularly the Emperor of Russia. Had there been any probability that, on the part of France the mediation of Russia would have been accepted, our government would have been unquestionably most desirous to have urged the cause of justice under so favourable auspices. But all direct intercourse had ceased between Russia and France. Indignant as Russia was at the multiplied aggressions of France, is it probable that Bonaparte, although he granted passports to Novozilzoff, would have acceded to any proposition so specific as a negotiation for peace with England, under the mediation of Russia? He would have rejected the

overture, and accompanied his refusal with his characteristic disdain; unless, indeed, he committed to Talleyrand the composition of the reply. In this case, Russia would have received a vague and insidious answer, in the strain of that which he transmitted to Austria, on a similar proposition, at a subsequent period of the year—"That on the one hand from the nature of things, and on the other from the situation of circumstances, it was not even permitted to hope that the proffered good offices could be employed with advantage."

The seizure of Genoa, the author contends, was an adequate cause for the rupture of the proposed overtures of Novozilzoff. It was inferior in importance, perhaps, to the invasion of Switzerland, or the incorporation of Piedmont; but an act of aggression is momentous, less from its political consequence, than from the spirit of the aggressor. Bonaparte had given very recent assurances of pacific dis-

position, both in his overture to our Court, and in granting passports to Novozilzoff. But he had scarcely subscribed his name to the latter pledge, when he violates good faith anew in the face of all Europe, by the seizure of one of its most ancient states. This act of perfidy, serious in itself from the importance of its object, was doubly dangerous, from the time of its execution. As demonstrative of his insatiable ambition and lawless violence, it was most alarming to all Europe. Need we then wonder that, to an independent state, it was the signal for breaking off the advances to a negotiation which could not even be commenced without dishonour?

The author next proceeds to argue, that the league had no precise or definite object in view. In opposition to so extraordinary a charge, I shall quote the Treaty itself.

Art. 2d of the Treaty of Concert at St. Petersburg, 11 *April,* 1805.

" The object of the league will be to carry into effect what is proposed by the present Concert, namely,

" *(a)* The evacuation of the country of Hanover and the North of Germany.

" *(b)* The establishment of the independence of the republics of Holland and Switzerland.

" *(c)* The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances will permit.

" *(d)* The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, the island of Elba included, by the French forces.

"(c) The establishment of an order of things in Europe, which may effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different states, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations."

On the first article our author makes no comment; but he affects to be doubtful of the meaning of the second, which stipulates the independence of Holland and Switzerland. He inquires, whether by this treaty is meant the nominal independence of these states, as had been already guaranteed by the treaty of Luneville; or their real independence, consisting in security from French influence during peace, and invasion during war. Is it possible to doubt that a league, formed expressly for establishing the independence of these republics, should not mean their *real* independence? Was it provable that so important a measure should have been adopted with no other object than their *nominal* independence, or that independence

for which the treaty of Luneville had provided, and which experience had demonstrated to be inadequate. The terms of the treaty of Luneville would at any time have been carried into execution by France, on condition of peace with England alone. But the confederacy was formed in order to get better terms; and its object was undoubtedly not merely the evacuation of these republics by the French troops, but the restoration of their barriers in the same condition as previous to the French revolution—barriers which, in the better times of Europe, had maintained for centuries the independence of both republics.

Our author appears entirely unacquainted with the nature of the Dutch frontier. His words are—"As soon as a new war breaks out—as soon as the occupation of Holland is of the smallest importance to France, or detriment to us, has she not the means of again over-running the Dutch territories in a week?" After so confident an assertion, we should be induced to

think that the Dutch barrier, once so famous, had been totally swept from the face of the earth. How has this writer, then, disposed of Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom, two of the strongest cities of the universe! Where has he placed Bois-le-Duc and Gertruydenberg, or has he forgot how much French blood was shed before the fortresses, comparatively inconsiderable, of Grave, Williamstadt, and Sluys? By every treaty between France and the United Provinces, all these places, as well as others of strength, have invariably constituted an integral part of the latter.

He proceeds to state, that "the whole of Flanders, from Ostend to Antwerp, from Antwerp to Wesel, is French. No barrier remains between the enormous mass of the French dominions, and the little, insulated, defenceless province of Holland. The strongest part of her frontier, the triple line of fortresses which surround France in the north, is opposed to the weakest side of the Dutch territories."

The whole of this extract, with exception of the two first lines, is erroneous. That part of the Dutch territories which is opposed to the French frontiers, instead of being their weakest side, is the strongest barrier in Europe. It contains the fortresses I have mentioned, and can besides be completely inundated in twenty-four hours. Our author calls it the weakest side of the Dutch territories. Now the fact is precisely the reverse; for it is their only strong side. Where else do they possess a fortress which deserves the name? Is this the sum of that volume of knowledge in foreign affairs which has been so lavishly ascribed to our Right Honourable Secretary in that department? And after this detection, what claim can an author have to our confidence?

In regard to Italy, likewise, he affects to consider the expression in the treaty as vague and indeterminate, "The evacuation of Italy by the French troops," he says, "would be nugatory in its effect.

The whole Cisalpine territory is substantially a province of France, whether she rules it by French or Italian troops, and even if entirely freed from French armies, would continue under the influence of France, acknowledge her alliance, and receive her troops as soon as hostilities were renewed." I answer, that from Turin to Tarentum, the name of Frenchman is held in detestation. Let them fulfil the provisions of the treaty, by withdrawing their troops, and re-establishing the king of Sardinia in Piedmont, and not a vestige of French influence will remain in all Italy. The whole system established by Bonaparte, his boasted laws and institutions, would share from this indignant people a fate equally destructive with that of the unwary Frenchman who wanders from his corps to fall by the stiletto.

The author has in this part of his work put to himself a question, to which it will be gratifying to have a more explicit answer. "It may be asked," he says, "is

the situation of Europe so hopeless, that no means can be devised for accomplishing the grand objects which we have been rapidly surveying? Must Holland be united in fate with Belgium, and the Cisalpine decide the destinies of the south? The consideration of these matters belongs to a future stage of this inquiry." I have looked through the pamphlet in vain for a reply to this interrogation, and I solicit the author's attention to the pledge he has given us of his sentiments on so interesting a topic.

He proceeds to argue, that we hurried on the allies to a premature contest, before circumstances justified a conviction of their firm adherence to the league. He insinuates that our reliance on the hostility of Russia to France should have been doubtful, because their political relations had recently borne the aspect of good understanding. How completely is experience at variance with these arguments! Russia, firm to her purpose, continues

faithful to the alliance, and the resolute enemy of Bonaparte's insolence and aggrandizement. Austria, likewise, although fatally unsuccessful in the conduct of the campaign, was not inconstant to the league. She adhered to it with characteristic fortitude, and never forsook it until compelled by imperious necessity.

The author of the Inquiry next blames our government for forming treaties, and stipulating subsidies, with Russia and Sweden, before we had secured Austria. The answer is obvious. These powers, remote from France and safe from her hostility, durst form engagements, which at that early period of the alliance would have been the height of imprudence in her immediate neighbour. In cementing a general league which is necessarily a work of time, and of communications between the respective powers too frequent to escape the eye of a watchful enemy, do you propose to begin with that power which, from its contiguity, he can make

the object of his immediate vengeance? Certainly not. The just and obvious policy is, let us make our arrangements in the first place with those powers who are safe from the resentment of France: let us next exhibit to Austria the nature and extent of the aid we have procured for her. It will then remain for her to determine whether that aid is such as to justify her to incur the hazard inseparable from a grand effort to resent the aggression of France.

Inconsistency is the genuine offspring of error; and the performance under review now affords a striking exemplification of this maxim. The author blames ministry for cultivating an intimate connexion with Russia, at a time when he conceives Austria was offended with that power. Yet, in the next page, he finds out that these two cabinets were so well reconciled, that the influence of Russia with Austria was *formidable*, and a princi-

pal cause of the court of Vienna acceeding to the league.

The author of the Inquiry proceeds in a train of general reasoning, to argue that delay was infinitely desirable to Austria, and might be prejudicial to France. But the discovery has come too late. In order to have benefited the country, the late Opposition should have given us this information before the events of last campaign. Their sentiments, however, with the exception of Mr. Fox, were then highly favourable, not only to continental alliance, but to continental co-operation. On the opening of the session on the 15th January last year, Lord Grenville expressed anxiety, not merely for a confidential intercourse with Russia, but for her active assistance. On the 20th June, Lord Carysfort blamed ministers for having been perfectly inactive for more than six months, in regard to continental connexions. Lord Grenville urged that no time should be lost,

either in acting with the continental powers as allies, or taking them as the umpires of our differences in open congress. Even Lord Howick, on the same day, urged a great and powerful co-operation on the continent. His speech, like those of the other members of Opposition, (except Mr. Fox) implied, that the alliance of either Austria or Prussia, joined to Russia, would form that great co-operation; for it was distinctly stated, that no one had ever been so sanguine as to expect the accession of both Austria and Prussia. The coalition actually formed was therefore not only in correspondence with the advice of Opposition, but its magnitude exceeded their demands, and surpassed the expectations of the most ardent. That was the time to have disclosed the circumstances in the situation of Austria which forbade her to tempt the hazards of war. But, on the contrary, although Austria was in the mouth of every speaker, no one seemed to think her situation unfavour-

able to active hostility; and all, except Mr. Fox, called for her co-operation. And such was the general satisfaction upon the developement of so extensive a confederacy, that the Opposition press, while they termed it a glorious coalition, made every exertion to deprive Mr. Pitt of the merit of its formation.

The events, however, of which Mr. Fox alone expressed an apprehension, have taken place. Had he then the gift of foresight? or was *he* alone, of all our statesmen, qualified to judge rightly on this most important subject? Appearances may suggest this conclusion; but an investigation of circumstances will condemn it. The opinion he so decidedly asserted, was supported by no conclusive arguments. We shall look in vain in his speech for any allusion to the superior talents of Bonaparte, or for any exposition of those errors on the part of confederacies, by which one vigorous opponent has generally been

enabled to overcome a coalition of several nations, united indeed by treaties, but differing both in their political views and in the conduct of their operations. Had he enforced the application of such considerations as these to the actual state of Europe, and deduced, in a chain of argument, those reasons which made him differ from all our other statesmen, he would have merited the reputation of superior judgment. We find, however, only a general allusion to the former disasters of Austria. She had been defeated, when acting alone in 1797 and 1800, and forced to sign the treaties of Leoben and Luneville. Mr. Fox mentioned these treaties; but he urged no arguments applicable to the new situation of Austria, when assured of the cordial co-operation of so formidable a power as Russia.

Was there not then a most material alteration in the state of circumstances, when to the solitary efforts of Austria was superadded the confederate strength of a sis-

ter empire? And, entertaining a conviction that both Austria and Russia, assisted by England, were unequal to cope with France, was it not incumbent on him to explain his reasons for so singular an opinion?

These reasons, I apprehend, we shall be forced to seek elsewhere than in the immediate subject of discussion. Mr. Fox has been through life the advocate of peace and the opponent of government—the prophet of success to France, and of failure to her adversaries. The French revolution had been formerly described by him as an event splendid but harmless. In 1802, when France had half a million of soldiers, he counsels a reduction of our army. Then, indeed, he assigned his reason. It was on account of the strength of our navy, and because the navy was a more constitutional force. In 1802, then, the danger from France does not appear to him sufficiently great to share his jealousy with the influence of the crown; but, in 1805, so

formidable does he consider France, that if England, Russia, and Austria, with united force, dare to take the field against her, the war is not only hopeless, but the existence of Austria is endangered.

Did Mr. Fox, in dissuading an active co-operation on the continent, recommend any other efficient measure in its stead?—The only suggestion he offered, was the vague and nugatory plan of a general congress. "Offer," said he, "at once the most reasonable terms. France will either accept them, or, by her refusal, she will draw on herself the indignation of Europe, in a degree commensurate with your moderation." In reply, I ask, what will this avail you? Europe has been indignant for years at the aggressions of France. No new display of arrogance, no fresh violation of sacred treaties, were requisite to increase her sense of injury. The independent powers had long complained, but the gate was barred to every demand of satisfaction. The cup of the bitterness of

Europe was full; but when she appealed to Bonaparte, the substance of his replies were, "You shall drain it to the dregs, and you shall not even remonstrate."

Mr. Fox, therefore, opposed a continental coalition, without offering any effectual substitute. In the blindness of his predilection for peace, he forgot that, with so domineering a neighbour as France, the only chance for obtaining permanent tranquillity is in vigorous war. In depreciating the importance of an alliance with Russia and Austria, he differed not only from all the leading men on both sides, but with that inconsistency which has frequently marked his conduct, he differed from himself. In June, 1805, he says, "I will refuse my sanction to any subsidy to Russia, even if leagued with Austria." But, in May, 1803, so highly did this *profound* statesman estimate the influence of Russia and the condescension of Bonaparte, that he exclaimed, "I ask any one who has attended to the affairs of the continent, whe-

ther he thinks that France, if she saw Great Britain and Russia firmly united against her, would not be *appalled* into justice and moderation."

Our author occupies nearly ten pages in treating of the imprudence of commencing hostilities before the disposition of Prussia was ascertained. He comments on the changes of disposition in that power, and on her apparent hostility to the confederacy at the commencement of the operations. While he acknowledges that our documents on this important matter are *peculiarly defective*, he adopts a decided tone throughout, on a subject, in many respects, involved in mystery. This is neither a candid procedure, nor likely to lead to a true result. Let us, in availing ourselves of the scanty materials afforded by the official papers, combine with these an attentive consideration of circumstances and events. This mode of reasoning will be found more favourable to the attainment of impartial conclusions on a most

interesting topic, than the plan adopted in the Inquiry, which appears to recognise no arguments unless those which have a tendency to censure the conduct of the allies.

Had the allies deemed the assistance of Prussia essential to the success of the coalition, and relied on obtaining it, such confidence in a power whose policy has long been either wavering, or favourable to France, would have been extremely injudicious. It appears, however, from the whole tenor of the official documents, that they neither reckoned upon her accession to the league, nor considered her co-operation necessary for their success. But although they neither calculated on her alliance, nor viewed it as indispensible, it is probable they entertained hopes that in consequence of the league, Prussia would be reanimated to a sense of what she owed to her own safety and to the interest of Europe. That these hopes were not without foundation, may not only be presumed

from a just view of her own situation, but is made apparent by the promptitude with which she assumed a hostile attitude to France immediately after the violation of the territory of Anspach, from the known disposition of her Minister Hardenberg, and from the influence of Russia at Berlin —an influence of which it is difficult to describe the nature or extent, but which appears from its effects to have been very powerful.

Of the hostility of Prussia the allies had no reason to be afraid. She had continued neutral since 1794, during a series of campaigns in the heart of Germany. Even when Austria fought alone, Prussia could not be induced by France to a departure from her favourite system. Much less would the arguments of France have availed, when Russia not only favoured the cause of Austria, but had become a principal in the war. Russia is not only the immediate and most formidable neighbour of Prussia; but I have the authority

of the writer of the Inquiry himself when I state, that the provinces of Polish Prussia are a constant subject of anxiety to the Court of Berlin; and that Russia, without incurring risk to herself, may at any time excite them to revolt. There is therefore no danger that the Cabinet of Berlin will hazard a war with that of St. Petersburg. With a view to the maintenance of peace in Germany, she interdicted, in the first instance, the passage of her territories to the Russians. But she had communicated a similar injunction to the French. This, therefore, was no act of hostility to the allies, but a demonstration of neutrality.

In urging the importance of the accession of Prussia to the league, our author maintains, that "without her co-operation, every chance of ultimate success was against the allies; with her aid, it was scarcely possible their scheme could altogether fail." This declaration is by much too absolute. The success of a confederacy against France depends less upon the

number of its component members than upon the spirit which invigorates and the talents which direct. In a coalition of several powers, the accession of another conveys less additional strength than the numerical statement of her forces may suggest. In an alliance of Austria and Russia, the addition of 150,000 excellent troops to the armies at their disposal, would be an incalculable augmentation of force. Not so the co-operation of 150,000 Prussians, commanded by different generals, actuated by distinct views, and acting on a remote part of the theatre of the war. In multiplying allies, you lose the benefit of unity of action, you incumber your plans, you delay your operations. Russia is to Austria a most valuable ally, not only from the magnitude of her power but from her disinterested views. Too distant from France to have any object in territorial acquisitions in the theatre of the war, she makes that disposition of her troops which Austria recommends. She renders their operations subservient, not

to the acquisition of a particular province, but to the general purposes of the league. Prussia, on the other hand, is possessed of territories near the seat of war, and desirous of making conquests for herself. Instead, therefore, of generously contributing her whole force to the common object of the league, she will direct her operations to the attainment of points conducive to her own views. An army of 50,000 men may be thus detained for months, in the siege of a fortress, garrisoned by one-fourth of their numbers, while the enemy throw the mass of their troops, in irresistible force, in a different direction. Had Prussia been, from the beginning of the campaign, an active member of the coalition, the scenes of her operation would naturally have been Hanover, Westphalia, and ultimately Holland. According to their usual policy, the French would have left in these countries scarcely any more regular troops than were necessary to garrison the fortresses. The chief part of their force would have

been withdrawn to attempts of daring enterprise towards the centre of the war. The sieges of Hameln, and of the fortified towns in Holland, would have long occupied the Prussians. During this precious interval, the French would have made a diligent and effectual use of their troops in a different quarter. And it would have been conformable to their system to have brought back, on the approach of winter, large bodies into Brabant and Flanders, and to have attempted, by dint of an overpowering force, the recovery of the Prussian conquests.

However singular it may appear, the Austrians have been more successful in several campaigns without than with allies. In 1794, although aided by the Prussians, the English, and Dutch, they experienced nothing but disasters. Left alone in 1795, they obtained the most brilliant victories. The issue of the campaign of 1796, had it not been for the fatal talents of Bonaparte, would have been eminently successful. In

the memorable campaign of 1799, they repulsed the French in every direction, and met with no misfortune until the arrival of Korsakoff, with 30,000 Russians, induced the Archduke Charles to give an unfortunate extension to the theatre of operations.

These examples by no means prove that the accession of an ally confers no increase of strength, but they warn us against adopting the additional numbers as the rule of computation for the extent of actual assistance. The aid of 150,000 troops, so well disciplined as the Prussians, would be incalculable were they placed at the absolute disposal of the generalissimo of the coalition. But if they receive their orders from the Court of Berlin, we must make a most important deduction from their computed efficiency, in consequence of the distinction of their objects, and their distance from the central operations of the war.

The author of the Inquiry finds fault with Ministry "for not attempting to avail themselves of the favourable change produced in the sentiments of Prussia, by the violation of the territory of Anspach, in submitting the whole dispute to Prussian mediation at a time when France," he affirms, "would have listened to whatever came from Berlin; while the forces of Austria were not irreparably injured, and the armies of Russia were still unimpaired." In this instance, as in many others, our author's reasoning is at variance, not merely with probability, but with facts of public notoriety. The violation of the territory of Anspach took place on the 4th and 5th October; and in a week afterwards, by Mack losing the opportunity of retreat, his army was lost to Austria. The sentence I have quoted must have one of two meanings: Either "that Ministers ought to have acquired the knowledge of the violation of Anspach, procured the mediation of Prussia, and saved the Austrian army in a week,"

which is too absurd ever to have been in the contemplation of the author; or "that they should have obtained the Prussian mediation before the Austrian forces were otherwise injured than by Mack's surrender, and *while the armies of Russia were still unimpaired.*" Strange to tell, this explanation of the author's meaning is equally inconsistent with fact as the other with possibility; for before the Austrian force was otherwise injured than by Mack's surrender, before the Russians had fought at all, (except at Krems where they were victorious) Count Haugwitz *did* arrive in the French camp with offers of mediation, to which Bonaparte *refused to listen*, except on the terms he had already offered to Austria—terms equivalent to her absolute and unconditional submission.

Mediation is a favourite topic with our author. He seems disposed to recommend it on every occasion; and there is an obvious correspondence between his

views in this respect, and the strain of pacific sentiments expressed at all times by Mr. Fox in the House of Commons. It is important, however, to observe, that the French are still more formidable in negotiation than in the field; and the history of Europe since 1792 offers a series of proofs of the fatal effects of armistices and treaties. Their object in making these is not to conclude an equitable peace, but to gain time, to divide allies from each other, to effect separate negotiations, and always to avoid treating with a confederacy. Even in the latter case, if obliged to treat with several powers at the same time, all the chances of success from diplomatic artifice are in favour of France. In the progress of the negotiation, she will calculate on detaching one at least of the allied courts from the league. In regard to the duration of the conferences, as she is under no necessity to consult any other power, she may make it as long or as short as suits her purpose. She may at one period gain time, by inducing false

expectations of a conceding disposition, or she may proclaim a sudden rupture, if she consider her forces in a state of preparation to anticipate the allies. Upon the violation of the territory of Anspach Prussia with one hand unsheathed the, sword, and with the other, opened the path to amicable negotiation. Our ministry then dispatched Lord Harrowby to secure her in the interest of the league. The chief object of his mission was probably a liberal overture of subsidy, if she would join her forces to the common cause. Had ministers omitted so important a measure, or had they confined themselves, as the author of the Inquiry recommends, to soliciting her mediation, what a torrent of abuse would have been poured upon them by the Opposition! They would have been told that a confederacy is formidable only in the field—that in negotiation it loses not only its energy, but the chance of its existence—that when a coalition has been formed, the only just policy is to proceed to im-

mediate action—that when a great power indicates a disposition to accede to a league, the most decisive measures should be adopted to procure her immediate co-operation in the field—and that ministers, by confining their application to Prussia, at such a crisis, to the solicitation of her mediatory offices, had lost the only moment for the redemption of Europe—a moment which would never return.

The writer of the Inquiry next censures the British government for allowing the command in chief to be intrusted to General Mack. I agree with him that this choice was singularly injudicious, but the interference of our Cabinet could not have prevented his nomination. The same blind predilection in the Court of Vienna which led to his appointment, would have persisted in his choice. An ally may interpose in the election of a commander for a particular service in which that ally is interested. Had the campaign proceeded as originally proposed, it is proba-

ble that that part of the Austro-Russian forces which would have been stationed to preserve the communication between the allies in Hanover and the grand armies in the South, would have been given to any officer the English Cabinet might have preferred; but to prescribe to Austria the nomination of the commander in chief of her forces, in the heart of her own empire, would have been an attempt not only fruitless but highly offensive to a great sat.

The Austrian plan of operations was very judiciously drawn, and has been generally ascribed to Mack, with the qualification that he was skilful to combine but unfit to execute. After misconduct, however, so glaring and inexcusable as that of last year, combined with his former errors, it is inconsistent to allow him any skill but that of intrigue, or any art except that of impressing others with a notion of his ability. It is very extraordinary that a man of such contemptible

parts should have been so long in favour at the Court of Vienna. No individual has contributed more to the success of France, and to the degradation both of his own country and of Europe. It is very probable that his influence with Prince Cobourg in 1792 and 1793 counteracted that vigorous plan of warfare which the genius of Clairfait would have recommended, and which, when he became commander in chief, he so gloriously exemplified. In 1799, Mack was sent to Naples, and in a few months entirely lost the army intrusted to him. Finally, in 1805, he is placed at the head of one of the finest armies ever sent into the field, and in six weeks he delivered it into the possession of the enemy.

Our author proceeds to state, that a grand error was committed by the Austrians in passing the Inn, and carrying the war at once into Bavaria before the Russians were near to support them. The influence of England, he adds, should have

interfered to "modify the plan of the campaign, and prevent the violation of the Bavarian neutrality."

To suppose that Austria would pay any attention to the suggestions of so distant a cabinet as our's, in regard to her operations in Bavaria is almost as extraordinary as to believe that our Admiralty would send to Vienna for instructions for the channel fleet. Passing by this charge as undeserving either of the author's attention or of mine, I shall proceed to a more interesting topic——the consideration of what should have been the conduct of Austria to Bavaria. This question will involve reflexions on some of those grand causes which decide the fate of battles and the issue of campaigns—a subject most important in itself, and essential to a disquisition of this nature, but on which it does not appear from the Inquiry that its author has bestowed the attention it deserves.

The conduct of Austria to Bavaria ought to have been similar to that of the King of Prussia to Saxony in 1756. That vigilant prince foresaw the approach of a war, in which he had reason to believe that his neighbour was concerned—he therefore took immediate possession of his country. The connexion between Bonaparte and the Elector of Bavaria was notorious. The electoral house is the hereditary enemy of the house of Austria. When his troops have fought under its banners, it has been the effect, not of cordiality but of necessity. The known duplicity of the Elector not only justified but necessitated the promptest measures. The obvious policy of Austria was, therefore, as soon as she judged hostilities inevitable, to invade Bavaria with a very numerous army, to over-run it with the greatest celerity, to disarm every electoral soldier, and to strip the treasury of its last dollar, not with the mean intention of finally retaining the money, but to deprive the Elector of the means of ful-

filling his perfidious engagements with France.

The invasion of Bavaria took place on the 7th September. The time appears to have been well chosen, as it was exactly the period at which Bonaparte ceased to entertain all ideas of peace, and to prepare with energy for war. While the main body of the Austrians passed the Inn, a division under General Klenau was ordered to advance by forced marches to Neuburg on the Danube, to cut off the retreat of the Bavarians into Franconia. Hitherto all was well managed, and the electoral army, it was probable, would soon have been surrounded, when the credulous Mack listened to the treacherous negotiations of the Elector and countermanded Klenau's march, at a time when the progress of the Austrians against Bavaria should not have been suspended an hour, by night or by day, except for the purposes of indispensible refreshment to the

troops. The consequence of the Elector's falsehoods, and of Mack's simplicity, was the safe retreat of the Bavarians to meet the French at Wurtzburg.

To have communicated the intended league to a power so intimately connected with France as Bavaria, in the expectation of gaining her over to the alliance, would have been the height of folly. Instead of treating the Elector with more delicacy, as the author of the Inquiry recommends, the great error was in showing him too much, and in suspending operations for a moment upon the pledge of so faithless a prince.

Although to invade Bavaria and disarm her troops was the undoubted policy of Austria, it by no means follows that the campaign should have been opened on the Iller. Wherever it was opened, the duty of the Austrian commander was unquestionably to retire upon the approach of the French, until he should have been joined

by the Russians. The plains of Suabia and Bavaria offered to the Austrians every advantage for retreat—here were no defiles or mountains to impede their retrograde march, or enable the enemy to cut off even detachments. It was not requisite to fight at all, unless perhaps some actions between the cavalry, a description of force in which the Austrians are far superior. That Mack should not have adopted so obvious a measure would justify the suspicion of treachery or madness, were we not assured, by fatal experience, that his intellects are of the meanest class.

Our author proceeds to explain the importance of Switzerland in an offensive war against France, and to insist on the impropriety of Austria acceding to the neutrality of that republic. I agree with him in regard to the importance of that country, and that it is in vain to think of assailing France elsewhere with effect, But it must be apparent to whoever has read the official papers, that although Aus-

tria acceded to the demand of the Cantons as long as Bonaparte should respect their neutrality, she was fully impressed with the advantages of carrying the war through Switzerland, into Franche Compte. It was evident, however, that until the whole of the Russian force should have arrived, there was no probability of the operations of the allies being sufficiently successful or extensive to justify the expectation of carrying the war into Switzerland. To have refused, therefore, to acknowledge the neutrality of Switzerland, would have been to have declared to France, from the beginning, the plan of the campaign—a declaration not only most imprudent but wholly unnecessary, for the chances were a hundred to one that before the allies could have penetrated to the neighbourhood of Switzerland, the French, agreeable to all former and reeent example, would have of themselves violated its neutrality.

If it be argued that Austria ought not

to have made any calculation on the probable conduct of the French, but to have declared from the beginning her determination to make Switzerland the theatre of war, although such declaration was neither prudent or necessary, I answer, that if such conduct be dignified, it is not wise; and that the simplicity it would discover, would at once unfit Austria to be the adversary of a power who is incapable of good faith, and whose whole policy is a system of fraud and falsehood.

The next object of our author's animadversion, is the conduct of the British ministry in the mode of our co-operation. He begins by blaming the expedition to Hanover, when a diversion might have been effected either in Holland or the north of France. To this the answer is obvious. By sending our troops to Holland, or the north of France, we should have exposed them to speedy destruction. What chance of success could attend a

detached force in the heart of an enemy's country, remote not only from the assistance, but even the communication of our allies? By sending our troops to Hanover they formed, in conjunction with the Swedes and Russians, an efficient army; and had not fortune so unexpectedly proved adverse to Austria, they would have assailed Holland in the only quarter in which her frontiers are open to attack.

Boulogne now becomes the subject of our author's attention; and he censures government because, when the French were conceived to have withdrawn their troops, they made no attempt against the flotilla. In a work professedly founded on official documents, and written in a style superior to common pamphlets, it is extraordinary to see the adoption of so vulgar an error as the eligibility of an attack, last autumn, upon Boulogne. "Expeditions of descent are, of all operations

in war," says a very intelligent author *, "the most difficult and dangerous. To all the fortuitous accidents of war, are joined those of the seasons, the weather, and the sea." The batteries of Boulogne are of such strength that they may be defended by a very small number, compared with the force of the assailants. What proof have we that all the veteran troops were at any time withdrawn, and the defence intrusted to new levies? How absurd is it to suppose that such a master in the art of war as Bonaparte should leave this, the most important of all his stations, inadequately protected. And even had there been a reasonable expectation of success, would our government have been justified in wasting on an object purely English, those forces which our engagements with our allies, and the common cause of Europe, called to the scene of combined operations?

* Character of European Armies.

He proceeds to find fault with government for accompanying the pensions to Swiss officers, with a stipulation that they should not reside in their own country. If government required the condition of non-residence, I must conclude, until the contrary be proved, that this measure was suggested by substantial reasons—especially when I perceive that the arguments advanced in the Inquiry, to censure, in this respect, the conduct of government, are fallacious. Let us briefly examine them.

The author describes the Swiss officers in our pay as "panting after the moment when their rage against France might once more shew itself at the head of their peasantry," and that "had they been allowed to receive their pensions at home, the means would have been prepared of rousing the whole Alps, from Constance to the Rhone, in hostility to France, as soon as the war should break out."

I reply to this elegant declamation, that the Swiss officer, embarked in foreign service, is not actuated by those generous feelings which our author so liberally attributes to him. He discharges his duty with exemplary fidelity, but he follows his profession, not for the honour but for the profit it affords. He feels no other attachment to England, to Holland, or to France, than on account of the pay he receives. On the contrary, the general disposition of men in foreign service, is a habit of invidious contrast between the country of their temporary adoption and their own. In case of Switzerland becoming the theatre of war, the Swiss officer who might be resident there, and in the receipt of a pension from England, would obey her summons to repair to the standard of her allies, and would discharge his duty in the field as a man of honour. But if it be expected that he will be zealous beyond the line of military duty, and that he "pants," as our author presumes, to excite

his countrymen to active hostility against the French, and in favour of the allies, the deception will be egregious. The prevailing sentiment in Switzerland is indeed a hatred of the French; but this sentiment has not yet led to a predilection for any foreign power. The inhabitants of this once happy republic are strongly attached to their country and to independence; and were not the attempt hopeless, they would generously brave every danger in a struggle between Switzerland and France. But it will be difficult to convince them that the invasion of their country by foreign armies will be the means of restoring its liberty.

So slender is the basis on which our author would have depended for "rousing the whole Alps from Constance to the Rhone in hostility to France." He "words it well;" but if you attempt to seize the substance, it will fleet, like a shadow, from the grasp.

——— frustra comprensa manus effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis, volucrique simillima somno.

Were Mr. Fox, in the event of a new war, to make any reliance on opposing the arms of Bonaparte by means so inefficient as these, his campaigns would be the counterpart of Mack's, and we might prepare ourselves for fresh disasters as fatal as those of Ulm.

Our author proceeds to ascribe to ministers the delay which occurred in the sailing of our expedition to Hanover. With his accustomed confidence of assertion, he insists that "we were still less prepared than our allies," and "that we took the means to defeat as far as possible the utility, and narrow the chance of success of our expedition." If the author was unacquainted with the real cause of the delay, his negligence in inquiry is reprehensible. If he knew it, and affected ignorance, the charge is more serious, and it would not be amiss to remind him of the *temperate* language of his patron, Mr. Fox, to the opponent whom he considers capable of wilful misrepresentation. The real cause

of the delay of the expedition was the prevalence of a strong north-east wind, from September till the middle of November. The armament was ready long before their sailing took place, and the same cause of detention prevented, for more than six weeks, a homeward-bound West India fleet from coming round from Portsmouth to London. Does our author mean to make Ministers responsible for the state of the winds? or will he ascribe wilful negligence to our merchants, on account of a delay of which there had been no example for fourteen years?

In one respect, however, I correspond in opinion with him—in the impropriety of landing an army in Naples. This measure was obviously the wish of Russia, but it effected no diversion, and was consequently an unavailing mode of employing twenty thousand men.

The author of the Inquiry proposes two alternatives for the disposal of these troops;

either to have disembarked them in the Venetian territory, and placed them under the command of the Archduke Charles, which would have been the proper plan; or to have landed them in Lombardy, in order to hang upon Massena's rear. To land in Lombardy would indeed be a difficult operation, for Lombardy has no sea-coast. But our author's meaning, no doubt, is, that while the Archduke made head against Massena's army in front, the English and Russians should have been landed in the north of Italy, and marched to Lombardy to hang upon Massena's rear. After making such a proposition, the author must forego his claims to the reputation of judgment in tactics. The disembarked army must either have confined its operations, with a view to its own safety, within such narrow limits, as to enable it to regain the shipping when threatened by superior numbers; a scheme so adverse to all efficient hostility, that I cannot consider it as having entered into the contemplation of an intelligent writer:

or, the author's idea must have been, that the English and Russians should have advanced, with decided resolution, into that part of the interior where it was judged they could most effectually annoy the enemy. This plan, although apparently vigorous, would have been a renewal of the disastrous system of last war, in acting with divided forces against a bold and active enemy, whose greatest successes have been obtained by a rapid and skilful concentration of numbers. Twenty thousand Russians and English would thus have been placed behind Massena, whose army was not over-rated at seventy thousand. They could have had no direct communication with the Archduke, and, in the event of attack from superior numbers, he could have afforded them no support; for it is highly improbable that he should have received intelligence of their danger, until the season of relief was past. Massena's army was composed of men in the prime of life, many of whom had marched in 1797, at the rate of thirty miles a day,

to destroy, on the same fatal scene, an Austrian force, detached and unsupported in consequence of the adoption of the unwise system recommended by the author of the Inquiry. This idea is equally judicious with his proposal to disembark the British troops in Holland, or the north of France. In either case, speedy and inevitable ruin would have ensued. The system of the French is to accumulate, by sudden movements, a mass of force, in order to overpower any detached body of their enemies. And in both instances, the author of the Inquiry recommends exactly that plan which will throw our troops into their hands.

The Second Part of the Inquiry relates to the consequences of our late foreign policy. The author begins by expatiating on the value of the cessions made by Austria to France. In speaking of Tyrol, he describes its loss as " of greater detri-

ment to Austria than her sacrifices in Italy, because it was invaluable as a barrier against the invasion of the hereditary states." He adds, that "Tyrol, if properly managed, must always have been the main theatre of any war where Austria acted on the defensive." So erroneous is the whole of this reasoning, that the misfortunes of the Austrians have generally proceeded from acting in mountainous countries. It is this mode of warfare in which the French surpass them, and are always eager to engage. The French are not only superior in the agility and intelligence requisite for operations in hilly countries, but the nature of the ground prevents their adversaries from making use of their excellent cavalry. The Austrians must not put their trust in mountains or defiles; they must summon their enemy to combat in the open plain—to the pitched battle—to the charge of the bayonet—to the deadly encounter of the sabre. Let the numbers be equal, and the commander

of the Austrians a Suwarrow or a Clairfait, and the issue will not long be doubtful.

After a florid enumeration of the advantages of Italy, our author adds, "All these are now in the hands of the nation in the world best able to improve them, to combine them, to make them aid one another; and after calling them forth to the incalculable augmentation of her former resources, ready to turn them against those, if any such shall remain, who still *dare* to be her enemies." This impartial writer does not then consider it necessary to notice, in a description of Italy, the hatred universally entertained in that country against the French; the obstacles to improvement from the prejudices, the indolence, the cowardice of its inhabitants, or from the headstrong and injudicious nature of Bonaparte's civil administration—his own tyranny—the rapacity of his officers — the embezzlement of the public property in every department of the French government, and a general system

of arrogance, of rapine and oppression, which condemns to misery the inhabitants of this delightful country, and imposes silence by the bayonet on the just complaints of the victims of oppression.

The conclusion of the sentence I have quoted is unworthy of a Briton. Can a citizen of this free and powerful nation be doubtful whether any countries shall remain who still *dare* to be the enemies of France? Are Britain and Russia then so degraded and intimidated that they shall not presume even to take up arms? Is their strength so exhausted, and their spirit sunk so low, that no alternative remains but to receive, in silent submission, the dictates of the enemy? of an enemy who acknowledges no law but his own will, no appeal but to the sword?

> Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer
> Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis.

I must submit to the painful task of exposing to the indignation they deserve,

several similar expressions in the publication under review. They are unworthy of a member of a free commonwealth, and, how much more, of a mind enlightened by the envied gifts of literature! In mentioning that since last campaign, the prospect of the deliverance of Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, is much lessened, the author concludes, "They have England to thank for this reverse of prospects, and it is probably the last favour they will receive at her hands." In a few pages farther he says, speaking of the continental war, and of the dread of invasion, "We have purchased a miserable respite from our alarms; for, in spite of our boasting, we were the dupes of our fears." Again, when adverting to the picture he has drawn of the state of the nation, he adds, "It is our misfortune that we look around in vain for any circumstances which may soften its features, while it is impossible to imagine any addition which may aggravate them." And he recommends to offer equitable terms of peace, "in order to ob-

tain, for *the first time,* the favourable character of moderation and pacific dispositions."

How false and treacherous are these assertions! By what fatality is a writer of such talents impelled, instead of accusing a party, to insult the nation? Mr. Fox, in giving an avowed sanction to so unguarded a production, belies his reputation for manly and liberal conduct, and justifies all the censures which have been passed on him for imprudence. In the heat of debate, a generous audience will forgive the incautious expressions which have so frequently marked his speeches. But the invectives in the performance under examination are gratuitous. They have been provoked by no aggression—they are justified by no hostility. Composed by the author in the leisure of the closet, and revised at the office of his patron, the injury they inflict is deliberate and wanton. The chief object of their acrimony is an illustrious

statesman, now beyond the reach of human censure; and with a blind eagerness to condemn his measures, the Inquiry before us transfers its reproaches from Mr. Pitt to the country for whose cause his life was devoted.

Not content with extolling the value of the countries lost to Austria by the last campaign, the author dwells upon the balance produced in favour of the conquerors beyond the mere changes of territory. "Defeat," he says, "has caused humiliation in the Austrians, and victory a corresponding elevation in the French." However the French may be animated by success, he ill appreciates the firmness of the Austrian character who represents that brave people as crushed, because they have been unfortunate. The Austrian soldier knows neither intimidation nor despondency; he will not forsake the field until ordered by his commander, and he meets death with a firmness peculiar to himself. Equal constancy actuates the

nation in their attachment to their sovereigns. With such subjects what may not the Cabinet of Vienna accomplish if guided by enlightened views? The weakness of Austria has confessedly been only in her government. The severe lessons of misfortune have a powerful tendency to eradicate abuses. Such perhaps were the errors in the Imperial administration, that adversity alone could effect their cure. Its salutary effects are already apparent. The Archduke Charles is raised to the supreme direction of military affairs — a general enrolment for acquiring the use of arms is stated to have taken place. These wholesome provisions justify the expectation of still greater improvements: they tend to promote the introduction of a wise system of policy in every department of this extensive empire. The loss of Venice and Tyrol will be compensated by the acquisition of a species of strength far more solid and effective; and Austria, when the wisdom of her government shall equal the energy of her subjects, and the

resources of her dominions, may with confidence appeal to arms, in vindication of her own rights and of the cause of Europe.

The next remarks in the Inquiry relate to the increased danger of invasion. I view these in a very different light from the rest of the work, and I have accordingly made them the subject of a separate discussion.

The author proceeds to accuse Ministry of having made no use of the interval of security from invasion, to effect a reform of our defensive measures. He neither indicates distinctly the plan of amelioration he requires, nor gives any explicit reason why that was the proper season for its adoption. He mentions indeed, that we were then exempt from the apprehension of invasion; but in that circumstance there was nothing novel, for two winters had already elapsed since the beginning of the war, and every reflecting

man must be aware that, during that season, the danger from Boulogne is infinitely lessened. The best apology the author can make for this awkward argument is, that at the time he urged it, he could not foresee that Mr. Fox would be in office for several months without passing a single act to remedy those defects, for which he had so loudly reproached his predecessor; that a principal feature in his measures of military improvement should be the inefficient scheme of an armed peasantry; and that the whole plan should be inadequate equally to the expectations of the country, and to the splendid promises of radical amelioration held out by himself and his friends, before coming into power.

We have now reviewed a large proportion of the Inquiry: we have seen the author attack almost every measure of

Ministry since the prorogation of last session. He adopts the strain of unqualified disapprobation formerly pursued by the Right Hon. Secretary: he commences where Mr. Fox ceased, and he rivals him in asperity of abuse; perhaps also he may dispute with his patron the palm of inconsistent and erroneous assertion.

Not satisfied with so liberal an effusion of censure, the author deems it necessary to revert to circumstances antecedent to the late coalition. In this, as in former parts of the Inquiry, we are presented with a fluent series of arguments deduced from the most fallacious views. He dwells on the probability of our having been able to procure the accession of Spain to a general league, when it is notorious that since 1796 the Court of Madrid has been blindly devoted to France. After expending every epithet of reprehension on the imprudence of Austria and Russia in attacking France, he affects to consider the hostility of Spain, on the side of the Py-

renees, as likely to be extremely hurtful to that powerful neighbour. The immense subsidies paid to France by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, as the price of the neutrality of Spain, he denominates a *trifling* aid. But the most extraordinary of his assertions is, that "if unfortunately we preferred hostilities, we should have taken care to make the war as advantageous as possible, by liberating the Spanish colonies from the galling monopoly of the mother-country, and opening a most profitable inlet for our commercial speculations." This profound politician would then recommend it as judicious to waste the lives of our seamen and soldiers, in attempts to conquer settlements in the fatal atmosphere of the Spanish main. He considers that commerce as likely to be *most profitable*, which, even in the event of conquest, we should have to carry on in a country without law, and with a race of men devoid of principle. Let him permit me to inform him that the evil of our West India acquisitions is their being

already too extensive. They are the grave of our population and the drain of our capital. The climate of the continent of America, on which he seems so desirous that we should extend our possessions, is still more destructive than that of our own islands: and the inhabitants are so destitute of good faith, that to sell them merchandise upon credit, is synonymous, in the language of our merchants, with the absolute loss of the property.

I come now to that part of the Inquiry where the author considers the situation of Holland. He infers but too justly, both from its immediate proximity to France and from the character of the people, that the chance of freeing them from the influence of our enemy is extremely doubtful. From the natural effects of commerce on national character, he concludes, that the Dutch dread revolution and war as the

last of dangers, and that they depend too much on their trade to put honour and glory in competition with it.

Having had the means of very accurate information, I feel justified in expressing a decided opinion on this important topic. My reasoning is the result of experience and observation. It applies to an interesting part of our foreign relations, and I claim accordingly the attention of the Right Honourable Secretary.

Holland exhibits in every feature of her national character the effects of long commercial habits. Accustomed for ages to pursue trade and to reap its comforts, her people possess the care, temperance, and regularity, consequent upon the discipline of industry, but they are devoid of energy or enterprise. Her soldiers, and even her sailors, are raised only in a small proportion from her own population. Westphalia, and the other adjoining parts of Germany, supply recruits for her army

and the landmen of her navy. Even the seamen, whether in the public or private shipping, are not in general native Dutchmen, but from the north of Germany, from Denmark and Sweden. Of the men who fought off Camperdown, and so bravely maintained the former fame of Holland, only a small proportion were Dutch. With respect to the army, Guelderland, a province comparatively inconsiderable, is the only source of supply. There exists not a nation more destitute of military habits, or possessing less aptitude to acquire them. If the writer of the Inquiry believes that from a greater dread of the horrors of internal war than of their present subjection, they would rise in active opposition to an invading foe, he is egregiously mistaken. The Dutch, whatever be their expectations from a force sent to deliver them, or whatever the tyranny of their oppressors, will act a neutral part. Individual safety is a Dutchman's object; and from that, no consideration, except downright compulsion, can make him de-

part. They are divided into two parties, apparently so equal in numbers and influence, that it is a matter of extreme difficulty to decide which of the two really possesses that superiority which is claimed by both. The highest and lowest classes are in general devoted to the Orange family, while the middle ranks constitute the popular party. The former are attached to the French; the latter, as far as commercial jealousy will allow, to the English. This division has subsisted nearly two hundred years. Its spirit is hereditary, imbibed from the earliest period of life, and retained with the characteristic pertinacity of the Dutch. So rooted is attachment to the Orange family in the minds of its adherents, that while that House possesses a representative, no succession of revolutions, no variety of new constitutions, will eradicate it from their breasts. Yet such are the habits and disposition of the people, that, notwithstanding this strong predilection, no active co-operation in the work of their deliverance is to be

expected from them. In 1794, when the French approached their frontier, and threatened the overthrow of all that was dear to the Orange party, there was made no exertion of individual patriotism—no voluntary levies—no pecuniary subscriptions. The hired troops of the Republic (Swiss and Germans) were left to fight, unaided, the battles of the state. In 1799, when the successes of the campaign had been entirely on the side of the allies, and the Prince's party had the strongest motives, from the prospect of success, as well as congeniality of feeling, to co-operate with the invading army, it is notorious that they afforded not the smallest assistance.

The republican party partakes equally of the national apathy. Their leaders, however, have the benefit of whatever movement can be communicated to this languid mass by the machine of government. In 1795, after the French invasion, a number of the citizens attached to the democratic side were formed into volunteer corps.

These, in the event of invasion, would be marched out against the assailing force. They would take the field from the necessity of obeying orders; but although numerous, they are so inefficient in a military view, that I do not under-rate the measure of their exertion, when I state that the addition of 5000 regular soldiers to the invading army would be an adequate provision against the whole annoyance to be expected from the collective body of Dutch volunteers.

My reasoning on the subject of Holland has not hitherto materially varied from that of the author of the Inquiry. We differ in the mode of deduction, but approximate in the result. In what remains, however, of this branch of the subject, we are most widely in opposition. He appears very imperfectly acquainted with the actual state of Holland; and it is important that his inferences should be investigated with care.

In treating of the Dutch commerce, his language conveys a belief, that, although not equally extensive, it continues in other respects in the same busy and prosperous state as in the better days of the Republic. Nothing can be more fallacious. A war with England is the signal for the Dutch flag to disappear from the ocean. Their West-India colonies fall an easy conquest to our arms, and their trade with the East, formerly the pride of Holland and admiration of the universe, is carried on by the limited and hazardous system of neutral flags. That portion of intercourse which they still maintain with other countries in Europe, is transacted in the same precarious manner. Their internal trade and manufactures are in a state of correspondent decay, and the whole country is undergoing a most serious diminution, not only of wealth, but of population.

Of this diminution our author appears to have been aware; but he recollects also to have read, as a principle in political econo-

my, that the profits of stock increase as its total amount in a society is lessened. He not only applies this principle to the present state of Holland, but deduces from it a conclusion, which, in its present unqualified shape, conveys an impression altogether contrary to the actual condition of that unhappy country. I quote his own words:

"In fact, the accounts of the Dutch oppressions are greatly exaggerated. Many capitalists have been ruined and forced to emigrate. Many persons have had their wealth diminished, and the whole riches of the state are greatly impaired; but the profits, which are still drawn upon the remaining stock, are necessarily higher; *and this of itself tends to alleviate the burdens of the capitalists who are left behind.*"

The general principle here introduced is illustrated in book Ist, chapter IXth, of that invaluable work, the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. It is thus ex-

pressed: "The diminution of the capital stock of the society, or of the funds destined for the maintenance of industry, as it lowers the wages of labour, so it raises the profits of stock, and consequently the interest of money." Dr. Smith quotes in support of this principle, the great fortunes suddenly acquired in the *ruined* countries of Bengal and the other British settlements in the East Indies.

This principle is not to be denied, and receives, in fact, an exemplification from the state of Holland. It was easy formerly to borrow money there at an interest of four per cent.; at present, it is nearly impossible to procure it at five. But the deduction of the author of the Inquiry, that the increased profit of stock tends to alleviate the burdens of the capitalists left behind, is most erroneous, if we are to take it in the natural meaning of the words, that the profit on capital having become greater, the whole income of the capitalist has increased. This does not result from

the general principle, and it is fully disproved by the actual condition of Holland.

The diminution of stock in all societies is attended with the most ruinous consequences to the country at large. The capitalist sustains his share in the general calamity: he obtains a higher rate of interest, but his capital is less secure: he therefore dares not in prudence either lend or employ the whole. The hazards of trade are multiplied by the increased number of failures. He suffers from this cause directly, if he trade himself; or indirectly through the instability of his debtors, if he lend his capital to others: he therefore does not employ the whole, either in trade or upon loan. Upon the invasion of Holland by the French, a large proportion of capital was hoarded. The practice of hoarding indicates a situation the reverse of prosperous, both in the individual and in the country. By a total loss of profit therefore on a part of his stock, the capitalist, notwithstanding the increased rate of in-

terest on the remainder, derives much less income from his whole property in times of public calamity.

In speaking of Bengal, Dr. Smith mentions, "that the great fortunes so suddenly and so easily acquired in it, and the other British settlements in the East Indies, may satisfy us, that as the wages of labour are very low, so the profits of stock are very high in those ruined countries. The interest of money is proportionably so. In Bengal money is frequently lent to the farmers at forty, fifty, and sixty per cent." If this was the state of India thirty or forty years ago, it is now materially altered. The usual interest of money is at present from ten to twelve per cent. The fortunes said to have been made in that country, have, both in Dr. Smith's days and our own, been much over-rated. If their origin be investigated, it will be found more frequently in the official situation of the individual in the Company's service, than in the legitimate profits of trade. They have

generally been acquired by men who were strangers equally to the principles and the habits of commerce: *presents from the natives*, or the possession of monopolies, will be found in the history of British India to have been a more fruitful source of fortune, than industry. The nature and progress of such acquisitions have been regulated therefore by causes very different from the rules of political economy.

It must be apparent that the state of society in Bengal and Holland is extremely different. In Bengal, property was formerly very insecure, and trade confined to a small number. In Holland, property was sacred, and trade the universal occupation. No two countries can differ more widely in the gifts of nature. The fertile soil of Bengal supplies with the returning season, a harvest abundant both for the industrious husbandman and his rapacious master. But Holland, bereft of commerce, would lose that which alone renders her territory valuable. Her coast would be

reduced to a barren asylum for fishermen; her interior would become a dreary marsh.

The ruinous effects of diminished capital would therefore be infinitely more felt in Holland, where commerce was both so generally prosecuted, and so indispensable to the prosperity of the country. There, as in this and in every trading country, a great part of business was transacted upon credit. So important an instrument is credit in mercantile operations, that in many branches the amount of stock or capital ceases to be the criterion of the extent either of business or of profit. In this country a longer or shorter term is taken for the payment of almost every purchase, and credit is as essential to trade, in its present state, as the atmosphere to our existence. The Dutch, further advanced in their commercial career than the English, more abundant in money and less accustomed to speculative enterprise, transacted more business by immediate payments. But even in Holland,

credit was the soul of commerce. A foreign conquest, a revolution, but above all, their wars with England, have lessened exceedingly the mutual confidence of the merchants. By the interruption of her intercourse with the East and West Indies, Holland is deprived of the most extensive and lucrative branches of her trade. The ruin of almost all the public funds of Europe, except the British, is a fatal blow to a people who had lent out a large portion of their stock to foreign powers. Their internal trade suffers under a universal diminution of consumption. This complication of disasters has continued to press upon them for above ten years. Its consequences have been, the emigration of a large proportion of the population, and despondency in those who have remained. Peace alone can preserve to them what they still possess, and peace is the prayer of every Hollander. But in the present state of Europe there is no prospect of any pacification which can restore them to independence. It may pro-

cure a partial relief from their burdens, but it will confirm their degradation, and rivet the chains of French despotism.

The argument of the author of the Inquiry, that the increased profit of stock tends to alleviate the burdens of the capitalist, would have weight, provided taxation in Holland observed a uniform ratio to the amount or profit of stock. Their late taxes are indeed a very large ratio or per centage upon property; but this ratio is not uniform. It varies in different years; and instead of being more easily paid by the remaining capitalists in consequence of the ruin and emigration of their countrymen, its pressure is by that cause exceedingly augmented. The measure of taxation in Holland has long been, not a just regard to the means of its inhabitants, but the unavoidable necessities of the state. The French prescribe to them the maintenance of an extensive military and naval establishment, or the payment of a direct contribution to themselves: for these, and

the interest of their immense funded debt, provision *must* be made. It is therefore the amount of their burdens, not the ratio of taxation, which is certain. The ruin and emigration of a number of capitalists, and the consequent diminution of the national stock, increases very much the proportion of taxation on the remaining individuals. A sum, certain and of large amount, must be paid—the smaller the national property, the fewer the contributors, so much greater must be the ratio of contribution.

I have proved, I trust, that although, in the present calamitous state of Holland, the rate of interest is higher than formerly, the whole income of the capitalist is by no means increased. To maintain that the ruin and emigration of many capitalists is productive of effects tending to alleviate the burdens of those who remain, without taking any notice that the same causes produce other consequences tending in a much greater degree to aggravate their misery,

is an extraordinary mode of describing the situation of a country. The total relief afforded is one per cent. additional to the capitalist on *part* of his stock. Our author dwells on this advantage, but makes no mention that it can take place only under such circumstances of general distrust, that a considerable proportion of capital must remain at the same time unemployed; and that from the same causes the national despondency is so great, that this solitary advantage affords no substantial relief. It is a single ray of comfort sinking unperceived in the universal gloom.

To lend a sanction to a work so erroneous in these important points, is no slight imputation on the accuracy of the Right Hon. Secretary himself. It is whimsical to consider how he will be apostrophized on the perusal of such a doctrine, by the classes whom it affects. The political economist will exclaim, "You lately expressed a most extraordinary opinion, that you were very doubtful of the practical

application of general principles. In the present case you not only apply decidedly the general principle, but you overstrain its operation." The merchant will say, "Your arguments are contradicted both by experience and common sense. To tell us that our burdens will be alleviated in consequence of failures and emigration, is equally judicious as to state that it is better to pay, instead of a moderate rate of income-tax, the enormous amount of ten per cent. at once."

To the doctrine of moderation and pacific disposition recommended in the publication under review, every man will subscribe. The difference will not be in regard to the admission of such principles while expressed in general terms, but in their application to particular circumstances. Until these circumstances are defined, to descant in general terms, is to say no more than that peace is preferable to war, and moderation to violence. Unquestionably every enlightened and liberal

mind, capable of appreciating the real causes of the prosperity of nations, will pronounce, that by a secure peace the interests of this country will be more effectually promoted, and its welfare more radically and permanently established, than by the most successful war: and if Mr. Fox succeed in negotiating a peace honourable to us and safe for the continent, he will deserve, not only the thanks of the country, but the forgiveness of all his inconsistencies.

Of such a peace, however, we have no flattering prospect. To act a condescending part in negotiation with so arrogant an enemy as Bonaparte, is to insure a renewal of hostility. Let it never be forgotten, that the treaty of Amiens, of which the chief recommendation was its having been made "in the spirit of peace," kept us, during the short interval of its duration, in a state of alarm worse than war. In any negotiation with Bonaparte, let Mr. Fox remember, that he is treating with the

most false and artful of men, with one who combines the most subtle mind with the most perfidious heart. He alternately oppresses by open violence, seduces by secret fraud, or assassinates in midnight obscurity.

——Ille venena
Colchica et quicquid usquam concipitur nefas,
Tractavit.

His system is to crush the weak, and beguile the powerful—to frighten the timid, and cajole the brave. The sword is the favourite engine of his government, and it is congenial to the turbulence of his temper. But he combines in his administration every species of support to himself, and of danger to his enemies. By the employment of enlightened men like Talleyrand, he makes even Philosophy administer her sacred aid to his lawless violence. He has reduced falsehood into a system, and adapts his lies with wonderful sagacity, to whatever character he addresses. He prevailed on the Cabinet of Vienna to acquiesce in his usurpations in Italy, by pre-

tending that they were necessary to enable him to re-establish with security, hereditary monarchy in France. With equal truth, he will endeavour to persuade Mr. Fox that he desires peace for the sake of alleviating the sufferings of mankind—that he has always admired pacific sentiments —that he has no wish to abridge the power of Britain, but that he is desirous to cultivate with her the most amicable relations, and to forget the evils of war in the innocent emulation of *commercial rivalship*.

We have now followed the author of the Inquiry through the greatest, and by far most important part of his work. We have seen that the prospect of France agreeing to a negotiation under the mediation of Russia, was extremely doubtful: and even had it been ostensibly adopted by Bonaparte, we could have entertained no hopes of the cordiality of his acceptance, or the

sincerity of his overtures: for he had scarcely agreed to the advances made by Russia, when, regardless of peace, he commits in the seizure of Genoa, an outrage replete with alarm, and declaratory of hostility to all Europe.

The pretended vagueness of the terms of the treaty of concert is best disproved by a reference to the treaty itself. The author's ignorance of the Dutch frontier will be apparent on a slight inspection of the map. Yet though thus imperfectly informed, he has no hesitation in passing unqualified censure on the statesmen who represented England and Russia in the conclusion of a treaty, whose object was the deliverance of Europe. The proper contents of a treaty, like that of St. Petersburg, is a declaration of its objects, and an outline of the means for their attainment. In both these respects, this treaty is equal in precision to any antecedent treaty entered into for the purpose of a general confederacy. Its objects are defined with

perspicuity, and it includes every provision which a treaty, contracted under such circumstances, could contain. Its result was a coalition far more powerful than any late confederacy against France. Europe, from the north to the south, seemed to rise up as one man against that overgrown power. She failed in her efforts by the infatuation of a General, who, in the first month of operation, lost to his Sovereign an army of 80,000 men.

The exemplary adherence of both Austria and Russia to the common cause affords a most satisfactory contradiction to the insinuations in the Inquiry. The fidelity of these powers justifies both the past confidence and the future hopes of Britain. Honour and courage are not always successful, but they are the best guardians of independence, and they offer a fair field of promise against a future period, when they may be called into exertion under more favourable circumstances.

The co-operation of Prussia is valuable; but it is not indispensable to the success of a confederacy against France. The allies do not appear to have reckoned on her assistance; but they had, in her own situation, the most satisfactory assurances that she would entertain no hostility against them.

It is a whimsical excess of crimination to accuse our Cabinet of the mistakes committed in conferences held between Russian and Austrian Generals in the heart of Germany, and of not having nominated the Commander in Chief of an army, where there was not a single British soldier, and of which we did not pay a third part. It is still more extraordinary to propose our Envoy at Vienna as a fit adviser for Generals in matters purely military. Mr. Adair might have adopted, but Sir Arthur Paget, we have no doubt, would have declined this innovation in diplomatic arrangement.

The necessity of insuring by treaties the co-operation of powers safe in their distance from France, before we called on Austria, her neighbour, to incur the formidable hazard of her hostility, is so obvious as to require no comment, unless it be on the ingenuity of the author of the Inquiry, who devises arguments for every case. Although facts and reason oppose him, he will not shrink from the encounter, but, like a true combatant, asserts the cause he has adopted under every disadvantage.

The invasion of Bavaria, so much condemned by our author, was a wise and vigorous measure. It failed through the credulity of Mack in exercising towards a faithless Prince too much of that confidence which the writer of the Inquiry so strenuously recommends.

Let him peruse again the Austrian plan of operations, and judge whether it was the intention of that Court to forego, in

the event of successful operations, the advantages of carrying the war into Switzerland—advantages which he has himself so fully and forcibly illustrated.

The sailing of our expedition to Hanover was delayed, not through the fault of Government, but by the continuance of contrary winds. The author censures the sending our forces to that Electorate, because the object was purely British; and in *the same page* he accuses Ministers of making no attempt upon Boulogne. Does he then mean, that to have attacked Boulogne would not have been an object purely British? And would it have been an evidence of disinterested policy, after arming the continent against France, to have confined our exertions exclusively to our own security?

To counsel an expedition against Boulogne, to dissuade the speedy conquest of Bavaria, to recommend the landing of bodies of British troops necessarily de-

tached and unsupported, in Holland, in the north of France, and in Lombardy, are propositions so radically erroneous as to prove a total ignorance of tactics in those who have composed this Inquiry. To a literary man, it is no reproach to have omitted to study a subject foreign to his usual pursuits; but why does Mr. Fox lend his sanction to a work replete with such fallacious views? The conclusion must be, that this far-famed statesman is unacquainted with the causes which decide the fate of battles and the issue of campaigns. When he relies on a defence so frail as an armed peasantry; when he countenances the recommendation of detached operations in the heart of the country of an enemy so fatally active as the French; and above all, when he makes light of the danger of invasion, without explaining the grounds of his security, except in vague and general terms, we are but too well justified to conclude, that he has neglected to give to these most important subjects the grave consideration

they demand, and that he has seen Europe shaken to her centre without investigating the causes of the awful convulsion.

It is a no less glaring error to assert, that the Austrians, by relinquishing Tyrol, have lost the best theatre of warlike operations. Mountains have been to them the scenes of reiterated disasters; their strength is in cavalry; and their wisest plan of warfare is to force the French to pitched battles.

In delineating the consequences of unsuccessful war upon Austria, the author of the Inquiry views the question only on that side which suits his argument. With singular candour, he avoids taking any notice of the salutary reforms produced by the severe lessons of misfortune, and he describes as dejected and despondent a people who are strangers to intimidation.

The causes of our quarrel with Spain have been so amply discussed, and its necessity so fully demonstrated, that I have

confined myself to combating the absurd idea of acquisitions on the continent of America. The Spanish settlements would not be difficult of conquest, but success would to us be as fatal as disconfiture.

To Holland I have assigned a longer chapter. The real situation of that country, although contiguous to us, is very imperfectly known; and the Inquiry describes it in terms which could not fail to increase the previous misconceptions of the public.

I have already expressed surprise at the palpable errors in regard to tactics, in the high quarter which has patronized the present publication. An equal degree of ignorance in regard to trade, is apparent throughout. The commercial situation of Holland is as egregiously misunderstood as the nature of her frontier; and to recommend an attack on Spanish America with a view to profitable trade, betrays an equal unacquaintance with the nature of these

settlements, and of West India colonies in general.

To the author, or rather assistant author of this Inquiry, I will recommend a better task. By adopting the distorted views of party, he narrows the wide field which is the legitimate province of the philosophic mind. While he obtains the patronage of the Minister of the day, he relinquishes a fair claim to general and permanent approbation. Instead of being the apologist of a party, let him constitute himself the advocate of Britain against France, the vindicator of the cause of Europe against the arrogant tyrant who threatens to enslave her. If we can indulge the hope of a secure peace, let him exercise his talents in an inquiry into those conditions and that system which alone can insure permanent tranquillity. If this prospect be denied us, if Bonaparte refuse to acknowledge claims indispensable to our safety, and belie, as usual, his professions, it will then become an adequate object for the

talents of this writer to excite merited indignation against such insatiable ambition, to point out the nature and extent of our danger, and unfold those resources by which it may be successfully opposed.

Had the publication under review been even less directly sanctioned by Mr. Fox, its internal evidence would have bespoke its parentage. It is replete with those extremes, both in thought and language, which characterize his speeches. Like them, the Inquiry presents us with an accumulation of arguments in support of whatever idea is uppermost at the moment, without considering that the best means of refutation may be frequently found in this hasty assemblage. And, like his own career in public life, this work is an instructive exemplification of those inconsistencies which infallibly proceed from an ardent mind, unrestrained by caution and undisciplined by moderation.

Although Mr. Pitt's name is not mentioned in this publication, the whole attack, with the exception of Lord Grenville's share, is directed in substance against him. When the present confederacy, the greatest which for nearly a century had been formed against France, first developed its strength, the Opposition press loudly refused Mr. Pitt the merit of its formation; but since Mack's infatuation marred our fairest prospects, every epithet of censure has been cast upon that distinguished Minister. He is accused of not having exercised in foreign states an extent of power which a sovereign often finds difficult in his own kingdom — of not having controlled from London the operations in Bavaria. The faults of every court are ascribed to him, as if he had ruled Europe with despotic sway. Is it not obvious that England, remote from the theatre of war, must leave the conduct of military operations to the powers who are near them, whose force consists in armies, and

who are more immediately interested in the issue of the campaign than herself? Were she permitted to direct the movements of the league, what could ensue from her distance but delay and disaster? The province of the British Minister was therefore to employ the resources of his country to unite as large a part as possible of the commonwealth of Europe against its oppressor; to conciliate the jarring interests of those powers, and bind them together in a solid league, definite in its objects, and upright in its views; to conduct this arduous negotiation with secrecy, and by every possible precaution to avoid awakening the suspicion of a vigilant enemy; and finally, after having agreed upon a general plan of operations, to commit the detail to those who were to execute them, avoiding that interference in particular objects which involves the ruin of confederacies by the distraction of their views, and the division of their force.

In whatever way we examine the conduct of these important measures on the part of Mr. Pitt, we shall find the most solid grounds of approbation. The alliance was formidable in magnitude beyond example, the cordiality of its members has been evinced by their constancy under disaster, and the whole scheme was concealed from the enemy until the Russians were approaching to Germany. England therefore amply fulfilled her part in the coalition, and its failure was occasioned by causes beyond her controul.

The career of the illustrious Statesman we have lost, has been uniform; it was no less great in its close than promising in its commencement. The historian of his life will be under no necessity to call in to his panegyric the aid of eloquent or impassioned language: let him endeavour to elevate his mind to the conception of Mr. Pitt's views, to investigate his measures by their own merits, to weigh his mo-

tives and conduct in silent meditation, without attending to the reports either of friends or enemies, and he will pourtray a character equally admirable in all that enlightens the mind, and dignifies the heart.

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STRICTURES

ON THE

CONDUCT

OF THE

PRESENT MINISTRY.

THE author of the Inquiry re-echoes the high encomiums on our present Administration, which were so lavishly bestowed on them when entering into office; but of which we every day hear less. He describes them as "uniting the largest portion of talents, experience, rank, and integrity; the most ample share of all the qualities, whether natural or acquired, intrinsic or accidental, which ever enabled a government to secure influence with its subjects, and command respect among foreign na-

tions." He subsequently adds, "No compromise of principles, no paltry half-measures, no incongruous mixture of big words and little doings, will bear them out in redeeming their pledge to save the country." Let us briefly examine how far their proceedings, since they came into office, have entitled them to the lofty description given of them by our author, have accorded with their own promises, or have fulfilled the expectations of the country.

1. Lord Ellenborough's appointment to a seat in the Cabinet. In an Administration composed of men who, on all occasions, had professed so great a jealousy of the executive power, and so firm an adherence to the rights of the people, above all to the impartial administration of public justice, the introduction of the Lord Chief Justice into the Cabinet was a step equally unexpected and inconsistent. To unite in one person functions so opposite as the judicial and executive, is repugnant equally to the provisions of our excellent consti-

tion, and to the first principles of justice. The impropriety of the measure was compensated by no countervailing advantage, it was required by no imperious necessity. Already fully occupied by most laborious duties, his Lordship can devote no adequate portion of his time to political avocations. Advanced to the summit of his profession, and enjoying its highest honours, his dignity does not require this adventitious distinction.

Besides, the study of law is not the school of politics. The best pleaders of the present day, whether distinguished for animated oratory, or depth of legal knowledge, are, with very few exceptions, unimpressive in the senate. The causes are obvious. A difficult and laborious profession absorbs that time, which, to make an able statesman, it is indispensable should be given to objects of general policy. The incessant study of former enactments and records accumulates a mass of information in regard to statutes and prece-

dents, but is unfavourable to the exercise of those faculties which must be roused into action in order to provide for combinations of circumstances perpetually varying, and contingencies perpetually new.

Were the study of the law indeed conducted in this country as it ought, it might well be considered a proper preparation for the duties of a statesman. Judicial may be no less necessary than political interference in the transactions which take place between the members of a community; and an intimate knowledge of the general principles which regulate these transactions, as well as of the actual circumstances in which the society is placed, seems equally essential to the complete education of the lawyer as of the politician. But while the study of the law consists chiefly in a knowledge of forms, of an ill-contrived technical jargon, and of a mass of decisions and regulations, without sufficient attention to the circumstances in which they originated, the principles on which

they are founded, or their defects and possible improvements—the study of the law cannot fit a man for any employment beyond the precincts of a court of justice.

This extraordinary measure of giving the Chief Justice a voice in the Cabinet, might suit the arrangement of parties, but it does not suit the country. It might gratify his Lordship, but it gives him no real exaltation. It renders more prominent that part of his character which is least admired. We reverence inflexible integrity and eminent talents in the Judge—in the Senator we recognise the common passions and prejudices of men.

2. The accession of Lord Sidmouth to a Cabinet, of which Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville were the leading members, was matter equally of surprise and censure. So glaring an inconsistency is not to be excused by attributing similar conduct to Mr. Pitt. There were no such radical grounds of difference between his Lord-

ship and Mr. Pitt as between his Lordship and the present Ministers. Of the three years of Lord Sidmouth's administration, Mr. Pitt concurred in and supported the measures of the first two. In the third year, upon the renewal of the war, he gave an example of constitutional and temperate opposition, which, let us hope for our country's sake, will not be soon forgotten. He disapproved of several important parts of the conduct of Administration; but he continued to give them that assistance which he considered due to men of irreproachable intentions. He was desirous to introduce more decision and celerity into our military preparations; yet, instead of thwarting, he supported the measures of Ministers. Instead of impeding their progress by new propositions from himself, he transfused his own energy into theirs. A negotiation for his return to office had been broken off under circumstances which he conceived the ground of just resentment towards Lord Sidmouth. But, contrary to the almost

uniform example of statesmen, his personal indignation led to no public opposition; he was satisfied in telling the House of Commons that he was detached from Administration, and took no part in advising their measures, except in Parliament. Conduct, so temperate and patriotic, endeared him to many who had formerly admired only his talents. Even among his opponents there was not a man, alive to generous sentiments, or open to conviction, who did not forget all former hostility, and join in the general approbation.

An opposition on such moderate and impartial principles as these, we are still fortunate enough to possess in Mr. Wilberforce and other independent gentlemen. They, however, have never been in office, and are unconnected with party; they are strangers, therefore, to those circumstances which intriguing men render instrumental to their ambitious designs, and which, even in the upright, have a powerful tendency to interest the feelings

and biass the judgment. But a Minister out of office is almost unavoidably exposed to the influence of party connexion. And in a leading Statesman, I know not, in our history, a parallel to the dignified and impartial conduct of Mr. Pitt.

It was not until the Addington ministry had put a negative upon several of his most important military propositions, and that our navy was hastening to decay, that Mr. Pitt considered it incumbent on him to make serious exertions for their removal from office. How differently had they been treated by Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox! His Lordship had combated and ridiculed every measure they had brought forward; and Mr. Fox, not contented with opposing particular propositions, declared them the weakest Administration who had ever governed the country. Despised, however, and vilified as he has been, Lord Sidmouth, instead of honourably disdaining the connexion, is induced to sit in the Cabinet with those whom he never can for-

give. After laying claim to the confidence of his Sovereign and the Country by a uniform appearance of candour and disinterestedness, he is tempted to a connexion with men of the most opposite principles, by an office, nominal in every respect but income. Indebted to Mr. Pitt for his introduction into public life, by the appointment to the high rank of Speaker, and professing throughout the greatest veneration for his talents and principles, his Lordship feels now no hesitation to act with the man who had been through life the opponent of his benefactor. Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, who had formerly differed in every thing, excepting the ridicule of Addington, now agree, with wonderful harmony, in recommending him as one of the confidential servants of the Crown *.

* The publication by the French of the intercepted letters in the Admiral Aplin undeceived the public in regard to a most important political transaction. On the unexpected appointment of Mr. Addington to the head of the new Administration in 1801, it was generally believed, from his intimate connexion with Mr.

3. The remission of the unpaid penalties for the Additional Force Act, and the reimbursement of those which had been

Pitt, from his apparent unfitness for the situation, and from Mr. Pitt's reputed love of power, that Mr. Addington was only a glove for the hand that still continued to guide the reins of Government. This opinion was openly declared by the Opposition. Mr. Fox, with his usual discretion, harangued the Whig Club about a King who threatened to send his jack-boot to direct his Senate, and that we might now see the Jack-boot's jack-boot. This sagacious insinuation, however, is disproved by Lord Grenville's letter to Marquis Wellesley of the 12th of July 1803 (intercepted and published), in which his Lordship, in speaking of the Ministry, says, "Mr. Pitt did *not* recommend Addington; and who that knew him would have done it?" Again; Mr. Henry Wellesley, in a letter to his brother by the same conveyance, dated 28th of July 1803, after mentioning that Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington were no longer on speaking terms, uses these remarkable expressions: "Mr. Pitt opposes daily the Defence Bill in the House, but he opposes it as a Counsellor; and by his very objections, he has rendered it fit for its intended purposes, which would otherwise never have been the case."

Those who justly appreciated Mr. Pitt's manly and disinterested character knew him to be incapable either

paid, *without any compensation to the parishes who had zealously fulfilled the intentions of Parliament,* is one of the most extraordinary proceedings in history. We were prepared for obloquy being thrown on Mr. Pitt's measures; but we could hardly expect in a Ministry, pourtrayed in such glowing colours, that even equity and justice should give way to resentment. By the mode adopted in rescinding this Act, those are acquitted who have contemned the authority of the Legislature; and those only have suffered who have evinced a meritorious and exemplary obedience. The anticipation of this dispo-

of Court intrigue for the appointment of a Minister, or of an insidious support in Parliament for his continuance in office. But the aspersions were plausible, and the Opposition urged them with an assurance calculated to impose on all those who adopted the current report of Mr. Pitt's ambitious disposition. Of these and similar calumnies, that great man disdained to take the smallest notice; and this specious assertion might have continued to mislead the public, had not the accidental publication of Lord Grenville's letter given it an explicit denial.

sition on the part of Government was latterly the cause of the non-execution of the Act. By the actual remission of the fines, a most dangerous example is given to neglect the fulfilment of future statutes; to oppose whatever may be troublesome or disagreeable to individuals, not by a constitutional resistance to a Bill in Parliament, but by a treacherous dereliction of duty in the execution of the law.

The intention of the author of the Bill, I am aware, was to find not money but men. The payment of the fine, however, was an evil on no account to be put in competition with the inconsistency and danger of rescinding an Act of Parliament under circumstances of direct injustice to that part of the nation whose exertions had been most zealous. Did Ministers repeal the Act as a measure of popularity? It could please only a part of the nation, and of that part only those narrow minds who can rejoice at their own escape, while their neighbours have suffered. Of this

obvious consideration, Ministers must have been aware; yet for the temporary gratification of condemning a measure of their predecessors, they have put on record, in its repeal, a precedent of most injurious tendency—the pernicious effects of which will take a deep and permanent root, and will continue in destructive operation when the Act itself shall be forgotten.

4. Complaints of the exclusion of merit from the high offices of State, have been sounded in our ears these twenty years. The failures of our expeditions, and the errors in the administration of important departments at home, have been uniformly ascribed to the employment of incompetent persons, and to the exclusion of the tried servants of the State. Party-favour, in short, has been the theme of the bitterest reproaches from the late Opposition. Pledged as they were to the preference of merit, and possessing ample choice of able men by the union of parties, what a selection have they made for the Treasurership

of the Ordnance! They have intrusted the control over millions of the public money to a man, by profession a contractor and a banker, that line which, of all others, offers the greatest facility for a lucrative use of the public treasure. They have promoted to a station of high rank, a private trader unknown to the public service of his country: and they have associated with themselves a man convicted, by an impartial tribunal, of bribery and corruption.

It will not avail them to plead, in apology, the recommendation of *higher* influence. As the Ministers of a free country, it is their duty to correct the misrepresentations to which *Princes* are exposed, and to inculcate the value of public opinion. A nation characterized by rectitude of sentiment and integrity of conduct, requires its public officers to be exempt, not only from the censure of the law, but even from suspicion. Adulation, or pretended purity, may deceive an *individual*, but they will

not deceive a people. Of the talents of its servants, the public is not, perhaps, the fittest judge; but it will seldom err in the broad distinction between honour and immorality. That to remove from offices of trust whoever shall have forfeited the public confidence, is necessary for the popularity of Government, will be readily acknowledged. It is a kindred maxim with the wise saying, "that a King of England, to be powerful or happy, must reign in the hearts of his people."

5. The refusal of a vote of thanks for the capture of so very valuable a possession as the Cape of Good Hope, is an act of unprecedented injustice. The time taken for its achievement was short; but are we not indebted in a great degree for the promptitude of our success, to the skill and gallantry of the attack? To the timid or unskilful, every enterprise is difficult. Has our navy the less merit because the destruction of an enemy has now become the work of a few hours? Had the attack on

the Cape been mismanaged, the force opposed to our expedition was sufficiently large to have repelled it. But the question has long been decided by repeated precedents. Both the value of the object and the difficulty of capture were much greater than on former occasions, when honours were conferred, and the national gratitude expressed. Let it be contrasted in both respects with the conquest of Tobago, Demerara, or Surinam, and say, whether it is fair to deprive the Commanders on this occasion of the fair meed of their gallantry.

The injustice of the measure is aggravated by its inconsistency. The tribute of national gratitude is withheld from our brave defenders by Ministers who profess the most anxious solicitude in their behalf. Sir Home Popham is not, indeed, attached to Lord St. Vincent; but may he not justly claim the patronage of an Administration which pretends to make no distinction of parties, but to unite the talents, and reward the merits of all?

6. The next subject of my attention regards the Right Hon. Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Were an admirer of that gentleman desired to select any late conspicuous display of his talents, he would probably name his speech on 23d April last, on the hostile conduct of Prussia. Let us examine the prudence and consistency of this celebrated oration.

The Right Hon. Secretary had very lately given his sanction to the Inquiry we have reviewed, a work replete with the condemnation of the haughty and intemperate conduct of former Ministers towards foreign countries. In the beginning of his speech itself, he advises mild and conciliatory language: in what manner does he exemplify the moderation he thus prescribes to himself, and recommends to others? By terming the seizure of Hanover an outrage unprecedented in the history of the worst proceedings of the worst times of Europe — the union of every thing contemptible in servility with every

thing odious in rapacity! In the prelude, he states this to be the measure of France; but soon forgetting this admission, he arraigns it as the act of Prussia. He declares in his outset, that Prussia had been forced into the conduct he now deprecates; but proceeding in his speech, he makes the important discovery, that this compulsion was only partial, and that, though obliged to cede Anspach and Bayreuth, she was *not* obliged to seize Hanover. And he concludes this most judicious and conciliating harangue, by declaring this great Power (who is naturally our ally, and whom he had declared it bad policy to irritate) to be in the last stage of complete vassalage, and to have become the contemptible instrument of the injustice of a master.

Such is the consistency and moderation of that *great man*, to whom it was called presumption in Mr. Pitt to consider himself a rival!

7. There is no talent of more essential importance to a country, in those who are placed at the head of its affairs, than the capacity of penetrating into the characters around them, and of making the wisest selections for the various departments of Government. Unless this be observed, it is in vain that some able men occupy the very highest situations; if the accomplishment of their views be intrusted to assistants of a different character, the best plans may become nugatory in the execution. But whether from want of sagacity to penetrate into character, or from certain other motives, which lull that sagacity asleep, there are more instances than one, in which the choice of the present Administration seems to be very different from what the welfare of the nation requires. Let us turn our eyes to the most important station which it is in the power of a British Cabinet to confer, the government of our vast possessions in the East Indies. The exasperated state of the powers who surround these possessions, the pernicious animosi-

ties which subsist between the servants of Government and of the country in that quarter, and the still more dangerous jealousies which have for years continued to increase between the Directors and the Board of Controul; all require that the supreme government of India should be intrusted to a man of known prudence and exemplary moderation. The temptations which immense power and the opportunity of extending it still farther, afford to ambition, demand that the Governor General should be a man in whom the love of rule ever yields with facility to a sense of public duty, and who is too careless of personal aggrandizement to make the slightest sacrifice for its attainment. The embarrassment of the Company's finances, the exhausted state of its finest provinces, the ruin which must ensue from augmenting the expences and exactions of Government, by again plunging into war: all these circumstances require a Governor General who shall regard the waste of public money with a degree of horror, and be impressed

with the conviction, that rigid economy is indispensable, not only to the prosperity, but to the salvation of our Indian empire.

But which of these qualities is found in Lord Lauderdale? For his moderation, let us look back to his public conduct when in Parliament, where, by the violence of his declamations, he obtained distinction even among the most violent. For the discretion that guides his ambition, let us appeal to the citizens of London, who saw him come down to the Common Hall, and condescend to solicit the Livery as a candidate for the office of Sheriff. For his sense of the indispensable necessity of public economy, we have not to refer to speeches which may have been ill-reported, or to actions which may have been misconstrued. We have his opinions on this important subject, fully stated and eagerly enforced in the work which he has lately given to the world on public wealth. We there find that private wealth is public poverty, and private poverty, public wealth; that eco-

nomy is the certain way to beggar a nation, and prodigality an infallible method of raising it to opulence; that to pay off a national debt is in every point of view a most ruinous and impoverishing measure; and that the heaviest taxation serves only to circulate the wealth of a country!!! Such are the avowed tenets of the man who has been selected for the government of India. In looking around for the merits which have entitled him to this distinction, we find that he has been a constant and violent adherent to the old Opposition; that he lost his seat in Parliament in consequence; that he was considered a martyr to their cause, and that in the day of prosperity it was deemed just to bestow a signal reward on his attachment. By being made, however, a British peer, he has already obtained an ample indemnity for his late exclusion. To appoint him Governor General of India, in order to avenge him of Lord Melville, would be a monstrous retaliation *.

* It deserves observation, that the reputed author, or assistant author of the "Inquiry into the State of

I might add that the Property Tax, formerly the most obnoxious to the present Administration of all Mr. Pitt's financial measures, and the object of their most clamorous resistance, has been not only continued, but almost doubled by them in a single stage. The measures on which I have animadverted, and others of a similar

the Nation," was also the writer of a severe exposure of Lord Lauderdale's work on public wealth. This criticism appeared in the Edinburgh Review for July 1804, and so much irritated his Lordship as to draw from him an indignant and very angry reply. The critic answered in a pamphlet, in which he drew a parallel between his Lordship and Dennis, and exposed to public ridicule both the noble author and his opinions.

Mr. Fox, the zealous patron of his Lordship, has doubtless read his book and approved its principles. In the overflow of admiration, he may have declared it, like Mr. Francis's speech, *unanswerable*. If official avocations will allow, I should beg leave to direct his attention to the Review I have mentioned. A perusal of it will probably alter his sentiments of his Lordship's work, and induce him to qualify the warmth of former approbation, by declaring that in calling it unanswerable, he meant of course it was so, *unless some one should be able to answer it*.

nature, have already very much impaired the popularity of the new Ministry. Mr. Fox, so long the strenuous champion of popular rights, the jealous observer of Ministers, has become in office an accommodating colleague, a pliant imitator of his predecessors. The adoption of those principles which it has been the object of his life to urge with vehemence, he now good-naturedly adjourns to a future period. He accounted them formerly of sufficient magnitude to hazard the division of the country. Such is now his additional stock of prudence, that he will not for their sake divide even the Cabinet. To the majority of his own party, who believed that all he said was sincere, and all that he proposed practicable; who, on his coming into office, were big with the expectation of that radical change which he had declared to be our only remaining chance of salvation, the disappointment has been inexpressible. His consequent loss of popularity has been incalculable. With the opposite party his conduct in office has had a tendency to

tranquillize fear without procuring esteem. Those keen partisans of the late Ministry, who from his constant and violent opposition considered him devoid of all principle, are pleased, without a minute scrutiny of his motives, to find him pursue that course which raises a lasting monument to Mr. Pitt's fame, while it affixes the seal of condemnation to himself. Those calmer minds, who explained the inveteracy of his opposition by the warmth of his temperament, and who considered his speeches in general to be the effusions of the moment, have experienced no surprise from his late conduct. They had always deemed him a man of more imagination than judgment. His talents they knew were great, but inadequately cultivated. They had no sanguine expectations from his coming into office; but they had some dread of danger from the practical execution of former declarations. Of this dread they now begin to be relieved, and they consider it infinitely better for the country that a party should be inconsistent, than that the public safety should be compromised. The contrast

therefore between the present and former conduct of the old Opposition affords them matter of security: but this security, however satisfactory in itself, is unmixed with any approving sentiment towards the quarter from whence it is derived. From Mr. Fox, the adoption of Mr. Pitt's measures proceeds with the worst grace, since it implies the dereliction of those principles for which he has so long and so violently contended. He must be impressed with a conviction either of the wisdom of Mr. Pitt's plans, or of the reverse. In the former case, he has made a very sudden discovery that he has himself been mistaken throughout; that the objects of his hostility to Ministers, and of his promises during so many years to the country, have been fallacious, and his long course of opposition captious, wanton, and criminal; or if he still retain his former sentiments, it will be difficult to explain his conduct in other terms than those the Morning Chronicle lately applied to the Governor, *ad interim*, of India, when desirous to make him give way for Lord Lauderdale; namely,

"by commending his personal policy and prudence at the expence of some other qualifications which alone can entitle any man to esteem in private life or to the confidence of the public."

Of the motives indeed which have induced such a change, different opinions will be entertained. Conversion by argument in so short a time, will hardly be alledged at the mature age of sixty. Some persons, and among these many of the most zealous of his former friends, will explain his conduct as originating in the vulgar feeling already alluded to—the desire of keeping in place. Others, with more courtesy, and we hope with more truth, however perplexed to reconcile his past and present conduct, stoutly reject this idea as unworthy of so distinguished a statesman.

Of the talents of the present Ministry a more decided opinion may be given. A most liberal portion of praise has been assigned them by their adherents. The writer of the pamphlet now under review,

after extolling them in terms of the most fulsome adulation, adds, " No compromise of principles, no paltry half-measures, no incongruous mixture of big words and little doings, will bear them out in redeeming their pledge to save the country." Were not the author evidently devoted to the cause of Ministers, it would be natural to consider him a *mauvais plaisant*, amusing the public at their expence. They have been a considerable time in office, and what have they done? Have they performed any thing commensurate with the lavish encomiums of their friends or the public expectations? Had Mr. Pitt proceeded in that course of injustice, inconsistency, and error, which has characterized so many of their measures, how loudly would they have exposed his conduct to public reprobation! If the author of the Inquiry is desirous to give a faithful description of their conduct since they came into office, let me recommend to him to *reverse* exactly the sentence I have quoted. He will neither impair its fluency, nor will he be distant from the truth.

If the public expectation has been disappointed in the Ministry, the conclusion is fair that their talents were over-rated. With the exception of Lord Grenville, the leading members of Administration have been eminent only in opposition. Now it is much easier to harangue with plausibility than to act with wisdom. There is generally much more to be said against than in favour of a subject. The opponent of Ministry has an advantage similar to that of the general who acts on the offensive. The enemy's positions lie before him, and he may choose his point of attack. If this advantage be acknowledged, and it will hardly be disputed, I am justified in attributing a very considerable portion of the reputation of the late Opposition for ability to this cause. Mr. Fox has long been the chief of this party, and held up by them to the country as an unparalleled assemblage of all that is wise and great. Instead therefore of discussing the merits of the minor members, I shall proceed at once to examine the pretensions of their leader.

No man, of even the best natural parts, can become without application a profound statesman. The most acute penetration will not avail, unless exercised in diligent research. The benefit of experience from a long political life, embracing every vicissitude of situation, and bringing under discussion almost every important question, will be inadequately reaped by a mind averse from assiduous investigation. The expression of manly sentiments is always gratifying to a British audience, for it promises independence and vigour. But what avails animation of language or of thought, without a correspondent firmness of conduct? That fertile imagination, which on the first view of a subject suggests argument upon argument in rapid succession, is the certain evidence of genius, and constitutes a forcible orator. But in the great statesman we expect not only natural ardour and impressive eloquence, but a profound knowledge of every important political question, and an unshaken adherence to fixed maxims. These are not the spontaneous fruits of na-

ture, even in her richest soil. They are the precious result of talents and industry combined---the effects of scrupulous research and careful meditation.

Let us apply these remarks to the Right Hon. Secretary for Foreign Affairs. On particular occasions his eloquence has blazed forth with luminous splendour, while at other times his speeches have been apparently the crude effusions of the moment. It is proper I should support by illustration an opinion of Mr. Fox so different from what his friends are desirous to promulgate. I shall select therefore for examination his sentiments on a subject upon which, above all others, it is indispensable that a British statesman should have the fullest information, and entertain opinions formed on the most decided conviction---a subject, of which the ignorance in a Minister involves not only his own disgrace, but the fate of the country itself---I mean the defence of Britain against invasion.

This most important topic has been a very frequent and anxious object of parliamentary discussion. During the first year of the present war, both Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox were detached from all share in Administration. What a contrast was exhibited in their conduct! We saw Mr. Pitt bestow on the defence of the country the most indefatigable attention, and discover in his speeches that profound knowledge of military science, the acquisition of which is to most men the labour of a lifetime: while he roused the country by his ardour, he enlightened it by his wisdom. Mr. Fox, on the other hand, spoke like one who had never studied the subject; who rose to repel with vehemence a particular point, but took no comprehensive view of the various relations of the whole system. Even on the debate, which through Mr. Pitt's support produced the resignation of the Addington Ministry, when Mr. Fox had summoned the attention both of the House and of the country; when the "prize contended" was the fate of an administra-

tion; when the subject of discussion was the defence of Britain, and Mr. Fox the leader of the debate, his speech was vague, superficial, and defective to a degree altogether unworthy the importance of the occasion.

It may be urged, that his object on this occasion (23d of April 1804) was less to make impression by his own eloquence, than to choose with dexterity a point which might unite Mr. Pitt in a joint attack on the Addington Ministry. I shall admit that this circumstance may account for a want of energy on this occasion on the part of Mr. Fox; but no man will advance it to justify any radical fallacy in the measures he proposed, especially since one of the principal measures (an armed peasantry), so far from having been abandoned, has been revived in a conspicuous shape, under the denomination of trained men, in the new military regulations. The plan of an armed peasantry thus becomes incorporated in a modified shape into

our system of defence. This qualification bears the presumptive marks of a compromise of sentiment between the two Right Honourable Secretaries for the War and Foreign Departments. The one, it would appear, must have urged the superiority of a large regular force; while the other sagaciously adhered to his favourite system of an armed peasantry. The adoption of a happy medium appears to have been the result. Mr. Windham consents to introduce the peasantry, provided Mr. Fox will assimilate them in some degree to the regulars. It is important therefore to examine the degree of efficient resistance which may be expected from an armed peasantry, or from trained men, in the event of invasion.

The local knowledge of the peasantry was a leading feature in Mr. Fox's recommendation of this description of force. Yet although he judged fit to term them irresistible, a little reflection will convince us, that in regard to efficient operations, in this country, local knowledge is a chimera.

The peasant, it is obvious, knows the locality only of a particular district: beyond that he possesses neither knowledge nor an aptitude for its acquisition. This precious quality then of local knowledge is necessarily confined to very few. And if the peasant know very little more than a French soldier of any district except his own, the inaptitude of the former to extend his knowledge by observation, will not be compared with the activity and ardour of the Frenchman.

Local knowledge can be of use only in the neighbourhood of military operations. The French will keep together in strong and compact corps. Nothing will have divided them, unless they have separated on the passage, and been obliged to land on different points. Even in that case, the different bodies will strain every nerve to form a junction, and their object will be to advance with combined strength, by forced marches, to London. Against such formidable assailants, what would avail the efforts

of a peasantry? The local knowledge of the district through which the French may be passing being possessed by the inhabitants only of that district, these are necessarily so few in number as to be inefficient for any enterprise of moment. The French advance on the succeeding day into a district unknown to these countrymen, and the British General must apply to a different class of peasants, the inhabitants of the district newly invaded, if he is desirous to avail himself of this boasted advantage of local knowledge. So imperfect must be the useful employment of this quality, which Mr. Fox extolled as the rock of our salvation. Was the Right Honourable Secretary aware of the circumstance I have stated? His encomiums would imply, that the local knowledge of the peasantry was general, as if the circumstance of living out of town gave to a man the knowledge of the whole country.

In mountainous and difficult countries, where the roads are few, and frequently

through defiles, local knowledge has often been useful. How different is the aspect of this country, every where level and intersected by public roads! Did Mr. Fox mean that we should abandon London and England to the French, and retire to fight for an exemplification of his theory on the mountains of Wales or Scotland?

Whoever is acquainted with the quickness and activity of the French, their intelligence in a strange country, their skill, their ardour, and extraordinary success in desultory warfare, will never advise to ac against them with half-disciplined troops. The only effectual mode of resisting them is by a brave and active army. You must oppose French veterans by British regulars. Avoid a general engagement, but multiply partial actions in every direction. Attack promptly whatever part of the enemy may be detached from the immediate support of the main body. Carry on a war of posts by night and by day. Our success will necessarily be various, and the scenes of blood-

shed distressing; but we can afford to lose more men than the enemy. By these incessant interruptions, they will buy their progress with a loss of lives, which to them will be irreparable; the time required for their march will be doubled, and, before they reach the capital, they will be harassed to such a degree that a battle may be hazarded without imprudence. If we are beaten, our superior cavalry will cover our retreat, and our numbers will supply a fresh army ready to engage the enemy next day. Let it be our practice, whether in general or partial engagements, to avoid manœuvring, and to come, at every proper opportunity, to *close action* with the enemy. It is chiefly in this rude combat that we are superior to the French; in stratagem and artifice we should wage with them a hopeless warfare. The flower of that force which has subjugated Europe will be brought against us; and unless they are opposed with incessant vigour, they will bear down every obstacle, and rush forward like a torrent.

How unavailing in such a contest would be the tardy efforts of an armed peasantry! To the inexperience of recruits, they join the heaviness natural to their mode of life: their numbers would not correct the evil of their inefficiency, but would engender a confusion calculated to increase it. Had we 200,000, or even 500,000 peasants in arms, the issue would be the same. The French army, unless opposed by a regular force, would sweep the country like a whirlwind. The peasants might fight with courage, and support, in honourable death, Mr. Fox's opinion of the national spirit. But their resistance would be ineffectual, and their feeble efforts would not prevent the French from reaching London before our Right Honourable Secretary had recovered from his surprise at the overthrow of his favourite force.

I have no wish to insinuate that Mr. Fox has ever represented an armed peasantry as sufficient for our defence without a regular army. Misrepresentation is not neces-

sary to my arguments, and will not, I trust, be ascribed to my work. My object is distinctly to state, that the plan of an armed peasantry, so strongly urged by Mr. Fox, is, in this level country, and against such an enemy as the French, not only inefficient, but nugatory; that to describe such a force as *irresistible* is a proof of gross ignorance; that such evidence of error on the part of the Right Honourable Secretary cannot fail to impair the authority attached to his opinion, and justify us to question the accuracy of his assertions in every matter in which they are not accompanied by proof.

Of this vague and unsatisfactory nature are his sentiments on the subject of Invasion. He has expressed himself entirely tranquil on this head, and considers the attempt neither likely to be made, nor dangerous to us, if tried. The grounds of his confidence are the superiority of our navy and the spirit of the people. These are neither new discoveries, nor sentiments peculiar to himself. Few will differ from

him in considering our countrymen the bravest, as they are the freest nation in Europe: but of the inefficiency of courage without discipline against veteran troops, I have already treated at some length; and I refer the Right Honourable Secretary for ampler information to his friends Mr. Windham and Colonel Crawford. These gentlemen, I apprehend, will tell him, that the spirit of a gallant nation is valuable, as affording to Government abundant means of preparation; but that on the day of invasion, we must not depend on the people, but on our army.

In regard to our navy, no man will differ from Mr. Fox in an opinion of its decided superiority to the enemy. But when the strength of our Boulogne squadron is not to the adverse force in the proportion of one to ten, it becomes important to inquire what other circumstances justify the security so confidently entertained by Mr. Fox. I beg leave to submit to him a few considerations on this momentous subject.

1. Our late naval victories, while they insure the safety of Ireland, have lessened very little the degree of danger from Boulogne, the expedition from which does not depend on the protection of large ships.

2. Bonaparte, naturally presumptuous, is inflated with late success. He is no longer deterred from the experiment of invasion by the apprehension of domestic insurrection or foreign invasion in the event of failure. Hatred to Britain is his predominant passion; and where he cannot conquer, he will delight to lay waste. His professions of peace should be viewed, like his flag of truce to Acre, as artifices to lull our vigilance asleep.

3. The chief disadvantage of Boulogne, Ambleteuse, and Vimereux, has hitherto been the difficulty of ingress and egress. The French have been indefatigable in their improvements, and the number of craft which can now be brought out in twenty-four hours, is not, I apprehend, over-rated at five hundred.

4. A flotilla of two thousand gun-vessels may be moored in Boulogne bay under the protection of the batteries, and secure from our attacks. They may ride there in safety, unless in strong gales, which, during the summer months, it is known, do not frequently occur.

5. In the event of the sailing of the flotilla, we shall be able to oppose to it only the force which may then be on the Boulogne station, or in the Downs. The easterly wind which brings out the flotilla, will prevent the arrival, till too late, of assistance from Portsmouth; and our force to the northward will be occupied by the movements (doubtless simultaneous) of the Dutch in the Texel, the Maese, and the Scheldt.

6. Yet although it cannot be unknown, that we can depend only on the force appointed to the Boulogne station, that force is allowed to remain in a state of inadequacy. If the French sail, as is likely, in

temperate weather, what would be the probable issue of the conflict? I certainly do not under-rate the exertions of our squadrons, when I suppose them to capture or destroy twice their own force. But even this degree of success would neither arrest the course of the expedition, or make any great deduction from its immense numbers.

7. I am aware that it may be urged, that in the event of the preparations at Boulogne assuming a serious aspect, our squadron may be considerably reinforced. But in what will this reinforcement chiefly consist? Not in sloops and gun-brigs, which are the best description of force for opposing the Boulogne flotilla, whether in the passage or the landing, but in large ships of war, which are incapable of acting in shoal water, and ill calculated to destroy any considerable number of the small vessels of the enemy during the temperate weather, of which it is probable they will make choice to put to sea.

These considerations prove, that invasion is a more serious danger than Mr. Fox appears to believe. That it would ultimately end in the defeat of the enemy, cannot justly be doubted; but the ravage they might make is incalculable, and the present question is not their final success, but the probability of the attempt.

If Mr. Fox, in expressing his opinion on invasion, will take a comprehensive view of its various chances under different contingencies, and, adducing satisfactory arguments for its *speedy* defeat under every probable combination of circumstances, demonstrate, that not merely its issue but its progress would be so hopeless, as to offer no strong inducement to the vindictive mind of Bonaparte to tempt the hazards of the enterprise: in that case Mr. Fox's confidence will be justified. He will not only enjoy security himself, he will communicate it likewise to the country; but without a full and conclusive exposition of this nature, the nation must give no attention to

the opinion or assertion of any man, in a question which involves its existence; especially if proceeding from a quarter where we are blamed for not having conducted offensive operations, by landing our troops *detached from support* in the country of the most active enemy in Europe, and where so languid a mass as an armed peasantry is described as irresistible.

The publication we have examined has been currently denominated the Manifesto of the new Ministry. This title is, in one respect, not inapplicable; for an invading enemy could not have scattered a declaration more calculated to depress the spirit of the country. Although professedly an Inquiry into the State of the *Nation*, it fulfils but a small part of its title; for its researches extend only to those points in our national situation which it suits Mr. Fox's purpose

to examine. It endeavours, by every species of misrepresentation, to throw odium upon the late Ministry, and to constitute them the authors of all the disasters of last campaign. It describes the situation of Europe, and of this country, as to the last degree calamitous, in order that the nation may feel grateful to the present Ministers, for having *consented* to undertake the management of affairs at this pretended crisis, and may shut its eyes to the contrast between the splendour of their former promises, and the insignificance of their performance — between the abuse which they used to lavish on their predecessors, and the approbation they now confer by adopting the measures which they formerly reprobated. Delusions of this nature may impose on the credulity of the French, but the British nation are not to be thus blinded; they will not acknowledge *that* to be a just report of the state of the nation, in which all mention is studiously avoided of their trade, their finances, and their navy; a trade extensive and flourishing beyond example; a navy

triumphant in every quarter of the globe; finances, in which in the thirteenth year of war a loan is effected below the legal rate of interest, and our immense expences defrayed, without increasing the national debt one fiftieth of its amount. The country is not in such terror of France as to consent to any peace which does not effectually provide for their honour and security. They will support the East India Company against Mr. Fox in their refusal to intrust the care of our Indian empire to a nobleman who has proved himself incapable of acting either wisely of his own accord, or of taking prudent advice from others. They will withhold their confidence from that Ministry which bestows offices of trust and emolument on such men as the Treasurer of the Ordnance: and until they see a wiser choice of measures, with a more upright selection of servants, they will refuse to acknowledge the pretensions of the new Ministry (so *modestly* expressed in the publication which has been examined), "to unite the largest portion of talents,

experience, rank, and integrity, which ever enabled a government to secure influence with its subjects, and command respect among foreign nations." The establishment of a commission for auditing the public accounts, to an amount *nominally* immense, may be a dexterous expedient for popularity; but the public will not accept it as a *real* discharge of the pledges so often given to effect that radical change, in which was affirmed to consist "our only remaining chance of salvation."

An Administration skilful only in heaping censures on their predecessors, will not now avail us. In that respect, the abilities of the present Ministry have long been undoubted. But the country now demands of them, "Either prove to us by your actions that you surpass your predecessors, or resign in unequivocal terms the pretensions you have made."

If a secure and honourable peace can be obtained, there will be no necessity to pre-

pare the public mind by the circulation of pamphlets, the obvious tendency of which is to disseminate depression. Unless the peace be secure and honourable, we shall act wisely to prefer war with all its burdens, to a deceitful truce with a tyrant so arrogant, so perfidious, and so insatiably ambitious as Bonaparte. Before we can intrust with confidence a negotiation with so artful an adversary to Mr. Fox, he must give very different proofs of wisdom from any he has yet afforded; whether in his former erroneous sentiments of the French ruler, in his late speeches in Parliament, or in sanctioning a pamphlet which accuses the head of Administration while it insults the country—which declares to the British nation, "that it is in vain to look around for any circumstance which may soften the gloomy picture drawn of its affairs, while it is impossible to imagine any addition which may aggravate them."

If Mr. Fox proceed in a course of such egregious imprudence; if while he pro-

claims moderation he shall endeavour to force obnoxious men into the most important stations; if he flatter himself, that by scattering abuse on his predecessors, he will blind the nation to his own errors, or be acquitted by nominal reforms of the pledges he has given the country, the consequence will be a total loss of public confidence, and his present, like his former administration, will be the transient vision of a few months. Let him exemplify the wise, just, and moderate policy he has so long recommended, or he will in vain endeavour to soothe the public indignation by such insidious appeals as the work we have now examined. Fallacy and misrepresentation have had their day.

SUPPLEMENT

TO THE

ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF THE NATION.

Strictures on the Arguments in the Inquiry in recommendation of Peace.

During the short time which has elapsed since the publication of the first two editions of this work, the public mind has been in continued agitation in consequence of rumours of peace. The Inquiry into the State of the Nation contains the only communication on this very interesting topic which has hitherto been made to the country with any degree of official authority. It is highly important therefore to bestow on this part of the Inquiry a more rigid and scrupulous examination

than has yet been given to it, and to investigate the strength of the arguments so warmly urged in favour of a speedy pacification with France. There will naturally result from this discussion a view of those conditions upon which only it will be eligible for us to make peace with Bonaparte, and of the chances of a negotiation on satisfactory terms at the present juncture.

The author of the Inquiry, after descanting upon "the delicate and urgent state" of our affairs in India, observes, that "the subject is only alluded to here as an additional presumption in favour of the moderate and pacific system which every other view of our present situation concurs to recommend." But a peace with France, so far from confirming the security of our Indian possessions, will expose them to a very serious increase of danger. At present the French have not a single settlement on the continent of India, and are consequently excluded

from communication with the native powers. But peace, by restoring to them Pondicherry and their lesser settlements, will re-open to them the avenue to intrigue at the courts of the Indian princes. Bonaparte, unless very closely watched and spiritedly resisted, will introduce his officers in order to discipline their troops, and prepare them, by the most assiduous exertions, to dispute with us on our next rupture with France the possession of that vast country. India has long been the favourite object of Bonaparte's ambition: the spirit which led him to attempt its conquest through Egypt and Arabia still animates him. He regards it not with the deliberate consideration of a statesman, but with the enthusiasm of a soldier; with the ardour of vulgar prejudice as an inexhaustible mine of wealth, the source of the riches and the power of Britain. He well knows, that during the continuance of the war his efforts to shake our power in that envied country will be hopeless; and he desires peace in order to prepare,

in fraud and secresy, the means of its radical subversion.

In regard to Ireland, the author of the Inquiry declares that "an *interval* of peace would be invaluable." I am prepared to admit that a secure and permanent peace would materially improve the situation of that important branch of the empire; but I have yet to learn in what respect an *interval of peace* (necessarily uncertain in duration) would conduce to that desirable end. Would this object be promoted by opening to the disaffected the intercourse between France and Ireland, and receiving Bonaparte's emissaries in the pretended capacity of commercial commissaries?

Among other inducements to peace the author of the Inquiry urges the improvement of our military economy. To make peace for the sake of improving our army is an idea so singular as to deserve at least an explanation. It is in war generally

that military reforms take place, especially in a free country, where an army, unless in the hour of danger, is an object of permanent jealousy. At the peace of Amiens France was equally formidable to us as at present; but did Mr. Fox avail himself of that occasion to counsel an improvement of our military economy? Did he not, on the contrary, advise a large and immediate reduction of our forces? I agree with the author of the Inquiry, that our military establishment is inadequate to the emergency; but I am justified in doubting that Mr. Fox, in the event of peace, would adopt vigorous measures for its improvement. To judge from the uniform tenor of his past conduct, and particularly on the conclusion of the peace of Amiens, we may venture to predict that in submitting a treaty of peace to parliament, he will accompany it with an advice to reduce largely our establishments, that we may afford the enemy the strongest evidence of our pacific disposition.

"There was a time," a time which has not long elapsed, when our present ministers were the strenuous advocates of entrusting the direction of our army to a military council. If we were not misinformed, this important alteration was deemed by them an object of primary consequence so lately as last February. By what powerful cause has so important a measure been made to sink at once into oblivion? Has a change of sentiment taken place in so short an interval; and do ministers now no longer approve what they were formerly so eager to urge? In this case it is highly important that the country should be apprised both of the alteration of their opinion and of its motives. Were they desirous to effect this improvement, and did they feel their influence unequal to the task? Wherefore did they then represent themselves as "uniting the most ample share of all the qualities, whether natural or acquired, intrinsic or accidental, which ever enabled a government to secure influence with its subjects?" Do

they consider such a change adviseable in peace, but too hazardous in war? Why did they then urge it on former administrations, in the midst of war, and represent it as our best defence against a danger so imminent as invasion? Or, in fine, does *not* the transfer of the patronage of the ordnance point out the *bonus* for the relinquishment of this favourite measure? Such a compromise may provide for individuals; but does it assure the defence of the country? And has our government sacrificed to so paltry an object its character and its prospects of assistance from this important reform, at the moment when that assistance would have been most valuable?

The writer of the Inquiry proceeds to ask, "Should the peace last for ten years, which is unfortunately a high estimate, how much would England gain in her commerce, her finances, her colonial and domestic economy, her military system, her foreign policy? And France too would

gain somewhat in several of these particulars." Admirable reasoning! England, whose commerce, whose finances, whose colonial policy flourish in war, would then gain so greatly by peace, while France, whose trade is annihilated, and whose credit is extinct in war, would gain only *somewhat!* England, who dares not in peace make any considerable reduction of her large and expensive establishments, would then, in the opinion of this *impartial* writer, gain more by peace than France, who dreads no enemy, and who holds in her hands the scales of peace and war!

He next enquires "would not the increase of the commerce of France be utterly incompatible with the military conscription, the most formidable feature in her present aspect?" I answer, the effect of peace, and of extended trade is unquestionably to render a people less warlike; but while Bonaparte lives, or while the government of France shall continue to

be supported by the sword, we shall in vain expect the relinquishment of the military conscription. He asks, "Could their navy in ten or even twenty years of peace, possibly grow up so as to match our own?" Our author will not, I presume, deny that Bonaparte is the best judge of the resources of his own empire. Let him permit me to refer him to the celebrated conversation between the First Consul and Lord Whitworth, where he will find that, in the midst of tranquillity, this *pacific* chief was immediately to complete his army to 480,000 men, and was confident of equalling in ten years that fleet which made England mistress of the seas.

The arguments for peace in the Inquiry are thus equally unfounded as the other parts of the work. Peace, says the author, is required for the security of India. I answer, in war India is secure from France, and in peace open to her intrigues. An interval of peace, he adds, would be

invaluable for Ireland. What radical change, what substantial reform can we hazard in that country, during an *interval* of peace, which we may not attempt in war? He demands peace for the amelioration of our military economy by ministers who no sooner come into office, than in defiance of former pledges, they forego the most important part of military improvement; that part which is the soul of the army, and which, in the day of trial, will be decisive of the safety of the country.

Such inconsistencies, in the work before us, are the consequences of viewing this momentous subject only on one side; of making a question of party of that which concerns---most deeply concerns the whole country; of obeying the bias of individual feelings in a matter where such feelings should have no weight---in a matter, where more than in any other, the most scrupulous investigation of circumstances, the most calm and

impartial discussion alone can lead to safe conclusions.

A wiser plan would be to weigh the disposition of our enemy and the nature of the peace we may expect; the means which our success may have given us of opposing, by the conditions of a treaty, a barrier to his ambition; the respective advantages of peace or war---not of war contrasted with a secure peace, for in this there can be no question, but with such a peace as the situation and disposition of our enemy are likely to afford us.

Of Bonaparte's disposition there can unfortunately be no doubt. The settled purpose of his soul is to aim at universal empire. He pursues this object with undeviating constancy in peace and in war. He advances to it alternately by force of arms, and by secret intrigues. He maintains in peace an army of half a million of men, that he may pursue a uniform course of encroachment, and reply to the

remonstrances of his neighbours, by threats of immediate war. At the peace of Amiens, liberal concessions were made to him in order to afford him every inducement for the maintenance of peace. We asked to retain nothing which might injure the interests or wound the pride of France. With a wise and moderate enemy, this policy would have laid the foundation of permanent tranquillity---with a headstrong tyrant, it was the signal for new aggressions. The interval of peace was to him a time of greater activity, of more extensive aggrandizement than the most vigorous war. He parcels out Germany, he incorporates Piedmont with France, he enslaves Switzerland, he sows the seeds of war in India, he plans another perfidious surrender of Malta, and a second invasion of Egypt. He threatens to exclude England from intervention in the affairs of the continent, and he orders the construction of twenty sail of the line in one year. His own harbours he shuts to our trade, and he commissions spies to

survey our's. And in the midst of these aggressions, he represents himself to Europe with unparalleled assurance as injured, because our ministry, awakened at last to his violence, refused to deliver up the key of Egypt and of India.

The first wish of his heart was, that Britain should have joined with France in conquering and oppressing Europe. "Two such countries," to use his own words, "by a proper understanding, might govern the world. Had he not felt our enmity on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens," (that is, had we yielded an unqualified obedience to whatever he thought proper to demand), "there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate; *participation in indemnities as well as in influence on the continent*; treaties of commerce; in short, any thing that could have given satisfaction and have testified his friendship." He once expected that Britain, insatiable of conquest like himself, might have been

tempted to join in a base league against the sacred rights of nations; when, after exhausting our strength in the subjugation of Europe, he would have bent his utmost efforts to subdue ourselves. Awakened, however, from this delusion, his present scheme is to overthrow Britain, and in her the rest of Europe. He will endeavour to attain this object by a gradual progress, similar to that which led to the completion of his usurpation in France. Violence and fraud combined, effected his appointment to the consulate, at first for a limited period. In the third year of his sway, emboldened by a successful career, he procures his nomination for life. In the fifth, he openly lays aside the mask, and assumes the absolute sovereignty of a country which had so lately braved utter ruin and extinction in the cause of liberty. Advanced in France to the plenitude of power, and secure of its duration, his ambition now takes a different range. He will pursue the degradation of Britain with the same com-

bination of artifice and violence, the same unwearied perseverance which has led to his own exaltation. War is an insurmountable obstacle to his progress, and he therefore desires an interval of peace.

It will hardly be argued that the outline I have drawn is unauthorised, or that any project, however extravagant, which can gratify ambition, may not with justice be ascribed to Bonaparte. This ungovernable passion hurries him on, not only beyond every restraint of religion or morality, but even against the dictates of policy. Was there ever an act of wilder injustice than to establish a sovereign in Holland, where royalty is proscribed by the concurrent voice of every party? or to introduce two kings into the German empire, a measure calculated to offend equally Prussia and Austria. The same mind which planned these daring innovations will hope to effect our expulsion from India; to wrest from us the sovereignty of the seas; to dismember Ireland

from Britain; and even dare to flatter itself with the hope of dictating a humiliating treaty in London. The man who is animated towards us with such rancorous hatred is endowed with talents, to which the history of nations scarcely exhibits a parallel in the lapse of centuries. His invention supplies expedients for every difficulty; his subtilty has deceived successively every enemy; his mind, incessantly active, renounces all relaxation, and occupies itself with perpetual schemes of ambition. He has maintained himself, during seven years, in possession of that absolute power which few of his predecessors enjoyed as many months. He has not only baffled every assault from abroad or conspiracy at home, but he has made them all subservient to his aggrandizement. The half of Europe is subject to his controul, and every force, except the British navy, has fled before him.

Such is the power and the disposition of the enemy with whom we are about to

negotiate. If Mr. Fox flatter himself that any display of confidence, any surrender of conquests, will induce Bonaparte to adopt a system of moderation and of real peace, he is most egregiously mistaken. The experiment has already been made on a liberal scale, and has failed. It can never be sufficiently urged that peace is desired by him, only as it will furnish more vigorous means of war. He is most anxious to re-establish the trade and manufactures of France, but with what object? Is it to promote the general happiness of his subjects? Are we justified to ascribe such a feeling to him who poisons his sick and assassinates his prisoners? Certainly not. He desires peace in order to recruit his finances and his navy. A soldier in the cabinet as in the field, he appreciates every thing by its utility in war; and, much as he affects to value commerce, we shall see him in the midst of peace continue to keep half a million of his subjects armed and abstracted from the pursuits of industry.

After having considered the disposition of our enemy, let us examine the relative situations of both countries in war and peace. In the present war, the balance of advantages is in every respect in our favour. To France, war with Britain has become an inglorious and a hopeless contest. Her fleets have either been destroyed and captured, or are accounted fortunate if, returning from a fruitless enterprise, they reach their own harbours in safety. There remains only the hazardous attempt of invasion; an attempt, which although much less impracticable than is commonly supposed, and likely to lead in its progress to sharp and serious conflicts, would doubtless end in our triumph, and complete our victorious and preponderating attitude. To Britain, war against France has been a series of brilliant successes. It is in our allies only that we have experienced misfortunes; with the termination of each successive coalition, the aspect of the war has entirely changed. France, irresistible by land,

becomes inactive and languid when the operations are confined to sea. England is triumphant on the ocean, and reaps all the glory of the active warfare.

The advantages of a peace to France are incalculable. It will relieve her from a disastrous contest, it will restore her colonies, revive her expiring commerce, recruit her exhausted finances, create innumerable seamen, and re-establish her navy in its former splendour. But which of these benefits will England reap from a termination of the war? Our trade, our finances, and our navy, are flourishing beyond example. Will our security be increased by peace, or our burdens considerably lessened? In former times the advantages of peace were solid and immediate. Fleets and armies were disbanded on both sides, and the burdens of war ceased with the signature of the definitive treaty. At present there can be no important reduction of our war establishment. We must continue armed and

bear the burden of war in the midst of peace. I do not under-rate the advantages of peace to us, when I state them to be comprised in

1. A *partial* reduction of public expence:
2. The diminution of insurance, and other war charges on our trade: and,
3. If a satisfactory treaty of commerce be concluded, a more free communication with the continent.

Whether the consequence of peace will be an extension of our trade and manufactures, is a question very difficult of solution. By the majority of those engaged in them, this question will be answered in the negative. And the expected improvement of our finances by peace, is evidently much overrated.

So deeply are a very numerous part of the nation impressed with these considerations, that they are disposed to adjourn the question of peace altogether, until a more favourable combination of cir-

cumstances, when we may lay down our arms in security, and reap, undisturbed, the blessings of tranquillity. I differ from this opinion upon the important ground that our continuance at war will not effect so desirable a change. War will keep us secure, but offers no prospect of producing alteration in the state of France. The obvious deduction however from our present situation is to make no peace, except on terms commensurate with our preponderance in war; terms highly advantageous to us, and conducive to the safety of the continent. Let us endeavour to weigh those terms, and define them with as much accuracy as possible.

Mr. Fox in urging peace a twelvemonth ago declared, that the equitable basis of negotiation would, in his opinion, be those terms with which we, were we in the enemy's situation, would be satisfied. This argument is specious, and has not, I believe, been answered. Like other opinions, however, of the Right Honourable Secretary, it will not stand the test of in-

vestigation. Great Britain, had she even the power of France, would be infinitely less dangerous to the liberty of Europe than that restless state. Morality in this country, among private, and we trust among public men is by no means at so low an ebb as with the giddy people of France and their perjured Ruler. We do not negotiate with our neighbours to deceive them, or persist in a domineering controul, after declaring their independence by solemn treaties. Had Britain been in the situation of France, treaties so advantageous as those of Luneville and Amiens would never have been violated by the wanton excesses of ambition. Has this ambition been moderated since the period when we were compelled to a rupture? Does Bonaparte's conduct, either before or since the late coalition, justify us in shewing again that confidence which we evinced in the treaty of Amiens, and of which he proved himself unworthy? Intrigue and falsehood have always been the favourite instruments of the French

government, but these weapons are wielded at present with an assurance and activity beyond all former example. Bonaparte as far surpasses in bold and systematic fraud his republican predecessors, as they were superior to the old government. Mr. Fox's rule, therefore, of considering *that* a just basis of peace, which Britain in the situation of France would deem fair, has no application unless the morality of the respective countries underwent a similar interchange with their political circumstances. This proposition, while it is disproved by reason, is falsified by experience, for the treaty of Amiens was a peace on Mr. Fox's principles, in all their latitude, and instead of terminating our differences and disquietudes, it was the prelude to tenfold agitation.

After such experience of restless ambition, after a state of perturbation and anxiety worse than war, the nation will be satisfied with no treaty, which shall

not contain the provisions of real tranquillity. Its conditions must be explicit and incontrovertible. We must not again rely on the professions of our enemy, or even on that moderate system which it is his interest to pursue. We must lay our account with an insatiable spirit of aggrandisement, which will explain in its own favour whatever shall not be clearly defined, and will seize for itself whatever shall not be occupied by us. It is a common practice in capitulations on the continent, that the French impose upon the credulity of those with whom they treat, by inserting a clause that "Whenever the conditions of surrender appear doubtful, their interpretation shall be in favour of the inhabitants." The capitulation is signed, and the gates opened to the French, who enter and violate successively, *under pretext of necessity*, every stipulation they have made!

The obvious result of these remarks is, that Mr. Fox's idea of placing ourselves

in the enemy's situation, however plausible, is neither a wise nor just rule of conduct for Britain towards France, because Britain in the situation of France (as in every other) would disdain to make a treaty which she did not mean to keep. Let the Right Honourable Secretary permit me to suggest to him a different plan. In the overtures to negotiation, let him remember that Bonaparte desires peace at present, for the sake of breaking it more advantageously hereafter; that war is predominant in his thoughts, and aggrandizement by fraud or force, the perpetual object of his solicitude; that ambition instead of being satiated by success preys upon his mind, and "grows by what it feeds on." In the progress of the treaty, let Mr Fox be prepared for a display of the most consummate artifice. In 1803, when Bonaparte considered our ministry timid and spiritless, threats were his favourite weapons. He menaced us in his message to the councils; in his communications to Lord Whitworth; in his

appeals through Andreossi. But when we had defied his threats, and dared him to the conflict, he adopts a different tone. In his overture for peace in January 1805, he assails our humanity, and affects to extol as of incalculable value, those Indian conquests, which he well knew were barren glories. To Mr. Fox he will represent himself as aggrieved by preceding administrations, as unjustly attacked, and as anxious to make every sacrifice for so inestimable a blessing as peace. In his communications with this country, he will pretend congratulations on the appointment of a ministry, "estimable by their illumination," while at the same hour he instructs his emissaries to seek access at St. Petersburgh, and endeavour to detach that court from our alliance, by traducing Mr. Fox as the most fickle of men, as absorbed in interests purely English, and an enemy to the co-operation of Britain and Russia.

If our ministry be actuated by these

impressions, as we trust for the sake of Britain and of Europe that they are, they will not offer to Bonaparte those conditions which they would themselves expect, were they in the situation of the enemy. They will not disband our victorious fleets before they obtain stipulations calculated to prevent the further progress of usurpation on the continent; they will not relinquish those means of security for ourselves which we now hold; they will make no allowance for vague assurances of pacific disposition, but they will give to every article of the treaty that explicit and indisputable shape which is indispensable with an enemy devoid of faith and justice.

The evils of war and advantages of peace, as already observed, are so greatly on the side of France, that she should account no sacrifice, except her honour, too great to obtain them. We have conquered from her and from Holland, Pondicherry, St. Lucia, Tobago, Surinam, Demerara,

Essequebo, Berbice, and the Cape; we have destroyed her navy, and made prisoners the flower of her seamen. Against all these acquisitions France has to place only Hanover, so unjustly occupied that it is doubtful whether she should be allowed to introduce it into the scale of equivalents. The continuance of the war promises to be equally in our favour. We cause to France incalculable deprivations; while the sum of her injury to us consists in petty depredations on our trade, and in the threat of invasion. Of invasion hardly any one doubts that the issue would be favourable to us; and no minister will alledge the desire of averting it as an argument for peace. France challenged us to the combat by denying that we were able single handed to withstand her. We accepted the defiance---we have fought and conquered.

While the advantages of war are thus entirely on our side, the benefits of peace are nearly in the same degree on the side

of the enemy. No wonder that, in such a situation, there should be many who urge a continuance of war until circumstances justify the expectation of greater tranquillity in peace; especially as our finances, which have been represented as our weak side, are, in consequence of the powerful operation of the sinking fund, in a state of extraordinary prosperity---in such a state that, although last year was extremely expensive, the addition to the national debt, after deducting the amount discharged by the sinking fund, was only ten millions; a sum less than one-fiftieth of the aggregate, and not equal to the actual yearly diminution of our debt by the progressive depreciation of money.

On the other hand, peace is recommended by humanity; by the prospect of a reduction (partial indeed) of our burdens; and more immediately by the conviction that the continuance of hostilities is not likely to lead to that change of

circumstances which will assure our tranquillity. An enlightened and impartial view of our situation will induce this inference: That peace is preferable to war, if peace can be obtained on the terms we have a right to demand.

Of the Terms of Peace.

Were we to make peace for ourselves alone, without desiring any stipulation in favour of the continent, we should be entitled not only to the cession in sovereignty of all we have conquered, but to further sacrifices from France and her allies. They have no prospect of either taking any of our settlements, or of re-capturing any of their own. To us the way is cleared for further conquests. Hanover is all the enemy can offer in return; and no one will maintain that the restoration of Hanover is of equal importance to us as the cessation of disastrous war to France. In order, however, to ameliorate the con-

dition of the continent, we are willing both to forego the flattering prospect of successful hostility, and to restore a considerable part of our conquests.

A renewal of hostilities on the continent it is obvious would lead only to fresh disasters, and to the further aggrandizement of France. It is equally apparent that the safety, nay the existence of every power in Europe which yet retains a portion of independence, can be maintained only by a deep impression of its danger from France, by a wise and diligent improvement of its resources, and by the cultivation of confidential intercourse with every state which is not under the controul of the common enemy. Austria can derive her safety only from a radical amelioration of her whole system. Let Prussia, less fertile in resources, less firm in the attachment of her subjects, beware of throwing more weight into the hands of a power of which she may become the next victim. Even Russia must

double the number of her gallant soldiers, and the energies of her vast empire, to retain at present any share of influence in the commonwealth of Europe, or to prevent her trembling hereafter before that power which may attack her after laying the intervening states prostrate at her feet.

While we deprecate the renewal of hostilities on the continent, we cannot too strongly urge an adherence to continental interests in a negotiation with France. Endangered, like the rest of Europe, by her fatal preponderance, our common safety can be found only in those provisions which, obtained by sacrifices on our part, shall arrest her career of aggression against weaker states. Such has in general been the policy of this country: a policy equally wise and generous; and which, if at present boldly urged and stedfastly persisted in, will procure us not only honourable terms of peace, but conditions of substantial security for our-

selves and our allies. Let no consideration detach us in negotiation from Russia. Russia, the only independent power on the continent, represents, in conjunction with Britain, the commonwealth of Europe against France. Were we to treat separately, our artful enemy might offer to each more tempting conditions, but our union and firmness alone can successfully assert the cause of Europe, and procure for us the grounds of solid peace.

By the acquisition of all Italy, and especially of Venetian Dalmatia, France has opened a direct road to the heart of the Turkish empire. On the importance of Venice, and her territory, let us consult the author of the Inquiry into the State of the Nation. "The commerce of Venice does not occupy at present less than 400 vessels belonging to the port of Venice alone. In its better days the number of these was tenfold. The naval arsenal of that city is famous, and the neighbouring harbours perfectly well adapted to the pur-

poses of trade. The coast of Dalmatia, with the islands, possesses more fine ports with strong fortifications, than any in the world. Nona, Zara, Sebenico, Trau, Spalatro, Castel Nuovo, Matero, Lesina, Corcyra, are but a few of the harbours impregnable to attack, and commanding every commercial advantage, which have now fallen into the hands of the Cisalpine and its masters. It is unnecessary to state how prodigious an accession of trade and force this must, in a short time, secure to France; and how paramount it must render her superiority in the Mediterranean. Whether we now attempt to defend Sicily, or avert the downfal of Turkey and the seizure of Egypt, we shall feel the consequences of the treaty of Presburg in every operation of the war."

After publishing to the country so formidable a representation of the importance of Venice and Dalmatia, our ministry cannot fail, in their negotiations, to

be actuated by the necessity of a barrier in this direction against France. In the projected dismemberment of the Turkish empire, Bonaparte will not now be contented with Egypt as his share. He will desire to add Greece to Egypt, and Albania to Greece. His order for the release of the Russian shipping is like his discharge of the Russian prisoners last war, the first of a series of insidious steps by which he expects to blind the court of St. Petersburg to his ambition, and to lure her to participate in his schemes of aggrandizement. He will tempt Russia to co-operate with him in the partition of Turkey, by offering her Constantinople and the heart of the empire, pretending to desire for himself, at first, only the maritime part; he will flatter himself, with his characteristic perfidy, that Russia having, by aiding in this nefarious design, become embroiled with Britain, he will have the means of expelling her from her new acquisitions; and that seizing for himself the whole of Turkey, he will insure the acqui-

escence of Russia in his future usurpations by the threats of immediate war---threats by which he has long overawed Austria, and by which he vainly thought to intimidate Britain.

It is therefore the part of Britain to rouse the jealousy of Russia on the side of Turkey, and not only to confirm to her the retention of Corfu, but to stipulate to her the possession of such a barrier on the side of Turkey against Dalmatia, as shall enable her to withstand either the secret intrigues or the open violence of France.

Malta is now less necessary to France, but doubly important to Great Britain. It is no longer required by Bonaparte as a stepping-stone to Egypt, but is indispensable to Britain as a central station, from which to detach her squadrons in order to assert, in conjunction with Russia, the integrity of the Turkish empire, or to impede its downfal, should Russia, se-

duced by the perfidious intrigues of France, concur in the base partition. Malta therefore *must* be ceded to Britain, for we can intrust it to the honour and courage of a British garrison alone. Since the acquisition of Venice and Dalmatia to France, the cession of Malta is no longer so important a sacrifice on her part as formerly. We are therefore not only entitled to its retention, but justified in considering that its cession by no means affords us an equal degree of satisfaction and security, as it would have done previous to the late conquests of France. While the cession of Malta to Britain is therefore indispensable, it by no means supersedes either the necessity or the justice of a further barrier against France to be held by Russia on the side of Dalmatia.

The cession of Malta having long been the point of honour between France and England, it is important that it should be couched in the terms least offensive to France. It could either be provided for

by a secret article, or, if it be deemed better to insert it at once into the body of the treaty, it could be accompanied by an enumeration of the late acquisitions of France, in order to make it appear in its real light---not of a concession, but of an equivalent.

The retention of the Cape is obviously dictated by the avowed designs of France upon India. The Cape is highly important to our trade; it is the intermediate climate to season our troops to the burning sun of India; the station from which we can threaten Mauritius when the ambition of France again forces us into war; above all, the retention of the Cape is imperiously required by the absolute subjection of Holland to France. If you restore the Cape to Holland, you make it a depot to France for the assemblage of armaments against India.

The situation of our unfortunate ally, the king of Naples, calls for our assist-

ance. If we cannot restore him to his throne, let us afford him a testimony of our fidelity, and procure if possible some alleviation of his calamities.

These considerations suggest the following outline of peace. Britain on condition of retaining Malta and the Cape, which no power can wrest from her, will forego the advantages of a state of war which is every where successful, and submit to that increase of strength in France and her allies, which will be the speedy consequence of peace. She will restore all her other conquests and acknowledge the past changes on the continent, provided France give up Hanover, consent to the establishment of a Russian barrier on the side of Dalmatia, and give assurance that no more changes in the state of Europe shall be attempted.

The treaty of Amiens does not afford a valid argument against these conditions. It is an example indeed of less satisfactory

terms obtained under an equally favourable combination of circumstances. But the treaty of Amiens is now acknowledged to have been a compact in terms altogether inadequate to our just demands. At that time the nation, weary of war, expected to enjoy in peace the blessings of tranquillity. A pacific ministry, anxious to meet the wishes of the country, and conceiving that to render Bonaparte moderate, it was only required to set, on our part, an example of moderation, made concessions evidently inconsistent with our just rights, and, as the event proved, impolitic in their operation. Nothing could justify the treaty of Amiens, but the expectation that it would lead to complete and permanent tranquillity. Bonaparte has taught us, that to yield to him is not the way to accomplish so desirable an object. Once deceived, let us beware of again buying our experience at so dear a rate.

Lord Grenville will subscribe, without hesitation, to the inadequacy of the treaty

of Amiens; but there is another feature in our situation, to which it may be necessary to request his Lordship's attention. If his Lordship continue to attach as much importance to continental co-operation as he lately did, he will deem the cessation of that co-operation, and the impossibility of its renewal, a strong argument for peace. I have already admitted, that it is highly improbable that the efforts of Britain alone, confined as they necessarily are to the sea, and operating on distant parts of the French empire, can effect any alteration in its interior. But it is equally obvious, that all the victories of France have proceeded from her enemies vainly persisting in the hope to assail her by land with effect. We had to act our part by sea, and we alone have performed it with success. In the years of continental operations, these successes have been clouded by the disasters of our allies, but when we have been left alone in the struggle, they have shone forth with undiminished lustre. In 1797 the Emperor of

Germany was forced to withdraw from our alliance, and the lot of Britain, it was predicted, would be either an immediate invasion, or a humiliating peace. We replied to these gloomy presages by the victory of the Nile. In 1799 Austria, reanimated, took up arms, and although at first eminently successful, was in the succeeding year compelled to acknowledge the superiority of her rival. Britain, become again the only object of the vengeance of France, achieves, unaided, the victory of Copenhagen, and the conquest of Egypt. In 1803, Bonaparte re-echoes the vulgar opinion, in defying us to contend single-handed with France. We have again decided the question; and how complete would have been our triumph, and the disgrace of France, had our victories not been clouded by the disasters of the continent!

In the present state of France, the efforts of the universe against her, by land, would be unavailing. Our safety and superiority

are assured by her inability to attack us otherwise than with troops weakened and divided by the obstructions to their passage by sea. In contemplating the relative situation of Britain and France, the mind, overcome by the disasters of Austria, views Britain as vanquished by the humiliation of her ally. But Austria has already paid, and dearly paid, the price of peace. That question is therefore at rest, and it remains for Britain to exact in her turn, from France and her allies, the price of cessation from successful hostility. By sea, France is at present as completely humbled as when Britain dictated peace in 1763. She is now indeed all-powerful on the continent, but that power to us who have defied it, can cause no intimidation. The just effect of a sense of that power on our negotiation should be, that we avoid all haughtiness, while we adhere the more firmly to those demands of security which her preponderance renders indispensable. Let us offer accordingly the restoration of every con-

quest we have made from France herself, and confine our acquisitions to a partial retention of the possessions of her allies.

The cessation of continental war necessarily reduces the contest to maritime operations. In these the discovery of the plan of forcing the enemy to close action, by breaking the line, has doubled our former superiority. It puts an end to all evasive manœuvres, and leads promptly to that direct trial of skill and courage, in which it seems the birth-right of our countrymen to be irresistible. A French fleet cannot now, as formerly, get away after exchanging a few broadsides; they have now no alternative, but to sacrifice half their ships, or come to a general engagement. The result of a battle is no longer the capture of a few vessels, but the almost entire annihilation of the enemy's squadron. The accessions of strength to France by land, great as they have been, are equalled by the increase of our naval ascendancy; and were

the fleets of Europe to assail us with united strength, the result would be to us a series of brilliant victories. No proposition therefore can be more radically erroneous, than that Britain must make peace because the continent is unable to co-operate with her.

Every view of our situation justifies the demand of favourable conditions. The sentiments of the country are in unison with this opinion, and to yield to the enemy will cause the downfal of the present administration.

Having answered that part of the Inquiry which contains so strong a recommendation of peace, and given an outline of the conditions on which, or on equivalent terms alone, we ought to disarm, it remains to enquire into the probability of the conclusion of a treaty at the present juncture.

Of the Prospects of Peace.

Bonaparte will be the principal actor on the scene of negotiation, and it is important to describe him in this character. He has made repeated overtures for peace, accompanied by professions of humanity, in which it would be a satire on the credulity of any one to suppose that he was considered sincere. As well might we deem him impressed with the belief of our sacred religion because he has found its re-establishment in France conducive to his popularity, or consider him a convert to Mahomet, because in Egypt he proclaimed himself a prophet, and the destroyer of Christianity.

We may predict with a considerable degree of confidence the conduct he will hold. In his overtures and in the early stage of the communications, while general terms only are used, we shall find him disposed to

promise every thing. But in the arrangement of the actual conditions, where the explicit nature of the terms will prevent the possibility of subterfuge, we shall experience nothing but obstinacy and delay. When Lord Malmesbury was sent to Paris in 1796, the Directory agreed to treat on the basis of mutual cessions; an admission which they afterwards qualified by the very *temperate* and *consistent* declaration, that they would listen to no proposals contrary to the constitution, the treaties, and the fundamental laws of the Republic; namely, that constitution by which the chief part of their acquisitions was annexed to France, while the remainder were erected into republics dependent on her; and those treaties, by which they had guaranteed to Spain and Holland the restitution by Britain of all her conquests.

If we urge the necessity of security to Britain on account of the immense increase of the French dominions, Bonaparte will

affect to consider our visionary conquests in India as equivalent to his solid acquisitions in Europe. Conscious that Russia has taken nothing for herself in Europe, he will fabricate tales of aggression against Persia. When we alledge the subjection of Holland and Italy to France, he will consider us as answered by the statutes of his venal senate, which stipulate that those crowns shall never be united on the same head as the diadem of France, as if they were not substantially provinces of the same empire. When we demand to retain a part of our conquests, he will argue his own moderation in demanding cessions from Austria not for himself but for his allies; as if a politic appropriation rendered these acquisitions less dangerous to Europe. And when we mention a barrier against further encroachments, he will have the confidence to appeal, as he did in 1803, to his *known pacific disposition*, and affect to treat the suspicion of ambition as an indignity.

If we yield in any one important point, we

shall find him altogether intractable in every other. Have we forgotten the delays and artifices he practised at Amiens? Even then it was necessary to threaten and to equip armaments, in order to make him agree to the few sacrifices we required in a treaty so highly favourable to him. In negotiation with Bonaparte there is only one effectual plan to be followed: Let our terms be explicit, our language direct and firm. Offer, in concurrence with Russia, a peace on such conditions as our success justifies, and the security of Britain and of Europe demands. Tender him a treaty on these conditions with the one hand, while in the other you hold the alternative of war. Adhere to these terms with inflexible firmness—a firmness equally remote from haughtiness as from submission. He will alternately storm and flatter; but we must despise his threats, beware of his artifices, and refute his sophistry. Our claims are just and our means ample for their attainment. We ask to deprive France of nothing, but to stipulate pro-

tection and tranquillity for ourselves. A manly perseverance will attain our end. The war can be conducted only by sea, and it is our's to rule the ocean. Bonaparte, convinced that we are neither to be overreached nor intimidated, will relinquish the hopeless contest, and seek a more solid glory in peace.

Those who are sanguine of an immediate pacification, and found their belief upon Mr. Fox's known sentiments, overrate both his inclination for peace and the extent of his influence. Mr. Fox, when in opposition to a warlike administration, expressed more ardour for peace in the heat of debate than it is likely he will feel in the calm deliberation of the cabinet. His official communications must have at last opened his eyes to the perfidious policy of Bonaparte, and his declaration in regard to Hanover announces not only that his Majesty will never consent to its relinquishment, but that he will accept of no equivalent for its cession.

Were the sentiments of the Right Honourable Secretary even as pacific as many believe, it is no compliment to administration to consider these sentiments as imperative on the cabinet. Mr. Fox regulates India and Ireland, because, in the partition of influence, these important branches are assigned to his party; but he is not therefore the arbiter of peace and war to the British empire. This question involves not the appointment of friends, but the salvation of the country; and in a matter of so high interest, the country is represented not by the secretary for foreign affairs, but by the united cabinet. It is worthy of the vulgar only to suppose, that because the dispatches proceed from the secretary's office, they bear the stamp exclusively of his sentiments.

Let us inquire the dispositions of the men who must be consulted, as well as Mr. Fox, on the present occasion. Lords Grenville, Spencer, and Fitzwilliam, along with Mr. Windham, have always been the ad-

vocates of war. Lord Sidmouth has been taught in a severe school, and will not again lightly concur in another treaty of Amiens. Lord Grenville is so decidedly pledged to the country, that we should be justified to dread the conclusion of no hasty or inadequate treaty without the signal of his Lordship's resignation. Flexibility is not his character, and it is very generally believed that the real cause of the dissolution of administration in the spring of 1801, was an incompatibility of sentiment on this most important subject, between his Lordship and Mr. Pitt. Such has long been the current report, and the conduct of these statesmen in the sequel, when each, detached from administration, spoke his individual sentiments, has given it an authority superior to report. If this cause therefore produced a dissolution of ministry, when his Lordship was joined with Mr. Pitt, the companion of his life, the friend of his bosom, how much more is it likely to occasion a similar effect, when acting with Mr. Fox, with whom his connexion is of

yesterday, unsanctioned by conformity of political ideas or by congeniality of personal feelings—a connexion equally hollow in its origin and precarious in its tenure—prompted in its commencement by motives unworthy of distinguished statesmen, and evincing in its course, a contrariety of views equally subversive of the harmony and the permanency of administration—a connexion which, in an evil hour, detached his Lordship from the illustrious character we have lately lost, and which at this moment of doubt and anxiety on the subject of a most important negotiation, is the only obstacle that prevents the nation from reposing an unlimited trust in his Lordship, and awaiting the issue with confidence and tranquillity.

The advocates of the present ministry alledge that Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville, before agreeing to act together, must have had the fullest and most satisfactory explanations on every important topic; especially, they add, in regard to peace, the

most interesting of all. Will these gentlemen undertake to define the nature of the explanations which produced this sudden harmony? Whether the one had the condescension to relinquish his sentiments *in toto*, and generously adopt those of his new friend, or whether, rivalling each other in courtesy, they met half way at the altar, and cemented the heterogeneous league by mutual sacrifices. Their apologists omit also to notice the alacrity with which certain statesmen out of place are disposed to agree in any plan which may give to the country the benefit of their services; an alacrity so powerful in the present instance as to overcome at once the deep-rooted objections of a whole life of variance. It is highly probable that no explanation whatever took place between those eminent statesmen, except in those general terms in which men will seldom differ on any occasion, and never when they pursue with avidity a mutual object. Had they entered into a strict investigation of their respective sentiments, it is as improbable that they

would ever have coalesced, as that they will long continue united. Every thing is opposite, whether we consider the temper of the men, their career in life, the opinions to which they are pledged for the past, or the dispositions with which they will view the occurrences of the future. Their junction was obviously necessary in order to get into power, and they may probably preserve harmony while they continue indispensable to each other. But remove this necessity, and enable either Mr. Fox or Lord Grenville to guide alone the vessel of the state, and a short time will elapse before one hand will seize the helm and hurl his brother pilot from his post.

It is therefore extremely unlikely, even if Mr. Fox continue as warm an advocate of peace as formerly, that he will procure Lord Grenville's acquiescence to conditions inferior to those to which his Lordship in 1801, although hopeless of continental assistance, maintained that we were entitled. Circumstances are again equally favourable,

and his Lordship is solemnly pledged to the country to resign, sooner than sanction a second treaty of Amiens.

It is inconceivable with what industry the most false reports of peace have of late been circulated, and with what credulity they have been received. Lord Yarmouth, instead of the bearer of a dispatch, has been metamorphosed into a second Malmesbury, capable of comprehending at one interview the complicated relations of the two leading powers of Europe. Others seem to have considered our differences with France of so simple a nature as to be susceptible of adjustment by the interchange of letters, without the necessity of personal conferences. And Lord Holland has been commissioned to subscribe a definitive treaty, when the overtures which precede a negotiation even for preliminaries, had scarcely been made. Policies of insurance, it is pretended, have been circulated, offering premiums for the signature of preliminaries in a week, or even a day. Mer-

cantile business is in consequence at a stand, the sale of almost every article of produce or manufacture suspended; and, while we continue to defray all the burdens of war, we are deprived of our just indemnity, in the increased price of our goods. Such a situation unites the evils of both peace and war. The metropolis and the country are a prey to the daily rumours of the selfish and the credulous, and the report of one hour is contradicted the next.

A rational and attentive view of our situation will suggest very different sentiments. It will convince us that while overtures only are pending, it is highly absurd to expect the consequences of advanced negotiation; that the differences between France and Britain are such as to render their adjustment a work of much time and difficulty; and that treating in conjunction with Russia, the objects of discussion become still more various and complicated. There exists on neither side, that necessity for immediate peace which alone could lead

to a treaty so rapidly concluded as the late rumours suppose. The well-known ambition of our enemy offers no flattering prospect as yet of those conditions which alone can render peace eligible. Since his late triumph on the continent, he might give us all we require without committing his own dignity; and were he as wise as he is great, he would eagerly avail himself of a concurrence of circumstances, in which to make sacrifices is to him no dishonour. But pride and resentment are predominant in his breast, the rage of ambition will stifle the admonitions of policy, and he will sooner encounter all the evils of war than subscribe a treaty favourable to Britain and to Europe.

On such a treaty our ministry are bound to insist, whether actuated by a regard to the public feelings, by a just sense of our present situation, or by the experience of the past. It enters into the giddy temper of the French to abuse success under every form of government. While they consider

themselves conquerors, no nation is secure from their aggressions; our only chance of tranquillity in peace is to impress them with a fixed conviction of our superiority in war. Let us look back to the history of Europe for the last century. The peace of Ryswick was favourable to France, and led to a renewal of hostilities in four years. Defeated and humbled at the peace of Utrecht, she allowed Europe to enjoy tranquillity nearly thirty years. Victorious at Aix la Chapelle, her encroachments were so rapid as to necessitate a recurrence to hostilities in less than seven years. Disappointed and overcome in the celebrated war which succeeded, it was with the utmost difficulty that after an interval of peace twice as long as the preceding, she yielded to the temptation of separating America from Britain. The peace of Amiens belongs to the catalogue of her triumphant negotiations, and did it not produce their usual effects---an unsettled truce, and a precipitate rupture?

Let us beware therefore of yielding to such flattering pictures of the advantages of peace as are exhibited in the Inquiry into the State of the Nation, and of which the apparent intention is to prepare the country for negotiation on terms inadequate to our just demands. The difference between peace and war cannot now be to us the difference between agitation and tranquillity, between light and heavy burdens. Our anxiety must be increased, and the reduction of our burdens can be only partial. Yet humanity and policy concur to recommend a cessation of war, if we can obtain in the conditions of peace the provisions of security. From an over-bearing tyrant these are not to be gained, by hasty overtures, but by the gradual progress of negotiation, and the firm attitude of war. Necessity alone will induce his acquiescence, and war is the instrument we must wield. Let us assiduously improve our army. Our navy requires no alteration, except the addition of small vessels, calculated to op-

pose the enemy in the Channel. And to assure the prosperity of our finances, it remains only to adhere, with undeviating constancy, to the admirable plan prescribed by the statesman we have lately lost.

If the negotiation is broken off, our enemy will renew his threats of invasion with double arrogance. He will publish his pretended injuries to his people, and deem himself so firmly seated on his throne as to be exempt, in the event of failure, from the dread either of domestic insurrection or of foreign attack. Let invasion come with all its terrors. We will not dissemble its dangers; we will boldly face them. The conflict will be fierce, but its issue will not be doubtful. The strength of the nation will be roused, and if we are true to ourselves, we shall turn the boasts of Bonaparte into speedy discomfiture. Baffled in his only means of hostility, he will learn at last to yield, and conclude peace on those terms which are indispensable not only to

our tranquillity but to our safety; and without which a cessation of war would be the signal for another series of insults and aggressions.

THE END.

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